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UTILITARIANISM WITH AND WITHOUT EXPECTED UTILITY
DAVID MCCARTHY, KALLE MIKKOLA, AND TERUJI THOMAS
Abstract. We give two social aggregation theorems under conditions of risk, one for constant popula-
tion cases, the other an extension to variable populations. Intra and interpersonal welfare comparisons
are encoded in a single ‘individual preorder’. The individual preorder then uniquely determines a social
preorder. The social preorders described by these theorems have features that may be considered char-
acteristic of Harsanyi-style utilitarianism, such as indifference to ex ante and ex post equality. However,
the theorems are also consistent with the rejection of all of the expected utility axioms, completeness,
continuity, and independence, at both the individual and social levels. In that sense, expected utility
is inessential to Harsanyi-style utilitarianism. In fact, the variable population theorem imposes only
a mild constraint on the individual preorder, while the constant population theorem imposes no con-
straint at all. We then derive further results under the assumption of our basic axioms. First, the
individual preorder satisfies the main expected utility axiom of strong independence if and only if the
social preorder has a vector-valued expected total utility representation, covering Harsanyi’s utilitarian
theorem as a special case. Second, stronger utilitarian-friendly assumptions, like Pareto or strong sep-
arability, are essentially equivalent to strong independence. Third, if the individual preorder satisfies
a ‘local expected utility’ condition popular in non-expected utility theory, then the social preorder has
a ‘local expected total utility’ representation. Although our aggregation theorems are stated under
conditions of risk, they are valid in more general frameworks for representing uncertainty or ambiguity.
Keywords. Harsanyi, utilitarianism, expected and non-expected utility, incompleteness, uncertainty,
variable populations.
JEL Classification. D60, D63, D81.
1. Introduction
The subject of this paper is how to evaluate different assignments of welfare to members of society
in the presence of risk. We thus consider distributions of welfare among individuals, and lotteries,
probability measures over distributions. Each lottery determines for each relevant individual a prospect,
a probability measure over welfare states. We assume that the value of prospects is represented by a
preorder of prospects that we call the individual preorder, encoding intra and interpersonal comparisons,
and we assume that the value of lotteries is represented by a preorder of lotteries that we call the social
preorder.1
How should the individual and social preorders be related? In what we will refer to as his ‘utilitarian
theorem’, Harsanyi (1955) proved (in a slightly different framework) that if the individual preorder
satisfies expected utility theory, then it determines a unique social preorder satisfying expected utility
theory, the strong Pareto principle, and a suitable condition of impartiality. This social preorder ranks
lotteries by their expected total utility.
Our main result is naturally seen as a generalization of Harsanyi’s utilitarian theorem. It says that
any individual preorder determines a unique social preorder satisfying three axioms related to Pareto
and impartiality. These axioms are much weaker than Harsanyi’s, and in particular we do not require
either the individual or the social preorder to satisfy expected utility theory. Our first version of this
result, Theorem 2.2, considers the constant population case, meaning that the same people exist in every
social outcome; Theorem 3.6 extends the result to variable populations. In the variable case, our axioms
do entail a mild constraint on the individual preorder related to the possibility of nonexistence that we
1A preorder is a reflexive, transitive binary relation. We say more about the interpretation of welfare and the individual
and social preorders in section 2.
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call Omega Independence (section 3.2). But it remains true that neither the individual nor the social
preorder has to satisfy any axiom of expected utility.2
As we will explain, there are good reasons to think of the social preorders described by our theorems as
being, like Harsanyi’s, utilitarian in flavour; we will ultimately dub them quasi utilitarian.3 Moreover, our
weakening of Harsanyi’s premises should surely be welcomed by utilitarians, as it provides our framework
with considerable flexibility in the kinds of welfare comparisons it can accommodate. Recall that the
three main expected utility axioms are completeness, continuity, and independence. In not requiring
completeness, we allow for all kinds of incomparabilities between welfare states (and between welfare
states and non-existence); in not requiring continuity, we allow some welfare states to be infinitely more
valuable than others; in dropping independence, we allow for all sorts of views about welfare comparisons
under risk.4 Indeed, while independence has come to be seen as integral to Harsanyi-style utilitarianism,
it is not so clear why it should be seen as a basic utilitarian commitment.5
Even so, one may wish to impose further constraints on the individual and social preorders. It turns
out that many natural conditions bring quasi utilitarian theories closer to Harsanyi’s utilitarianism. We
explore this point systematically in sections 4 and 5.
We begin with expected utility in section 4. If the individual preorder satisfies any one of the main
axioms of expected utility theory, then so does the corresponding social preorder (Proposition 4.2).
Indeed, if the individual preorder has an expected utility representation, then the social preorder is
represented by total expected utility, or equivalently, expected total utility (Theorem 4.4). This is
the conclusion of Harsanyi’s utilitarian theorem, but extended to variable populations, and resting on
much weaker premises (see section 6.4). For example, strong Pareto and expected utility axioms for
the social preorder are derived rather than assumed. As we explain, this basic result holds even if we
allow the utility function to be vector-valued, which allows one to deny completeness and continuity
while maintaining independence.6 Indeed, independence—specifically, strong independence—is enough
by itself to guarantee a vector-valued expected utility representation (Lemma 4.3), and therefore strong
independence for the individual preorder is sufficient, under our aggregation theorems, for the social
preorder to be represented by expected total utility.
Still, as we mentioned above, it is curious that any independence axiom should be seen as a funda-
mental premise of utilitarianism. The results of section 4.3 are striking in this light. Proposition 4.8
2For notational convenience, we take the expected utility axioms to apply to preorders, so that reflexivity and transitivity
do not count as expected utility axioms.
3In speaking of ‘utilitarianism’, we do not need to take sides in the familiar debate about how Harsanyi’s view relates to
classical utilitarianism (see also note 5). What is clear is that his view has many formal properties that are by now closely
associated with utilitarianism: besides the additive form, we especially have in mind Pareto, separability, and indifference
to equality. Thus when discussing the utilitarian features of our social preorders, we only have in mind the extent to which
they share such properties.
4In normative settings, the status of the expected utility axioms has been heavily debated. For entries into a vast
critical literature, see e.g. Pivato (2013) and Dubra, Maccheroni, and Ok (2004) (completeness as deniable); Richter
(1971) and Fishburn (1988) (continuity as a technical assumption); Luce and Raiffa (1957) and Kreps (1988) (continuity
as deniable); and Allais (1979) and Buchak (2013) (independence as deniable). In addition, there are well-documented
empirical violations of completeness and independence, and continuity has often been regarded as difficult to test for,
raising a doubt about including it with other axioms in positive theories. See, for example, Starmer (2000), Schmidt
(2004) and Wakker (2010). Here we mainly avoid positive topics, but see the beginning of section 5 for a brief discussion.
5While we stay neutral about the objection to a utilitarian interpretation of Harsanyi’s results raised by Sen (1976, 1977)
and Weymark (1991), their worry can nevertheless be seen as providing a further motivation for our project. Sen (1986: p.
1123) claims that classical utilitarianism starts with an “independent concept of individual utilities of which social welfare
is shown to be the sum”. In our terminology, the objection pressed by Sen and Weymark is essentially that given that
the individual preorder satisfies expected utility theory, no reason has been offered for thinking that the cardinalization
of welfare provided by expected utility theory coincides with the cardinalization assumed by classical utilitarianism (see
Greaves (2017) for discussion). But there is a perhaps more basic issue. If Sen and Weymark are right, then it does not
seem that classical utilitarians are conceptually committed to expected utility theory in the first place. Thus even if one
regards expected utility theory, and independence in particular, as normatively plausible, it is far from obvious that they
should be seen as fundamental axioms of utilitarianism itself.
6When we speak informally of expected utility representations, we typically allow them to be real or vector-valued.
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shows that, for quasi utilitarian preorders, independence conditions on the individual preorder are es-
sentially equivalent to corresponding Pareto conditions on the social preorder, and also to corresponding
separability conditions. The conditions that correspond to strong independence are what we call Full
Pareto, an apparently novel but natural extension of strong Pareto to cases involving incompleteness,
and a version of strong separability. This means that, with one qualification, we can derive the utilitar-
ian results just mentioned using one of those conditions instead of strong independence; the conceptual
advantage is that strong separability and especially Full Pareto seem more central to traditional utili-
tarian concerns than strong independence. This leads to a particularly economical Harsanyi-like result
in Theorem 4.10: Full Pareto plus just one of our aggregation axioms, Two-Stage Anonymity, implies an
expected total utility representation of the social preorder. The qualification is that it is only a ‘rational
coefficients’ version of strong independence that is exactly equivalent, given our axioms for aggregation,
to Full Pareto. This means that the expected total utility representation just mentioned may be slightly
less well behaved than the one that arises from strong independence.
Our results on non-expected utility theory in section 5 paint a similar picture: we do not need to
add much to our basic aggregation axioms to get close to Harsanyi-style utilitarianism. For example,
monotonicity, or respect for stochastic dominance, is widely assumed in non-expected utility theory.
But Theorems 5.2 and 5.3 show that, given some common background assumptions, monotonicity for
the social preorder entails that the social preorder is once more represented by expected total utility.
Even if we deny monotonicity, Theorems 5.5 and 5.7 show that when the individual preorder has a ‘local
expected utility’ representation in the style of Machina (1982), the social preorder has a ‘local expected
total utility’ representation.
Given these results, it is natural to ask just how close quasi utilitarian social preorders are to Harsanyi-
style utilitarian preorders, and how close our axioms for aggregation are to Harsanyi’s own. We explore
this question in section 6 and draw connections to the literature. While our axioms are much weaker
than Harsanyi’s, they retain the indifference to ex ante and ex post equality that is integral to Harsanyi’s
approach (section 6.1). More generally, Harsanyi’s axioms are often said to combine ex ante and ex post
requirements, and our axioms do this as well, albeit in a weakened sense (section 6.2). On the other hand,
our axioms for aggregation permit violations of independence that are far more severe than any that are
taken seriously by non-expected utility theory, and some of our social preorders appear decidedly nonu-
tilitarian. As already noted, our social preorders may also violate Pareto and separability principles, and
failures of separability are sometimes associated with egalitarianism. In relation to this, Proposition 6.1
shows that any social preorder on distributions (rather than lotteries), even if apparently egalitarian, is
compatible with quasi utilitarianism in the constant population case. For instance, Example 2.9 shows
that imposing rank-dependent utility theory on the individual preorder leads to separability-violating
rank-dependent social preorders that have been seen as canonically egalitarian. Overall, the sense in
which all quasi utilitarian social preorders should be seen as utilitarian is somewhat equivocal. We rec-
ommend reserving ‘utilitarian’ for quasi utilitarian preorders that satisfy strong independence, in large
part because they have Harsanyi-like expected total utility representations and are essentially the only
ones that satisfy Full Pareto or strong separability (section 6.3).
We briefly revisit Harsanyi’s utilitarian theorem in section 6.4, but Harsanyi had another famous
contribution to the theory of social aggregation: the veil of ignorance construction of Harsanyi (1953),
leading to his impartial spectator theorem, another constant population result with the same utilitarian
conclusion. However, it is not clear how to justify the use of the veil, and when applied to variable
population problems, it is far from obvious even how to interpret it. Nevertheless, our aggregation
theorems can be seen as vindicating a specific version of the veil in both the constant and variable
population cases (section 6.5).
We briefly sketch an alternative strategy for generalizing Harsanyi (section 6.6), and end with a
discussion of related literature (section 6.7). For now we emphasize Pivato (2013) for a generalization
of Harsanyi that is closest to ours, and Mongin and Pivato (2015) for also deriving independence from
Pareto in a Harsanyi-like framework, though one somewhat different from ours.
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Let us make three final comments about our framework. First, our assumption that there is a single
individual preorder governing welfare comparisons under risk is accepted by Harsanyi.7 This assumption
may seem implausible, as individuals may well disagree about welfare comparisons, and indeed Harsanyi’s
arguments for it have been heavily criticized (Broome, 1993; Mongin, 2001a). Nevertheless, in section 2.1
we outline a number of other rationales for the assumption. Recall also that, in contrast to Harsanyi,
we do not assume that the individual preorder is complete. This allows for limitations on welfare
comparisons that Harsanyi often acknowledged in informal discussions.
Second, it is nonetheless true that Harsanyi’s most general result, which we will refer to as his ‘social
aggregation theorem’, Theorem V of Harsanyi (1955), does not rely on a single individual preorder, nor
does it explicitly require the kind of interpersonal comparisons implicit in its use.8 Given an expected
utility function for each individual, its conclusion is that the social preorder can be represented by a
weighted sum of these functions.9 Thus what we refer to as Harsanyi’s utilitarian theorem—representing
the social preorder by an unweighted sum of utility functions that have been normalized to reflect
interpersonal comparisons—is presented by Harsanyi as a corollary to his social aggregation theorem,
obtained by adding strong Pareto and an impartiality condition.10 By contrast, we simply assume
interpersonal comparisons from the outset.
Third, throughout this paper we work, for simplicity, in the setting of risk, where the uncertainty
involved in each option is represented by a single probability measure, which one might think of as
objective or universally agreed. But the principles underlying our aggregation theorems are much more
general than this, and in section 2.7 we briefly outline how they work for a variety of other representations
of uncertainty, such as convex sets of probability measures and Anscombe-Aumann acts. This enables
us to illustrate the relevance of our aggregation theorems to views according to which social evaluation
should be based in part on a social consensus about uncertainty. Even if disagreement between individuals
means that this social consensus cannot be represented by a single probability measure, our aggregation
theorems can still cope.
Most proofs are in the appendix.
2. A Constant Population Aggregation Theorem
In sections 2.1 to 2.4 we present the basic framework, axioms, and theorem. Section 2.5 introduces
some useful terminology, section 2.6 gives examples, and section 2.7 explains how our framework and
theorem could be adapted to other ways of representing uncertainty.
2.1. The individual and social preorders. We assume that each social outcome can be adequately
represented by specifying what we call a ‘welfare state’ for each individual. This welfare state contains
all the information that might be relevant to, broadly speaking, how well off the individual is in that
outcome. It could be a single numerical indicator (see e.g. d’Aspremont and Gevers, 2002: p. 464), but
more generally it could be a vector with many components corresponding to, say, levels of happiness,
pleasure, desire satisfaction, achievement, functioning, capabilities, resources, and so on.11 Thus our
7Perhaps most clearly in Harsanyi (1977b: Ch. 4), Harsanyi assumes that each individual i has an ‘extended preference
relation’ on lotteries over outcomes in which i takes on the personal characteristics of different individuals in different social
outcomes. He argues that rational individuals will have identical extended preference relations. Such universal rational
preferences provide one way of interpreting our individual preorder.
8Whether Harsanyi’s social aggregation theorem in some sense implicitly assumes interpersonal comparisons is a matter
of controversy; see e.g. Harsanyi (1979: p. 294), Harsanyi (1978: p. 227), Harsanyi (1977b: pp. 81–2); Broome (1991: p.
219); Mongin (1994: pp. 348–50); and Mongin and d’Aspremont (1998: p. 432).
9For elaboration, see e.g. Domotor (1979); Border (1981); Coulhon and Mongin (1989); Weymark (1993, 1995); and De
Meyer and Mongin (1995).
10Harsanyi sometimes seems to have normalized via interpersonal unit comparisons (see e.g. Harsanyi, 1977b: p. 69),
which does not require interpersonal level comparisons at all. But as is common, we interpret the normalization in his
theorem in terms of level comparisons.
11See Adler and Fleurbaey (2016) for many essays on these possibilities. The vectorial treatment of welfare has been
emphasized by Sen; see e.g. Sen (1981, 1985).
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approach is welfarist in the sense that we are only concerned with the distribution of welfare under risk,
rather than non-welfare factors.12
With this in mind, we adopt the following terminology, already sketched in the introduction. A
‘distribution’ is an assignment of welfare states to individuals. A ‘lottery’ is a probability measure over
distributions. And a ‘prospect’ is a probability measure over welfare states. Each lottery determines a
prospect for each individual. The ‘social preorder’ expresses a view about how good lotteries are from
an impartial perspective, while the ‘individual preorder’ expresses a view about how good prospects are
for individuals. The latter allows for both intrapersonal and interpersonal comparisons: a lottery is
better for one person than for another if and only if, according to the individual preorder, the prospect
it assigns to the first person is better than the prospect it assigns to the second person. The central
question for us is how the social preorder should depend upon the individual preorder.
A different framework from ours would start with one ‘individual preorder’ for each individual.13 After
all, various individuals might disagree about the values of prospects, by ranking welfare states differently
or by having different attitudes to risk, and one could use different individual preorders to reflect their
different judgments. One possible way to interpret our single individual preorder is to suppose that
in fact (or following Harsanyi, at some level of idealization; see note 7), all the individuals agree; the
individual preorder reflects their unanimous consensus. But our framework admits a wide variety of
interpretations which do not presuppose any such agreement.
Indeed, we said above that the individual and social preorders encode views about the value of
prospects and lotteries, but the source of these views may vary. For example, the two preorders may
be seen as representing objective evaluative facts. Alternatively, the two may reflect the preferences
or evaluative judgments of a single impartial person, the ‘social planner’. Finally, both the individual
and the social preorder could encode a (not necessarily unanimous) social consensus, perhaps formed
by pooling individual preferences. We claim that our axioms for aggregation are plausible under each of
these interpretations, and we allow for any interpretation that makes them plausible.
Three further points of flexibility are helpful here. First, as already mentioned, our ‘welfare states’
could be understood in many different ways. In particular, they can include information about preference
satisfaction, so the individual preorder can take such information into account, whether or not it directly
represents the preferences of any individual.
Second, we impose no formal requirements on the individual preorder beyond preordering, allowing for
the flexibility in welfare comparisons outlined in section 1. The social preorder is similarly unconstrained
(although we will provide some axioms characterizing it and relating it to the individual preorder).
Third, as noted in the introduction and explained in more detail in section 2.7, although we assume
for simplicity that the individual and social preorders apply to probability measures, versions of our
aggregation theorems are valid for many other ways of representing uncertainty.
In summary, we adopt a two-stage approach to social aggregation. At the first stage, welfare compar-
isons at the individual level are expressed by a single, but possibly highly incomplete, preorder that we
call the individual preorder. At the second stage, axioms are introduced to show how the social preorder
is determined by the individual preorder. Our focus is on the second stage, and it is not our purpose
to defend the two-stage approach as a whole. We note, however, that it fits with Harsanyi’s treatment
of extended preferences (see note 7); it is adopted in Pivato (2013, 2014)’s extensions of Harsanyi’s
utilitarian theorem; and it provides one well known response to impossibility theorems concerning so-
cial aggregation in the face of individual disagreement about uncertainty (see section 6.7.4). Aside from
Harsanyi-like frameworks specifically involving risk or other forms of uncertainty, the two-stage approach
also corresponds to the pioneering work of Sen (1970) in which the social planner first forms a view about
interpersonal and intrapersonal comparisons before addressing questions about the social preorder (for
discussion, see e.g. d’Aspremont and Gevers, 2002: sec. 1).
12Given that we allow for many views about what constitutes welfare, and about the comparability of different welfare
states, this makes our framework akin to ‘formal welfarism’ in social choice theory; see Mongin and d’Aspremont (1998);
d’Aspremont and Gevers (2002); Fleurbaey (2003).
13This is the framework of Harsanyi’s social aggregation theorem; we survey developments of it in section 6.7.
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2.2. Framework. Formally, our basic framework starts with a set W of welfare states, and a finite,
nonempty set I of individuals. We model social outcomes as what we call distributions, elements of WI ,
the product of copies of W indexed by I. We write Wi(d) for the ith component of distribution d, i.e.
the welfare state that individual i has in that outcome. We focus on any set D ⊂ WI of distributions
that satisfies certain conditions shortly to be announced. Besides welfare states and distributions per
se, we consider probability measures over them. Thus we assume that W and D are measurable spaces.
We call probability measures over W prospects, and those over D lotteries. Notationally, if P is (say) a
prospect and A is a measurable subset of W, then we write P (A) for the probability that P assigns to
A. Instead of just considering all prospects and all lotteries, we will, for generality, focus on arbitrary
non-empty convex sets P and L of prospects and lotteries respectively.
Here is what we will assume about the finite set I, the measurable spaces W and D ⊂ WI , and the
convex sets of probability measures P and L.
(A). First, we assume that for each individual i ∈ I the projectionWi : D →W is a measurable function.
This allows us to define a prospect Pi(L) for each lottery L. Explicitly, if A is a measurable subset of
W, then
Pi(L)(A) = L(Wi−1(A)).
We further assume that Pi(L) ⊂ P.
(B). Second, for each w ∈W, we assume that D contains the distribution D(w) in which every individual
i ∈ I has welfare w. Thus
Wi(D(w)) = w.
We further assume that the function D : W → D is measurable. This allows us to define a lottery
L(P ) for each prospect P . Explicitly, if B is a measurable subset of D, then
L(P )(B) = P (D−1(B)).
In L(P ), every individual i ∈ I faces prospect P (that is, Pi(L(P )) = P ), and it is certain that all
individuals will have the same welfare.14
We further assume that L(P) ⊂ L.
(C). Third, we assume that D is invariant under permutations of individuals. Formally, let Σ be the
group of permutations of I. For each σ ∈ Σ and d ∈ D, the assumption is that D contains the distribution
σd such that
Wi(σd) =Wσ−1i(d)
for all i ∈ I.
We further assume that the action of Σ on D is measurable. That is: if B ⊂ D is measurable, then
σ−1B is measurable, for any σ ∈ Σ. This allows us to define an action of Σ on lotteries L:
(σL)(B) := L(σ−1B)
for any σ ∈ Σ, lottery L and measurable B ⊂ D.
We further assume that L is invariant under Σ.
Example 2.1. The various measurability conditions are not very stringent: for example, they are auto-
matically met if D ⊂ (W)I has the product sigma algebra, i.e. the smallest one for which the functions
Wi are measurable. To check that D is measurable with respect to that sigma algebra, it suffices
to check that D−1(Wi−1(A)) is measurable whenever A is a measurable subset of W. But, in fact,
D−1(Wi−1(A)) = A. Similarly, if W is a topological space, and we give D ⊂ WI the product topology,
then the measurability conditions will be met with respect to the Borel sigma algebras (even though the
Borel sigma algebra on D is not necessarily the product one (Dudley, 2002: Prob. 4.1.11)).
14This second statement just means that any measurable subset of D containing the image of D has probability 1
according to L(P ). We do not assume that the image of D is itself measurable. It may not be, even when D has the
product sigma algebra, without modest further assumptions (Dravecky´, 1975).
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2.3. Axioms for Aggregation. Now we assume that P and L are each preordered. The preorder %P
on P is the individual preorder; the preorder % on L is the social preorder. As already mentioned, the
individual preorder encodes interpersonal and intrapersonal comparisons. Thus for any individuals i and
j, not necessarily distinct, Pi(L) %P Pj(L′) if and only if L is at least as good for i as L′ is for j. We
will use obvious notation, e.g. writing P ∼P P ′ to mean the conjunction of P %P P ′ and P ′ %P P . Since
%P is allowed to be incomplete, we will also write P upriseP P ′ to mean neither P %P P ′ nor P ′ %P P .
We will sometimes informally treat the individual and social preorders as ranking not only prospects
and lotteries but also welfare states and distributions respectively. Strictly speaking, this presupposes
that we can identify welfare states and distributions with the corresponding delta-measures, for example,
writing w %P w′ to mean 1w %P 1w′ . (Here, if y is an element of a measurable space Y , then the delta-
measure 1y is the unique probability measure on Y such that for any measurable set A, 1y(A) = 1
just in case A contains y.) This does not always make sense in our framework: different welfare states
or different distributions may determine the same delta-measure (unless the sigma algebras separate
points, an assumption we only take on in section 6.1); and anyway these delta-measures may not be in
the convex sets of probability measures under consideration. But we often ignore this detail in informal
discussion.
Our first principle of aggregation says that the social preorder only depends on which prospect each
individual faces.
Anteriority. If Pi(L) = Pi(L′) for every i ∈ I, then L ∼ L′.
Second, we need a principle which captures the idea that individual welfare contributes positively
towards social welfare.
Reduction to Prospects. For any P, P ′ ∈ P, L(P ) % L(P ′) if and only if P %P P ′.
It says that for lotteries that guarantee perfect equality, social welfare matches individual welfare.
Anteriority can be seen as a very weak form of Pareto indifference,15 which is obtained by replacing
‘Pi(L) = Pi(L′)’ with ‘Pi(L) ∼P Pi(L′)’. In fact, Anteriority and Reduction to Prospects are both
restrictions of a natural but apparently novel Pareto principle, which we call Full Pareto (see section 4.3),
that extends strong Pareto to cases involving incompleteness.16 We further discuss Anteriority and
Reduction to Prospects in section 6.2.1, where we argue that together they express a weak sense in
which the social preorder is ex ante (hence the term ‘Anteriority’).
Third, we need a principle of impartiality or permutation-invariance. The simplest such principle is
Anonymity. Given L ∈ L and σ ∈ Σ, we have L ∼ σL.
We will in fact use the following stronger condition.17
Two-Stage Anonymity. Given L,M ∈ L, σ ∈ Σ, and α ∈ [0, 1] ∩Q,
αL+ (1− α)M ∼ α(σL) + (1− α)M.
One motivation for Two-Stage Anonymity is that it follows from the combination of Anonymity and
the central axiom of expected utility theory, strong independence, or even the restriction of strong
independence to the indifference relation. However, our preferred motivation for Two-Stage Anonymity
avoids appealing to any independence axiom.
15The expected utility and Pareto axioms mentioned in this section are formally defined in sections 4.1 and 4.3.
16The idea of restricting Pareto principles to lotteries that guarantee equality is familiar; see e.g. Fleurbaey (2010),
McCarthy (2015), and Fleurbaey and Zuber (2017). But Reduction to Prospects appears to be novel even in the absence
of risk. For example, it implies w upriseP w′ ⇒ D(w)uprise D(w′). This inference is not licensed by any standard Pareto principle
we know of, restricted or otherwise.
17The use of only rational numbers α in stating Two-Stage Anonymity is simply a matter of precision: we do not require
more. In fact, the obvious generalization to real α will hold for all our social preorders, as a consequence of Theorem 2.2.
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Define an ‘anonymous distribution’ to be an element of the quotient D/Σ. One natural principle says
that L and L′ are equally good if they define the same probability measure over anonymous distribu-
tions.18 Here is a convenient reformulation:
Posterior Anonymity. Given L,L′ ∈ L, suppose that L(B) = L′(B) whenever B is a measur-
able, Σ-invariant subset of D. Then L ∼ L′.
In section 6.2.2 we will argue that this principle expresses a weak sense in which the social preorder
is ex post, hence the term ‘Posterior’. Posterior Anonymity is easily seen to logically entail Two-Stage
Anonymity, and that is our preferred motivation for accepting the latter as an axiom.19
Now strong independence is itself often said to be an ex post principle, so one might ask whether Two-
Stage Anonymity is genuinely weaker than the conjunction of strong independence and Anonymity. But
in section 6.2.3 we give a precise sense in which Two-Stage Anonymity is much weaker. To anticipate, the
following aggregation theorem, our main result, is compatible with rejecting any independence axiom for
the individual and social preorders. In fact it is compatible with any individual preorder, and therefore
with individual preorders that violate even the weakenings of independence axioms that are typical of
non-expected utility theory.
2.4. The Aggregation Theorem. Now we state the main constant population result. We assume
given domains I, W, D, P, and L satisfying the domain conditions (A)–(C) of section 2.2.
Theorem 2.2. Given an arbitrary preorder %P on P, there is a unique preorder % on L satisfying
Anteriority, Reduction to Prospects, and Two-Stage Anonymity. Namely,
(1) L % L′ ⇐⇒ pL %P pL′
where pL (similarly pL′) is the prospect
pL =
1
#I
∑
i∈I
Pi(L).
Proof. First let us show that if the social preorder satisfies the three conditions, then it is has the form
(1). Consider the lottery L1 :=
1
#Σ
∑
σ∈Σ σL. By repeated application of Two-Stage Anonymity, we
have
L =
1
#Σ
∑
σ∈Σ
L ∼ 1
#Σ
∑
σ∈Σ
σL = L1.
On the other hand, for any i ∈ I,
Pi(L1) =
1
#Σ
∑
σ∈Σ
Pi(σL) =
1
#Σ
∑
σ∈Σ
Pσ−1i(L) = pL.
By Anteriority, we must have L1 ∼ L(pL), and so L ∼ L(pL). Similarly, we will have L′ ∼ L(pL′).
Thus L % L′ if and only if L(pL) % L(pL′). By Reduction to Prospects, the latter holds if and only if
pL % pL′ .
Now we must check that, conversely, the social preorder defined by (1) necessarily satisfies the three
conditions. For Anteriority, suppose that Pi(L) = Pi(L′) for every i ∈ I. Then clearly pL = pL′ , so
L ∼ L′ by (1). As for Reduction to Prospects, (1) gives L(P ) % L(P ′) if and only if pL(P ) %P pL(P ′).
However, this biconditional is equivalent to Reduction to Prospects since pL(P ) = P and pL(P ′) = P ′.
Finally, suppose given L,M, σ, α as in the statement of Two-Stage Anonymity. To deduce from (1) that
18More precisely, we can use the quotient map D → D/Σ to push forward the sigma algebra on D to a sigma algebra
on D/Σ, and the lottery L ∈ L to a probability measure LΣ on D/Σ. Then the principle is that L ∼ L′ if LΣ = L′Σ, and
this is easily shown to be equivalent to Posterior Anonymity.
19Posterior Anonymity itself follows from Anonymity and the widely accepted principle of monotonicity, provided the
social preorder is upper-measurable, a common domain assumption needed for monotonicity to apply (see section 5.1).
Anonymity is the case of Two-Stage Anonymity where α = 1.
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αL+ (1− α)M ∼ α(σL) + (1 − α)M , it suffices to show that pαL+(1−α)M = pα(σL)+(1−α)M . It is easy
to see that pL = pσL, and then we can calculate
pαL+(1−α)M = αpL + (1− α)pM = αpσL + (1− α)pM = pα(σL)+(1−α)M . 
Definition 2.3. We say that a social preorder % is generated by the individual preorder %P whenever the
constant population domain conditions (A)–(C) hold and % satisfies (1). We call such social preorders
quasi utilitarian.
We defend the ‘quasi utilitarian’ terminology in section 6.3.
The following result shows that our favoured principle of Posterior Anonymity, which implies Two-
Stage Anonymity, could be used in place of the latter in Theorem 2.2.
Proposition 2.4. If a social preorder is generated by an individual preorder, then it satisfies Posterior
Anonymity.
2.5. Representations. We now introduce some standard terminology which will be useful in the sub-
sequent examples and results.
Definition 2.5. Given two preordered sets (X,%X) and (Y,%Y ), a function f : X → Y represents %X
(or is a representation of %X) when, for all x1, x2 ∈ X, x1 %X x2 ⇐⇒ f(x1) %Y f(x2).
The mere existence of a representation is trivial; let X = Y and f be the identity mapping. The
interesting case is where (Y,%Y ) is better behaved or easier to understand or more fundamental than
(X,%X). For example, Y may be R with the usual ordering. For another example, the conclusion of
Theorem 2.2 can be put by saying that the function L → P given by L 7→ pL represents %.
We will be much concerned with the case where (Y,%Y ) is a preordered vector space, or a slightly
more general space that we call a Q-preordered vector space. These are discussed in sections 4.2 and 4.3,
where we show that they are especially useful for making sense of vector-valued expected total utility
representations in the absence of continuity or completeness assumptions.
2.6. Examples. Now let us give some examples of individual preorders and the social preorders they
generate. For concreteness and simplicity, we will take W to be the real line R and take P to be the set
of all finitely supported probability measures on W.20
Example 2.6 (Expected Utility and Total Utility). Suppose that %P orders P by the expectations of a
utility function u : W → R. That is, %P is represented by the function U : P → R defined by U(P ) =∑
x∈W P ({x})u(x). (This sum, which has finitely many non-zero terms, can also be written as an
integral
∫
W udP .) The corresponding social preorder is represented by the function V : L → R given
by V =
∑
i∈I U ◦ Pi. We can identify V (L) as the total expected utility of L, or equivalently as the
expected total utility, since V (L) =
∑
i∈I
∑
x∈W Pi(L)({x})u(x) =
∑
d∈D L({d})
∑
i∈I u(Wi(d)). For a
more general statement and proof, see Theorem 4.4.
As we discuss in section 4.1, the conceptual content of the assumption that %P has an ordinary
(i.e. real-valued) expected utility representation is given by axioms of continuity, completeness, and
independence. The next examples illustrate, for one thing, what can happen if one denies each of these
axioms. In particular, the first two examples below illustrate the main lesson of section 4: as long as the
individual preorder satisfies strong independence, the social preorder still has an expected total utility
representation. The last example illustrates the denial of strong independence.
Example 2.7 (Leximin). In this example the individual preorder satisfies strong independence and com-
pleteness, but not the axiom of mixture continuity. Let %P order P so that P %P P ′ if and only if
either P = P ′ or the smallest x ∈ W at which P ({x}) 6= P ′({x}) is such that P ({x}) < P ′({x}).
20Conceptually, a probability measure p on a measurable space Y is finitely supported if it is supported on a finite set (in
the sense of note 32). Equivalently, though, it just means that p can be written as a convex combination of delta-measures.
The equivalence, which we prove in Lemma A.4, holds regardless of whether the sigma algebra separates the points of Y ,
e.g. by making singletons measurable. For reasons not to require a separating sigma algebra, see Halpern (2003: §2.3).
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When restricted to distributions, the corresponding social preorder is leximin: d  d′ if and only if the
worst off individual in d is better off than the worst off in d′; if they are tied, turn to the next worst
off. Although this seems quite different in flavor from Example 2.6, it becomes structurally very similar
once we allow the utility function u to have values in a preordered vector space V rather than the real
numbers. We develop this idea in section 4.2, but a quick explanation is that, since one can average as
well as add up vectors, it still makes sense to speak of the expected utility of a prospect, the total utility
of a distribution, and the expected total utility of a lottery.21 In this example, the vector space can be
taken to be the space V of finitely supported functions W → R. The ‘lexicographic’ ordering %V on V
is defined by the condition that f %V g if and only if f = g or the least x ∈W for which f(x) 6= g(x) is
such that f(x) > g(x). The utility function u : W → V is given by u(x) = −χ{x}, that is, minus of the
characteristic function of {x}. The social preorder is then represented by expected total utility just as
in Example 2.6.
Example 2.8 (Incompleteness). Here the individual preorder satisfies strong independence and mixture
continuity, but it is not in general complete. Let U be a set of real-valued functions on W. Let %P
preorder P so that P %P P ′ if and only if, for all u in U , the expected value of u is at least as great
under P as under P ′. The corresponding social preorder ranks L % L′ if and only if, for each u in U ,
the expected total value of u is at least as great under L as under L′. In section 4.2 we explain how
this type of ‘multi expected utility’ representation by many real-valued utility functions is equivalent to
an expected utility representation by a single, vector-valued utility function. With respect to this single
utility function, the social preorder again ranks lotteries by their expected total utility.
Example 2.9 (Risk-Avoidance and Rank-Dependence). Finally, here is an example in which the individ-
ual preorder violates strong independence, even though it is complete and satisfies mixture continuity.
This has interesting consequences for the social preorder: it illustrates a connection between strong
independence and strong separability that we develop in section 4.3.
Say that %P is a ‘rank-dependent’ individual preorder (RDI) if it has a ‘rank-dependent utility’
representation.22 In other words, besides a utility function u : W → R, there is an increasing function
r : [0, 1]→ [0, 1], with r(0) = 0 and r(1) = 1, which we will call the ‘risk function’; %P is represented by
U : P → R defined by the following sum (which has finitely many non-zero terms):
U(P ) :=
∑
x∈W
Pr(x)u(x), where Pr(x) := r(P [x,∞))− r(P (x,∞)).
If in addition r is convex, we will say that %P is ‘risk-avoidant’.23
Although U(1w) = u(w) holds in general, and ordinary expected utility theory is satisfied when
r(x) = x, U(P ) is not in general simply the expected utility of P . To see the deviation from ordinary
expected utility, assume for concreteness r(x) = x2 and u(x) = x. Consider the following distributions
containing four individuals with listed welfare states.
dA = (1, 1, 1, 1), dB = (5, 0, 1, 1)
dC = (1, 1, 0, 0), dD = (5, 0, 0, 0).
Each of these distributions dX determines a prospect PX := p1dX that gives equal chances to each
individual’s welfare state; for example, PB gives probability 1/4 to welfare states 5 and 0, and probability
1/2 to welfare state 1. Computing the value of U for each prospect yields PA P PB and PD P PC .
This has the structure of the Allais paradox, violating strong independence. For the corresponding social
preorder, our aggregation theorem then implies that dA  dB and dD  dC , violating strong separability.
21For the purpose of these examples, we can understand expectations as weighted sums, as in Example 2.6. In section
4.2 we explain how to understand vector-valued expectations as integrals.
22Rank-dependent utility representations were introduced in Quiggan (1982). For further discussion of this popular
non-expected utility theory, see e.g. Quiggan (1993), Wakker (1994), Schmidt (2004: §4.2), and Buchak (2013: Ch. 2).
The function r is often required to be continuous and strictly increasing, but the weaker definition will be useful.
23This term is from Buchak (2013: p. 66); Yaari (1987) and Chateauneuf and Cohen (1994) use ‘pessimistic’.
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Such violations of strong separability have been seen as expressions of egalitarianism. Thus it might
be said that while the perfect equality in dA outweighs the greater total welfare in dB , there is there is
not much difference in inequality between dC and dD, so the greater total in dD is decisive (Sen 1973:
p. 41, Broome 1989).
Returning to the general case, assume a population of size n. Say that a preorder % on distributions
is a rank-dependent social preorder (RDS) if, for some a1, . . . , an ≥ 0 with
∑
k ak = 1, % ranks a
distribution d with welfare states w1 ≤ w2 ≤ · · · ≤ wn according to the aggregate score
V (d) := a1u(w1) + a2u(w2) + · · ·+ anu(wn).
If in addition a1 ≥ a2 ≥ · · · ≥ an, we will say that % is ‘downwards increasing’.
Downward increasing RDSs are called ‘generalized Gini’ by Blackorby and Donaldson (1980) and
Weymark (1981), who take them to be natural examples of egalitarian preorders. We will say more about
the relationship between apparently egalitarian preorders and our aggregation theorems in section 6.1.
But for now, by setting ak = r(
n−k+1
n )− r(n−kn ), we see that % is a [downwards increasing] RDS if and
only if it is generated by a [risk-avoidant] RDI. Thus what has been taken to be a canonical form of
egalitarianism at the social level emerges from what has been characterized as ‘pessimism about risk’ at
the individual level. For example, by setting r(x) = 1 if x = 1, r(x) = 0 otherwise, we obtain the social
preorder on distributions given by the Rawlsian maximin rule.
Curiously, though, the empirically best supported RDIs have S-shaped risk functions.24 Provided the
population is large enough, such RDIs lead to RDSs which are apparently inegalitarian at the high end,
favoring unit transfers from the relatively well-off (but perhaps absolutely badly off) to the relatively
better off. Given the lack of enthusiasm for inegalitarian ideas, this might call into question the sometimes
mooted idea that people’s attitudes to inequality reflect their attitudes to risk.
The examples illustrate how distributive views which are traditionally seen as very different can be
obtained while maintaining our axioms for aggregation simply by varying the form of welfare compar-
isons.25 General results corresponding to such possibilities will be given in section 4.
2.7. Uncertainty. As laid out in section 2.2, we model uncertainty using probability measures on sets of
outcomes (whether welfare states or distributions). But analogues of our aggregation theorems hold for
many other ways of modelling uncertainty. All we need is that we can take well-behaved mixtures (even
just with rational coefficients) of the appropriate analogues of lotteries and prospects. Thus there is no
difficulty in dealing with infinitesimal probabilities, non-additive ‘capacities’, or many other variations of
standard probability theory. Even in Savage’s decision theory, in which there is no explicit representation
of uncertainty, it is sometimes possible to endow the set of acts with convex structure, as in Ghirardato,
Maccheroni, Marinacci and Siniscalchi (2003).
More formally, suppose we have a finite set I with permutation group Σ; convex sets P and L (or,
more generally, associative mixture sets26); a mixture-preserving27 map L : P → L with, for each i ∈ I, a
mixture-preserving left-inverse Pi : L → P; and finally a mixture-preserving action of Σ on L such that
Pi(σL) = Pσ−1i(L) for every i ∈ I, L ∈ L, σ ∈ Σ. Then Theorem 2.2 makes sense as stated, and is still
valid, with the same proof.28
Here are two more detailed illustrations. In both, we assume given the population I with permutation
group Σ, as well as sets P and L of probability measures satisfying the domain conditions in section 2.2;
24See Schmidt (2004: §4.2.2) for references.
25This reflects a theme in social choice theory, where, for example, classical utilitarianism and leximin can be derived
from common axioms except for different assumptions about the measurability of welfare; see d’Aspremont and Gevers
(1977).
26For a definition of ‘mixture set’, see axioms (A1)–(A3) of Mongin (2001b), following Herstein and Milnor (1953); we
call ‘associative’ a mixture set that also satisfies Mongin’s axiom (A4). Example 2.10 below requires this level of generality.
27A map f : X1 → X2 between convex sets, or more generally between mixture sets, is mixture-preserving (by some
authors called ‘affine’ or ‘convex-linear’) if f(αx+ (1− α)y) = αf(x) + (1− α)f(y) for all x, y ∈ X1, α ∈ [0, 1]. Below, the
action of Σ on L is assumed mixture-preserving in the sense that L 7→ σL is mixture-preserving for each σ ∈ Σ.
28An analogous remark applies to the variable population analogue Theorem 3.6, but we omit the details.
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we use these to construct more complicated domains that do not themselves consist of probability
measures.
Example 2.10 (Convex sets of measures). In some choice frameworks one uses a convex set of probability
measures, instead of a single one, to model uncertainty, as in, for example, the maxmin expected utility
decision theory of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and the Knightian decision theory of Bewley (2002).
In any case, let con(P) and con(L) be the sets of nonempty convex subsets of P and L. We can apply
our aggregation theorem to relate an individual preorder %con(P) on con(P) to a social preorder %con
on con(L). To do this we first have to define suitable mixing operations on con(P) and con(L): for
any α ∈ [0, 1] and P,Q ∈ con(P), set αP + (1 − α)Q = {αP + (1 − α)Q : P ∈ P, Q ∈ Q}, and
similarly for con(L). Second, we need suitable maps Lcon : con(P) → con(L), Picon : con(L) → con(P),
and an action of Σ on con(L). Define Lcon(P) = {L(P ) : P ∈ P}, Picon(L) = {Pi(L) : L ∈ L}, and
σL = {σL : L ∈ L}.
Example 2.11 (Anscombe-Aumann). In the Anscombe and Aumann (1963) framework, perhaps the most
popular decision-theoretic treatment of uncertainty, the objects of choice are probability-measure-valued
functions on a set S of states of nature. In our setting, consider the function spaces PS and LS . Our
aggregation theorem can be used to relate an individual preorder %PS on PS to a social preorder %S
on LS . First we can define mixtures in PS , and similarly LS : for any P,Q ∈ PS and α ∈ [0, 1],
(αP + (1−α)Q)(s) = α(P(s)) + (1−α)(Q(s)). Then we need suitable maps LS : PS → LS , PiS : LS →
PS , and an action of Σ on LS . For this we can define LS(P)(s) = L(P(s)), PSi (L)(s) = Pi(L(s)), and
(σL)(s) = σ(L(s)).
The formalism explained in these examples can be interpreted in different ways, along the lines laid
out in section 2.1. But they especially illustrate the relevance of our aggregation theorems to the
much discussed problem of social aggregation in the face of individual disagreement about uncertainty.29
Assume, for example, a social choice perspective in which it is seen as desirable for social evaluation to
reflect the social consensus about uncertainty. One model might assume that each individual is equipped
with a subjective probability measure (or a convex set of measures), and regard the social consensus
about uncertainty as represented by their convex hull (Brunnermeier, Simsek and Xiong, 2014; Alon
and Gayer, 2016). Another could take each individual to be equipped with a preorder of Anscombe-
Aumann acts, and see the social consensus about welfare comparisons under uncertainty as given by
their intersection, or some extension thereof. As the examples illustrate, variations on our aggregation
theorems still apply, even when, as in these cases, the social consensus about uncertainty can fall a
long way short of being representable by a single, point-valued, probability measure.30 These and other
possibilities are discussed further in McCarthy, Mikkola, and Thomas (2017c), but to focus on other
problems, here we stick with our simpler framework in which uncertainty is always represented by a
single probability measure.
3. A Variable Population Aggregation Theorem
In this section we present a version of the aggregation theorem in which the population is allowed to
vary from one distribution to another. In sections 3.1 to 3.3 we present the basic framework, axioms,
and theorem. In section 3.4 we show that any constant population individual preorder can be extended,
in many different ways, to a variable population one that generates a social preorder. In sections 3.5
and 3.6 we consider some examples.
3.1. Framework. At a basic level, the generalization to variable populations is straightforward: we
simply introduce a new element Ω representing nonexistence, and use an expanded set Wv := W ∪
{Ω} of welfare states. (In general, we will mark variable population objects with a superscript v, to
distinguish them from their constant population analogues.) This allows each distribution to represent
29Section 6.7.4 gives references to discussions of this problem in the framework of Harsanyi’s social aggregation theorem.
30Of course, the literature on pooling uncertain opinion is vast, and we are not arguing for any particular approach.
See Dietrich and List (2016) for an entry to the literature.
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some individuals as nonexistent and, otherwise, Theorem 2.2 remains unchanged. To be sure, there are
some questions of interpretation. For example, we will speak of Ω as a welfare state, but one need not
take this literally. We will say more about comparisons involving Ω in section 3.4.
The shortcoming of the approach just mentioned is there is only a finite set I of possible individuals.
The interesting generalization is to allow the population size to be unbounded. We will, however, insist
that any given lottery involves only finitely many individuals. We spell this out as assumption (D)
below.31 In comparing two lotteries, then, only a finite population will be relevant, and we can apply
the ideas of section 2. Only a little more work is required to ensure that these pairwise comparisons
combine into a well-defined social preorder. That is what we now explain.
Thus let I∞ be an infinite set of possible individuals. Assume that Wv and Dv ⊂ (Wv)I∞ are
measurable spaces, with Ω ∈Wv, and that Pv and Lv are non-empty convex sets of probability measures
on Wv and Dv respectively. We make the following domain assumptions, parallel to those of section 2.2.
(A). First, we assume that, for each i ∈ I∞, the projection Wvi : Dv → Wv is measurable. This again
allows us to define a function Pvi from lotteries to prospects, so that Pvi (L)(A) = L((Wvi )−1(A)) for
measurable A ⊂Wv.
We further assume that Pvi (Lv) ⊂ Pv.
(B). Second, for each w ∈ Wv and each finite population I ⊂ I∞, we assume that our set Dv of
distributions contains the distribution DvI (w) such that
Wvi (DvI (w)) =
{
w if i ∈ I
Ω if not.
We further assume that DvI : Wv → Dv is measurable. We can then define a corresponding function
LvI from prospects to lotteries. Thus if B is a measurable subset of Dv, LvI (P )(B) = P ((DvI )−1(B)).
We further assume that LvI (Pv) ⊂ Lv.
(C). Third, we assume that Dv is invariant under permutations of I∞. We write Σ∞ for the group of
all such permutations.
We further assume that the action of Σ∞ on Dv is measurable. This allows us to define the action of
Σ∞ on lotteries.
We further assume that Lv is Σ∞-invariant.
Finally, we assume that each distribution in Dv and each lottery in Lv involves only finitely many
individuals. Let us explain what this means. For a distribution d, the assumption is that Wvi (d) = Ω
for all but finitely many i ∈ I∞. One might guess that for a lottery L to ‘involve only finitely many
individuals’, it would suffice that Pi(L) = 1Ω for all but finitely many i ∈ I∞. But this is not conceptually
the right criterion, as the following example shows.
Example 3.1. Suppose that I∞ = [0, 1], and let di be the distribution in which only individual i exists,
with welfare state w. Let L be the uniform probability measure over these di. Then each person i
is certain not to exist—each has prospect 1Ω—yet there is a clear sense in which L involves infinitely
many individuals, rather than no individuals. Namely, for any finite population I ⊂ I∞, it is certain
that someone not in I exists. One reason that this is problematic is that it would be natural to reject
Anteriority in this example. Anteriority would say that L is just as good as no one existing at all, but
intuitively it is rather as good as having one person who is certain to exist in welfare state w.
31Aggregating the welfare of infinitely many individuals raises quite formidable problems which we thus set aside. For
example, full Anonymity is inconsistent with strong Pareto. See Bostrom (2011) for an overview of such problems; Pivato
(2014) for a careful study of separable aggregation in the infinite setting with applications to the present setting of risk;
Zhou (1997) for an infinite population version of Harsanyi’s social aggregation theorem; and McCarthy, Mikkola, and
Thomas (2017b) for an infinite population version of that theorem that dispenses with continuity and completeness.
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(D). To state a better criterion, given finite I ⊂ I∞, let DvI be the subset of Dv consisting of distributions
d such thatWvi (d) = Ω for all i /∈ I. We always consider DvI as a measurable space, with its sigma-algebra
restricted from the one on Dv. In other words, its measurable sets are those of the form B ∩DvI , with B
measurable in Dv. The assumption we make is
Each distribution d ∈ Dv is a member of some DvI , and each lottery L ∈ Lv is supported on some
DvI ,32 with I ⊂ I∞ finite in both cases.
We write LvI for the subset of Lv consisting of lotteries which are supported on DvI . In this notation,
I ⊂ I∞ is always assumed to be finite.
Note that, if I is contained in some larger population I′, then DvI ⊂ DvI′ , and any lottery supported
on DvI is also a lottery supported on DvI′ . Because of this, any two lotteries in Lv are members of some
common LvI , with I ⊂ I∞ finite.
Example 3.2. The various measurability assumptions are again guaranteed if Dv ⊂ (Wv)I∞ has the
product sigma algebra, or if Wv is a topological space, Dv has the product topology, and we use Borel
sigma algebras (cf. Example 2.1). However, it would be natural to consider a finer-grained sigma algebra
by including the sets DvI . Then LvI would be the subset of Lv containing lotteries L such that L(DvI ) = 1.
But we do not need this assumption.
The implications of the domain assumptions are illustrated by the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3. Assume the variable population domain conditions (A)–(D).
(i) Given L ∈ LvI , we have Pvi (L) = 1Ω for any i ∈ I∞ \ I. In particular, 1Ω ∈ Pv.
(ii) Dv contains the ‘empty distribution’ dΩ such that Wvi (dΩ) = Ω for all i ∈ I∞.
(iii) Lv contains the ‘empty lottery’ 1dΩ , and Pvi (1dΩ) = 1Ω for all i ∈ I∞.
(iv) Suppose {Ω} is measurable in Wv. If Pvi (L) = 1Ω for all i ∈ I∞, then L = 1dΩ .
3.2. Axioms for Aggregation. We let %Pv be the individual preorder on Pv and %v be the social
preorder on Lv. The key axioms for aggregation are much as before, replacing constant population
objects by variable population ones. The only notable point is that Reduction to Prospects must be
formulated relative to every finite, non-empty subset of I∞.
Anteriority (Variable Population). If Pvi (L) = Pvi (L′) for every i ∈ I∞, then L ∼v L′.
Reduction to Prospects (Variable Population). For any P, P ′ ∈ Pv and any finite, nonempty
I ⊂ I∞, LvI (P ) %v LvI (P ′) if and only if P %Pv P ′.
Two-Stage Anonymity (Variable Population). Given L,M ∈ Lv, σ ∈ Σ∞, and α ∈ [0, 1]∩Q,
αL+ (1− α)M ∼v α(σL) + (1− α)M.
In line with Theorem 2.2, Anteriority, Reduction to Prospects, and Two-Stage Anonymity will turn
out to be satisfied by at most one social preorder. However, for such a social preorder to exist, we will
need a condition on the individual preorder.33
Omega Independence. For any P, P ′ ∈ Pv and rational number α ∈ (0, 1),
P %Pv P ′ ⇐⇒ αP + (1− α)1Ω %Pv αP ′ + (1− α)1Ω.
We will present a defence of this condition, and discuss its relation to other independence axioms, in
section 3.4.
Let us comment on the justification for our three main axioms in the variable population context.
Anteriority seems just as compelling as in the constant population case. And as in section 2.3, our
32We say that a probability measure p on a measurable space Y is supported on A ⊂ Y (not necessarily measurable) if
p(B) = 0 whenever B ⊂ Y is measurable and disjoint from A. More conceptually, the condition is that p is the pushforward
to Y of a probability measure on A by the inclusion of A in Y , assuming that A is given the sigma-algebra restricted from
Y . This pushforward is a bijection between probability measures on A and probability measures on Y supported on A,
and it is convenient to identify these things informally.
33Again, we can apply Theorem 2.2 to determine a unique social preorder on each LvI separately. The issue is whether
these are compatible, in the sense of defining a social preorder on Lv as a whole.
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favored motivation for Two-Stage Anonymity is that it is entailed by Posterior Anonymity, now taking
the following form.
Posterior Anonymity (Variable Population). Given L,L′ ∈ Lv, suppose that L(B) = L′(B)
whenever B is a measurable, Σ∞-invariant subset of Dv. Then L ∼v L′.
But Reduction to Prospects requires further comment. As in the constant population case, it is natural to
think of the individual preorder as encoding some view about welfare comparisons under risk, according
to which:
(E) Pvi (L) %Pv Pvj (L′) if and only if L is at least as good for i as L′ is for j.
But, granted (E), some common views about welfare comparisons specific to the variable population
setting violate Reduction to Prospects. Two examples will illustrate.
Example 3.4 (Bad, but not bad for the individual). It has been argued that existing at a given welfare
state cannot be better or worse for an individual than not existing at all.34 But suppose that w is a
very low welfare state, corresponding to a life of terrible suffering. A natural view is that a distribution
containing a single person at w is worse than the empty distribution, even though it is not worse for the
person.
Example 3.5 (Good for the individual, but not good). It has been argued that there are lives which are
worth living which are nevertheless not worth creating.35 For example, it might be thought that for
some low but tolerable welfare state w, having w is better for someone than nonexistence even though
a distribution containing a single person at w is worse than the empty distribution.
An option for defending Reduction to Prospects is to reject these controversial views. However, even if
one accepts them, one can still maintain Reduction to Prospects if one interprets the individual preorder
in a different way. For example, one might accept
(F) P %Pv Q if and only if a one-person lottery in which the single person faces prospect P is at
least as good as a one-person lottery in which the single person faces prospect Q.
To be clear, (F) is entailed by Reduction to Prospects: it says that, for any population I of size one,
P %Pv P ′ if and only if LvI (P ) %v LvI (P ′). The point here is that (F) itself could be taken as the basic
interpretation of %Pv , leaving it open whether (E) also holds. For example, even if (F) provides the basic
interpretation of %Pv , one might accept (E) when restricted to constant population comparisons but
reject the unrestricted version (Broome, 2004). Alternatively, one might accept the unrestricted version
of (E) and (F) on conceptual grounds, and regard the views in the examples as conceptually mistaken
(Hammond, 1991). Neither of these positions is mandated by our approach, but on both, Anteriority
and Two-Stage Anonymity, as well as Reduction to Prospects, retain their plausibility.
3.3. The Aggregation Theorem. Now we state the main variable population result. We assume given
domains I∞, Wv, Dv, Pv, and Lv satisfying the domain conditions (A)–(D) of section 3.1.
Theorem 3.6. Given an arbitrary preorder %Pv on Pv, there is at most one preorder %v on Lv satisfying
Anteriority, Reduction to Prospects, and Two-Stage Anonymity. When it exists, it is given by
(2) L %v L′ ⇐⇒ pIL %Pv pIL′
for any finite non-empty I ⊂ I∞ such that L and L′ are lotteries in LvI , and where pIL (similarly pIL′) is
the prospect
pIL =
1
#I
∑
i∈I
Pvi (L).
It exists if and only if the individual preorder satisfies Omega Independence.
34See Broome (1999: p.168) for one classic statement of this view.
35See e.g. Blackorby and Donaldson 1984: p. 21, and section 3.6 below).
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Proof. Once we have fixed I, the proof goes the same way as that of Theorem 2.2; for example, we define
L1 and L
′
1 by summing over the group ΣI ⊂ Σ∞ of permutations of I.
The only worry is that the comparison between L and L′ defined by (2) might depend on I, and that
is where Omega Independence comes in. In detail, if I ⊂ I′ and #I = m and #I′ = n, then
pI
′
L =
m
n
pIL +
n−m
n
1Ω.
Thus Omega Independence ensures the required independence of I:
pI
′
L % pI
′
L′ ⇐⇒ pIL % pIL′ .
To see that Omega Independence is a necessary condition, note that we can choose I and I′ so that m/n
equals any rational number α ∈ (0, 1). 
The following parallels Definition 2.3.
Definition 3.7. We say that a variable population social preorder %v is generated by the individual
preorder %Pv whenever the variable population domain conditions (A)–(D) hold and %v satisfies (2).
We call such social preorders quasi utilitarian.
The social preorders described by Theorem 2.2 turned out to automatically satisfy Posterior Ano-
nymity. We can prove a similar result here, but we need a technical assumption. It would suffice to
assume that I∞ is countable—a modest limitation, given Anonymity and the fact that each lottery
involves only finitely many individuals. However, we instead focus on a condition to the effect that
there are plenty of measurable sets. Say that the sigma algebra on Dv is coherent if the following holds:
B ⊂ Dv is measurable in Dv if and only if, for every finite I ⊂ I∞, B ∩ DvI is measurable in DvI . (The
left-to-right implication is automatic, since we defined the sigma-algebra on DvI to be the restriction of
the one on Dv.) Note that coherence is a harmless assumption, in the sense that one can always expand
the sigma algebra on Dv to make it coherent without invalidating any of the domain conditions (see
Lemma A.5 in the appendix for details).
Proposition 3.8. Suppose that the sigma algebra on Dv is coherent, or that I∞ is countable. If a variable
population social preorder is generated by an individual preorder, then it satisfies Posterior Anonymity.
In parallel to the constant population case, this shows that, granted coherence, Posterior Anonymity
could be used in place of Two-Stage Anonymity in Theorem 3.6.
Remark 3.9. In the constant population case, there is no real difference between between total and
average utilitarianism. In this variable population setting, the fact that the definition of pIL involves
‘averaging’ over members of I may seem to suggest that (2) amounts to a form of average utilitarianism.
But this impression is misleading: while I contains every individual who has a positive probability of
existing under L or L′, it is an arbitrary indexing set which may also contain individuals who are certain
not to exist under L and L′, and it can be replaced by any larger finite I′ ⊃ I without effect. In
fact, one cannot say whether (2) should be seen as expressing a form of total utilitarianism, average
utilitarianism, or something else, without more information about %Pv . Section 3.5 illustrates the extent
to which theories with the form of total and average utilitarianism are compatible with (2), while section 4
concludes that given (2), the social preorder has an expected total utility representation if and only if
the individual preorder satisfies strong independence.
3.4. Omega Independence. We now argue that Omega Independence is a fairly weak condition; in
particular, it is compatible with any individual preorder on P ∪ {1Ω}.
To do this we need to be able to identify members of P with members of Pv. For this we assume that
P is a (non-empty) convex set of probability measures on a measurable space W, that Wv = W ∪ {Ω},
and that Wv has the sigma algebra generated by the one on W. In other words, A ⊂Wv is measurable
in Wv if and only if A ∩W is measurable in W; in particular, W and {Ω} are measurable in Wv. This
enables us to identify members of P with probability measures on Wv by the natural inclusion P 7→ P v,
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where P v(A) := P (A ∩W) for all measurable A in Wv.36 We then identify Pv with the convex hull of
PΩ := P ∪ {1Ω}. We summarize these assumptions by saying that Pv extends P. For any sets X ⊂ Y ,
we also say that a preorder %Y on Y extends a preorder %X on X if x %X x′ ⇐⇒ x %Y x′ for all
x, x′ ∈ X.
Proposition 3.10. Assume that Pv extends P. Suppose given a preorder %P . Let %PΩ be any preorder
on PΩ that extends %P . Then
(i) There is a preorder %Pv on Pv that extends %PΩ (and hence %P) and satisfies Omega Independence.
(ii) There is a preorder %Pv on Pv that extends %PΩ (and hence %P) and violates Omega Independence.
The first part shows that Omega Independence is compatible with any preorder on PΩ. For example,
having fixed any %P , Omega Independent %Pv can be chosen so that for a given P ∈ P, 1Ω ∼Pv P ;
alternatively, Omega Independent %Pv can be chosen so that 1Ω uprisePv P (or 1Ω Pv P , or P Pv 1Ω) for
all P ∈ P. This provides the first sense in which Omega Independence is a weak condition.
The proposition as a whole shows that no matter how nonexistence is compared with other welfare
states, Omega Independence of %Pv is logically independent of strong independence of %P , despite
the formal resemblance between these principles. In particular, because of the qualitative distinction
between nonexistence and other welfare states, anyone who is moved by something like the Allais paradox
to reject strong independence for %P might well accept Omega Independence for %Pv . In addition, even
if %P satisfies strong independence, Omega Independence for %Pv falls a long way short of implying
strong independence for %Pv ; Example 3.12 below illustrates this with a natural view about the value of
nonexistence. These observations provide a second sense in which Omega Independence is weak.
Our variable population Theorem 3.6 shows that given a variable population domain, any Omega
Independent individual preorder is compatible with our axioms of aggregation. That is a final sense
in which Omega Independence is fairly weak, and in fact Theorem 3.6 gives strong reasons to accept
Omega Independence. If the social preorder satisfies Anteriority, Reduction to Prospects and Two-Stage
Anonymity, then the theorem tells us that the individual preorder must satisfy Omega Independence.
This is an argument for Omega Independence from seemingly modest principles of aggregation. Of
course, someone who strongly objected to Omega Independence could instead interpret Theorem 3.6 as
an impossibility theorem.37
3.5. Examples. In the following examples we assume that Pv extends P. In each example we give
a general construction to show how a natural view about welfare comparisons involving nonexistence
extends a given %P to an Omega Independent %Pv , illustrating Proposition 3.10(i). We then make the
construction more concrete by further assuming the framework of Example 2.6, so that P is the set of
finitely supported probability measures on W = R, implying that Pv is the set of finitely supported
probability measures on Wv = W ∪ {Ω}, and %P is represented by expectations of a utility function
u : W → R.
Example 3.11 (Total Utility and Critical Level Utilitarianism). One possibility for extending a given %P
to %Pv is to identify some prospect P0 ∈ P that is effectively interchangeable with Ω, in the sense that,
for any P ∈ P and α ∈ [0, 1],
αP + (1− α)1Ω ∼v αP + (1− α)P0.
While this equivalence determines %Pv in terms of P0 and %P , it does not guarantee that %Pv satisfies
Omega Independence. But it does if %P satisfies strong independence.
To illustrate, in the framework of Example 2.6, suppose we extend the utility function u : W → R to
a function u : Wv → R, and define %Pv to be the individual preorder represented by expectations of this
extension. This amounts to saying that Ω is interchangeable with any P0 ∈ P that has expected utility
u(Ω) (although there might not be such a P0). The corresponding social preorder is represented by the
expected value of
∑
i∈I∞(u ◦Wvi − u(Ω)); see Theorem 4.4(iii).
36Another way to put this is that the sigma algebra on Dv is the pushforward of the one on D by the inclusion of W
in Wv, and members of P are identified with their pushforwards.
37We thank a referee for this observation.
18 DAVID MCCARTHY, KALLE MIKKOLA, AND TERUJI THOMAS
Social orders of this type are also given by the ‘critical level utilitarianism’ of Blackorby, Bossert,
and Donaldson (2005), and the ‘standardized total principle’ of Broome (2004). These treatments do
not formally give nonexistence a utility value. Instead, writing I(d) for the individuals who exist in
distribution d, they posit some constant c such that the social preorder is represented by the expected
value of
∑
i∈I(d)(u ◦ Wi − c). This constant is said to be a ‘critical’ or ‘neutral’ level of utility: an
individual’s existence in a given distribution contributes to social value to the extent that the utility of
her welfare state exceeds c. Thus the social preorders described in the previous paragraph have a critical
level utilitarian form with critical level u(Ω).
As we explain in Remark 4.5, we could normalize u so that u(Ω) = 0. The stated representation of
the social preorder would then have a total utility form; that is, L %v L′ if and only if L has at least as
much expected total utility. In section 4 we consider very general expected total utility representations
of the social preorder, but these might also be seen as general forms of critical level utilitarianism.
Example 3.12 (Average Utilitarianism and Value Conditional on Existence). Here is a second way to
extend a given %P to an Omega Independent %Pv . It works whether or not %P satisfies strong indepen-
dence. The idea is that sure nonexistence is incomparable to any other prospect, while in other cases the
value of a prospect P is to be identified with its value conditional on the existence of the individual.38
So define %Pv by the rule that, given P, P ′ ∈ P and α, α′ ∈ [0, 1],
αP + (1− α)1Ω %Pv α′P ′ + (1− α′)1Ω ⇐⇒
{
α, α′ > 0 and P %P P ′, or
α = α′ = 0.
Note that %Pv will violate strong independence (unless %P ranks all prospects as equal).
In the framework of Example 2.6, the resulting variable population social preorder can be seen as
a version of average utilitarianism. It ranks lotteries by expected total utility divided by expected
population size. Here and in the next example, the total utility of a distribution d is given by
∑
i∈I(d) u◦
Wi; nonexistence is not given a utility value. The ‘empty’ lottery in which it is certain that no one exists
is incomparable to the others.
This is an unusual version of average utilitarianism, but two more obvious versions are less well
behaved. Ranking lotteries by expected average utility violates Anteriority. Alternatively, one could
consider the expected utility conditional on existence for each individual who has a non-zero chance
of existing, and then average over such individuals. Ranking lotteries by this average then violates
Two-Stage Anonymity.
Example 3.13 (Incomparability of Nonexistence). A third method of defining %Pv may appeal to those
who take to heart the view mentioned in Example 3.4 that nonexistence is incomparable to other welfare
states. For P, P ′ ∈ P and α, α′ ∈ [0, 1], they may define
αP + (1− α)1Ω %Pv α′P ′ + (1− α′)1Ω ⇐⇒
{
α = α′ > 0 and P %P P ′, or
α = α′ = 0.
This invariably produces an individual preorder satisfying Omega Independence. However, it leads to
widespread social incomparability: we will have L uprisev L′ unless the expected population size under L
equals that under L′. In the framework of Example 2.6, the social preorder ranks lotteries of the same
expected population size by their expected total utility. In the next subsection we give an example of a
‘neutral-range’ view that involves less widespread incomparability.
3.6. The Repugnant Conclusion. We now give some further examples organized around the ‘Repug-
nant Conclusion’ of Parfit (1986), which has played a central role in discussions of variable-population
aggregation. This is the statement that for any distribution in which every individual has the same very
high welfare state, there is a better distribution in which every individual has the same very low but
positive welfare state, corresponding to a life barely worth living. For example, this is a consequence of
38Such an idea is emphasized, for example, by Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve (2016), and also seemingly endorsed by
Harsanyi in correspondence reported in Ng (1983).
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critical level utilitarianism (Example 3.11), on the assumption that ‘barely worth living’ lives have utility
above the critical level. Many people find the Repugnant Conclusion, or variations on it, as repugnant
as the name suggests (see e.g. Parfit 1986; Hammond 1988; Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson 1995).
Let w0 be the welfare state of a life that is barely worth living, and W a much higher welfare state,
representing an excellent quality of life. Let Pα be the prospect α1W + (1− α)1Ω, for α ∈ [0, 1]. Under
the conditions of our variable population aggregation theorem, the Repugnant Conclusion amounts to
the claim that 1w0 Pv Pα, for some rational probability α ∈ (0, 1).
There are, at least formally, many ways in which this claim about prospects can be denied. Some
we have already seen. The critical level utilitarianism of Example 3.11 holds that Pα Pv 1w0 for any
α ∈ (0, 1), as long as u(Ω) is above u(w0). The average utilitarianism of Example 3.12 similarly holds
that Pα Pv 1w0 . And the highly incomplete social preorder of Example 3.13, ranking lotteries of the
same expected population size by their expected total utility, holds that 1w0 uprisePv Pα.
In the first and third examples just mentioned, the individual preorder satisfies strong independence.
As we have already advertised, this leads to a general form of expected total utility representation to be
studied in section 4. To illustrate the scope of this result, we now give two further examples of individual
and social preorders that satisfy strong independence while avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion.
Example 3.14 (Non-Archimedean Total Views). In this example, people in welfare state w0 contribute
positively to the social value of a distribution, but no number of such people can contribute more than
even one person in welfare state W .39 The key condition on the individual preorder is that Pα Pv 1w0
for every α ∈ (0, 1), even though, corresponding to α = 0, 1w0 Pv 1Ω. This requires that the individual
preorder violate mixture continuity and the closely related Archimedean axiom (see section 4.1). As a
concrete example, consider V = R2, with the lexicographic ordering %V; that is, (x1, x2) %V (y1, y2)
if and only if either x1 > y1, or x1 = y1 and x2 ≥ y2. Choose a utility function u : Wv → V with
u(W ) = (1, 0), u(w0) = (0, 1), and u(Ω) = 0, and rank prospects by (component-wise) expectations of
u. The corresponding social preorder ranks lotteries by expected total utility. Any distribution in which
everyone has welfare state W is better than any distribution in which everyone has w0.
Example 3.15 (Neutral-Range Views). In this example some welfare states, including w0, are ‘neutral’
in the sense of being incomparable to Ω; Example 3.13 is the extreme case in which all of W is in this
neutral range. The Repugnant Conclusion is avoided because people in welfare state w0 do not contribute
positively to social value.40 In terms of the individual preorder, we might suppose that PαuprisePv 1w0 for α in
some interval containing 0, while Pα Pv 1w0 for α outside that interval. As a concrete example, suppose
that W = R, with w0 = 1 and W = 100. We will define the variable population individual preorder in
such a way that welfare levels w ∈ (−10, 10) are incomparable to Ω. Let V = R2 with the ‘strong Pareto’
preorder %V: that is, (x1, x2) %V (y1, y2) if and only if x1 ≥ y1 and x2 ≥ y2. Define a utility function
u : Wv → V by u(Ω) = 0 and u(w) = (w + 10, w − 10) for w ∈ W. Let the individual preorder rank
prospects by (component-wise) expectations of u; note this is compatible with the natural ordering on
W. In particular one finds that that Pα uprisePv 1w0 for α ∈ [0, 1/10) and Pα Pv 1w0 for α ∈ [1/10, 1]. The
corresponding social preorder ranks lotteries by the expected total utility. A population of m people in
welfare state W will be better than one of n people in welfare state w0 as long as n ≤ 10m; otherwise
they are incomparable.
4. Expected utility
We now begin to explore more systematically the relationship between individual preorders and the
social preorders they generate. What do natural constraints on the individual preorder tell us about the
39See e.g. Arrhenius and Rabinowicz (2015) and Thomas (2018) for recent discussions of such theories, which are often
called ‘non-Archimedean’ or ‘lexical’.
40This relatively popular kind of theory, often called a ‘critical range’ or ‘neutral range’ view, is developed by Broome
(2004), Blackorby et al (2005) and Rabinowicz (2009), although these authors differ in how to interpret the relevant
incomparability. It is worth noting that these views are usually described using a set of real-valued utility functions, rather
than a single vector-valued utility function (cf. Example 2.8); we connect the ‘multi-utility’ approach and our vectorial
approach in section 4.2.
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social preorder, and vice versa? In this section we focus on axioms related to expected utility theory,
while in section 5 we consider non-expected utility theory.
Section 4.1 presents the preliminary result that the social preorder inherits the most normatively
central expected utility axioms from the individual preorder, in the sense that if the individual preorder
satisfies a given axiom, then so does the social preorder it generates (and vice versa). This contrasts
with common approaches in which the same expected utility axioms are imposed on the individual and
social preorders; in our framework, this is often redundant.
Section 4.2 shows that if the individual preorder is represented by expected utility, then the social
preorder it generates is represented by expected total utility. The continuity and completeness axioms of
standard expected utility theory are often seen as normatively questionable, and some of the examples
we have discussed may provide further reasons to drop them.41 This is why we work with a vector-valued
form of expected utility representation that relies only on strong independence, the most distinctive and
normatively plausible axiom of expected utility theory.
Section 4.3 shows the equivalence (under the aggregation theorems) of various Pareto, independence,
and separability axioms. Thus one might take Pareto or separability as fundamental and derive inde-
pendence, since the former two axioms are arguably more central to the utilitarian project. It allows
us to give our weakest axiomatization of an expected total utility representation of the social preorder,
based solely on Two-Stage Anonymity and what we call Full Pareto, a natural strengthening of strong
Pareto in the face of incompleteness.
4.1. Axioms. Let us review the main expected utility axioms before proving that they are inherited
by the social preorder. At the heart of expected utility theory is the notion of independence. Several
different independence axioms are possible, and, like other axioms from expected utility theory, they can
be posited separately for either the individual or the social preorder. Thus we state them generically for
a preorder %X on a convex set X.
Independence axioms. Suppose given p, p′, q ∈ X and α ∈ (0, 1).
(Ia) p ∼X p′ =⇒ αp+ (1− α)q ∼X αp′ + (1− α)q.
(Ib) p X p′ =⇒ αp+ (1− α)q X αp′ + (1− α)q.
(Ic) pupriseX p′ =⇒ αp+ (1− α)q upriseX αp′ + (1− α)q.
Let (I1) := (Ia), (I2) := (Ia)∧ (Ib), and (I3) := (Ia)∧ (Ib)∧ (Ic). These seem to be the reasonable packages
of independence axioms. In particular, (I3) is equivalent to perhaps the best known independence axiom,
strong independence, that is, p %X p′ ⇐⇒ αp + (1 − α)q %X αp′ + (1 − α)q. Although the weaker
independence axioms are often sufficient given other assumptions, Lemma 4.3 below strongly suggests
that (I3) should be seen as the core idea of expected utility.
Just as Omega Independence only quantified over scalars in (0, 1) ∩ Q, we similarly define the Ra-
tional Independence axioms (IQi ) for i = 1, . . . , 3 as the corresponding independence axioms, but with α
restricted to (0, 1) ∩Q. We will use these rational-coefficient axioms in section 4.3.
Standard expected utility theory also assumes
Completeness (Comp). %X is a complete preorder: for all p, q ∈ X, p X q or q X p or
p ∼X q.
The final main idea of standard expected utility is continuity, often understood to mean either one of
the following two axioms.
Archimedean (Ar). For all p, q, r ∈ X, p X q X r implies that there exist α, β ∈ (0, 1) such
that αp+ (1− α)r X q and q X βp+ (1− β)r.
Mixture Continuity (MC). For all p, q, r ∈ X, the set {α ∈ [0, 1] : αp+(1−α)r %X q} is closed
in [0, 1], as is the set {α ∈ [0, 1] : q %X αp+ (1− α)r}.42
41We have in mind here especially the idea that Ω may be incomparable to other welfare states (Examples 3.12, 3.13,
and 3.15) and the desire to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion (section 3.6).
42This is the continuity axiom of Herstein and Milnor (1953).
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Given (I3) and (Comp), (Ar) is equivalent to (MC). But when %X is incomplete, there is tension between
the Archimedean and mixture continuity axioms, and one may have to choose between them.43
When X is equipped with a topology, many continuity conditions typically stronger than (MC) have
been considered. The following is the most popular.
Continuity (Cont). {p ∈ X : p %X q} and {p ∈ X : q %X p} are closed for all q ∈ X.
One can only expect nice results about (Cont) if the basic operations on prospects and lotteries are
themselves continuous. Say that mixing is continuous on X if for any λ ∈ (0, 1), λp + (1 − λ)q is a
continuous function of p, q ∈ X. In the constant population case, the basic assumption is as follows.
Topology (Top). P and L have topologies such that L and all the maps Pi are continuous, and
mixing is continuous on P.
In the variable population case, we need a further condition on the topology of Lv that allows us to pass
from continuity on each LvI to continuity on Lv itself. Say that Lv is topologically coherent if it satisfies
the following condition: X ⊂ Lv is closed if and only if X ∩ LvI is closed in LvI for every finite I ⊂ I∞,
where LvI has a topology as a subspace of Lv. Thus in the variable population case we use
Topology (Variable Population) (Topv). Pv and Lv have topologies such that all the maps
LvI and Pvi are continuous, mixing is continuous on Pv, and Lv is topologically coherent.
Example 4.1. Suppose that Wv is a topological space, and give Dv a topology as a subspace of (Wv)I∞
with the product topology (cf. Example 3.2). Assuming that Pv and Lv consist of Borel measures, we
can give them the weak topologies. That is, the topology on LvI is the coarsest one such that, for every
bounded continuous f : Dv → R, the function L 7→ ∫Dv f dL is continuous on LvI ; similarly for Pv with f
bounded and continuous on Wv. Define a topology on Lv by the condition that X is closed if and only
if X ∩LvI is closed in this weak topology on LvI for every I.44 It is then easy to check that (Topv) holds.
Proposition 4.2 (Inheritance). Suppose that a (constant or variable population) social preorder is
generated by an individual preorder . Then
(i) Each of (Comp), (Ar), (MC), (Ii), and (I
Q
i ) (for i = 1, 2, 3) is satisfied by the individual preorder
if and only if it is satisfied by the social preorder.
(ii) Assuming (Top) or (Topv), the individual preorder satisfies (Cont) if and only the social preorder
does.
Thus the most normatively central expected utility axioms are all inherited by the social preorder.
Similar results hold for many other normatively natural expected utility axioms.45
4.2. Expected utility representations. We saw in Proposition 4.2 that the standard axioms of ex-
pected utility theory are inherited by the social preorder. We now focus on the conclusion of expected
utility theory, that is, on the existence of an expected utility representation. We show that such repre-
sentations of the individual preorder yield expected total utility representations of the social preorder.
This result works even for a very general kind of expected utility representation which, as we explain,
requires only the independence axiom (I3).
We again state the relevant conditions in terms of the generic preorder %X on a convex set X, but
in this subsection we further assume X = P(Y ) for some convex set of probability measures P(Y )
on a measurable space Y . In this case we say that f : Y → R is P(Y )-integrable if it is Lebesgue
integrable with respect to all p ∈ P(Y ).46 Say that a function U : P (Y )→ R is expectational if there is
43For example, when incomplete %X satisfies (I3), it cannot satisfy both (MC) and a mild strengthening of (Ar) which
is natural in the presence of incompleteness; see further Dubra (2011) and McCarthy and Mikkola (2018).
44It does not follow automatically that the topology on LvI as a subspace of L
v is the weak topology, as one might wish.
But this does follow if {1Ω} is closed in Pv, which is guaranteed e.g. if Wv is metrizable (Bogachev, 2007: Cor. 8.2.4).
45For example, the social preorder also inherits the strengthening of (Ar) mentioned in note 43, finite dominance axioms,
and also countable dominance axioms (cf. Fishburn 1970; Hammond 1998) if L and Lv are closed under countable mixing.
46We follow Bogachev (2007: Def. 2.4.1) and other authors in not insisting that an integrable function must be
measurable (although all results go through on that stronger notion of integrability). Still, if f is integrable with respect
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a P(Y )-integrable function u : Y → R such that U(p) = ∫
Y
udp. The basic form of an expected utility
representation is as follows.
EUT. There is an expectational function U : P (Y ) → R that represents %X . We say that U is
an EU representation of %X .
Given the implausibility of completeness, however, there has been much interest in the following
‘multi-utility’ generalization of EUT.47
Multi EUT. There is a set U of expectational functions P (Y ) → R such that for p, q ∈ P(Y ),
p %X q ⇐⇒ U(p) ≥ U(q) for all U ∈ U . We say that U is a Multi EU representation of %X .
However, if %X has a Multi EU representation, it automatically satisfies (MC). Since our aggregation
theorems allow for violations of all kinds of continuity axioms, we now consider a further kind of expected
utility representation to cater for this possibility.
Here is the general set-up. A preordered vector space is a vector space V with a (possibly incomplete)
preorder %V that is linear in the sense that v %V v′ ⇐⇒ λv + w %V λv′ + w, for all v, v′, w ∈ V and
λ > 0.48 So R with the standard ordering is one example; other examples for (V,%V) were described
in Example 2.7 and section 3.6. Given a preordered vector space (V,%V), we need a way of integrating
V-valued functions. Suppose we have a set A of linear functionals on V that separates the points of V.
A function u : Y → V is weakly P(Y )-integrable with respect to A if there exists U : P(Y )→ V such that∫
Y
Λ ◦ udp = Λ ◦ U(p) for all Λ ∈ A, p ∈ P(Y ). In particular, every Λ ◦ u must be P(Y )-integrable. We
then define the weak integral by setting
∫
Y
udp := U(p).49 When U : P(Y ) → V can be written in this
form, we here also say that U is expectational.
Vector EUT. For some preordered vector space (V,%V) and some separating set A of linear
functionals on V, there is an expectational function U : P(Y ) → V that represents %X . We say
that U is a Vector EU representation of %X .
An ordinary EU representation, as above, can be identified with a Vector EU representation with (V,%V
) = (R,≥) and A = {id}. We can similarly identify a Multi EU representation with a special kind of
Vector EU representation. Indeed, for whatever index set I, equip the vector space RI with the ‘Pareto
preorder’ ≥Par, i.e. x ≥Par y ⇐⇒ xi ≥ yi for all i ∈ I. Let A be the set of projections x 7→ x(i) of RI
onto R, so that the weak integral with values in RI is just the component-wise ordinary integral. Then
Multi EU representations of the form U = {Ui : P (Y ) → R | i ∈ I} correspond exactly to Vector EU
representations U : P (Y ) → RI ; the correspondence is given by U(p)(i) = Ui(p). However, since Multi
EU representations imply both (I3) and (MC), the following result shows that Vector EU representations
are much more general.
Lemma 4.3. Suppose %X is a preorder on P(Y ), a convex set of probability measures on a measurable
space Y . Then %X satisfies (I3) if and only if it satisfies Vector EUT.
This result shows that (I3) is the only crucial axiom for expected utility theory in this setting, and
makes it clear that the existence of a Vector EU representation is a normatively natural assumption.
Now let us apply these definitions in the context of our aggregation theorems. When combined with
Lemma 4.3, the next theorem shows that if the individual preorder satisfies (I3), then the social preorder
is represented by total expected utility, or, equivalently, expected total utility.
Theorem 4.4 (EUT Inheritance). Suppose that a (constant or variable population) social preorder is
generated by an individual preorder.
(i) The individual preorder satisfies Vector EUT if and only if the social preorder does.
to p, then f coincides with a measurable function on some set of p-measure 1. (By the definition of integrability, there
is a sequence (fn) of simple functions converging to f on some set A of p-measure 1. It follows from (Bogachev, 2007:
Thm. 2.1.5(v)) that the limit of (fnχA) is a measurable function agreeing with f on A.)
47See Dubra et al (2004), Evren (2008, 2014), and Gorno (2017).
48A linear preorder, in our sense, is sometimes called a vector preorder.
49This integral is the weak (or Pettis) integral corresponding to the (locally convex) topological vector space whose
topology is induced by A (Rudin, 1991: 3.10). We will therefore refer to it as the weak integral.
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(ii) In the constant population case, if %P has a Vector EU representation
U(P ) =
∫
W
udP
then % has a Vector EU representation
V (L) =
∑
i∈I
U(Pi(L)) =
∫
D
∑
i∈I
(u ◦Wi) dL.
(iii) In the variable population case, if %Pv has a Vector EU representation
Uv(P ) =
∫
Wv
udP
where Uv is normalized so that Uv(1Ω) = 0,
50 then %v has a Vector EU representation
(3) V v(L) =
∑
i∈I∞
Uv(Pvi (L)) =
∫
Dv
∑
i∈I∞
(u ◦Wvi ) dL.
Although stated for Vector EUT, the result holds for both ordinary EUT and Multi EUT as well
(see the proof of part (i) for details).51 Specialized to ordinary EUT, the claim that the constant
population social preorder is represented by V (L) =
∫
D
∑
i∈I(u ◦Wi) dL is the conclusion of Harsanyi’s
utilitarian theorem, when translated into our framework, but resting on premises that are much weaker
than his (see section 6.4). Theorem 4.4 also includes the familiar fact that this expected value of the
sum of individual utilities is identical to the sum of the expected values of individual utilities. This is
sometimes put by saying that in Harsanyi’s conclusion, ex post utilitarian social evaluation is equivalent
to ex ante utilitarian social evaluation.52 The general Vector EUT version allows for failures of continuity
and completeness, but maintains the expected total utility form and ex ante/ex post equivalence. We
have derived the same sort of expected total utility representation and ex ante/ex post equivalence in
the variable population case.
Remark 4.5 (Normalization). The main difference in the variable population case is the normalization
condition on Uv. When utilities are values in a preordered vector space, one can add any constant to a
utility function without changing the preorder it represents, allowing for different normalizations. Since
we always have 1Ω ∈ Pv (Lemma 3.3(i)), the normalization Uv(1Ω) = 0 used in Theorem 4.4 is always
available. But other normalizations may be natural; for example, a utility value of zero is sometimes
reserved for welfare states that are neutral, rather than good or bad, for the person in question.53
Without imposing any normalization, (3) would become
(4) V v(L) =
∑
i∈I∞
(Uv(Pvi (L))− Uv(1Ω)) =
∫
Dv
∑
i∈I∞
(u ◦Wvi − u(Ω)) dL.
Comparison with Example 3.11 shows that (4) can be seen as a very general version of the formula
used to define critical level utilitarianism. It allows for failures of continuity and completeness, and can
accommodate the popular view that there is a range of critical levels (see section 3.6). In any case, we
will continue to emphasize total utility representations like (3) rather than representations like (4) that
make the critical level explicit.
50An equivalent normalization condition is u(Ω) = 0, since u(Ω) = Uv(1Ω). We explain the normalization more in
Remark 4.5; it implies that, in the following formula, the sums have finitely many non-zero summands (see Lemma 3.3(i)).
51In the case of Multi EUT, we can unwind parts (ii) and (iii) of the theorem in the following way. In the constant
population case, if U is a Multi EU representation of %P , then {
∑
i∈I U ◦ Pi : U ∈ U} is a Multi EU representation of %;
in the variable case, if Uv is a Multi EU representation of %Pv with each Uv ∈ Uv normalized so that Uv(1Ω) = 0, then
{∑i∈I∞ Uv ◦ Pvi : Uv ∈ Uv} is a Multi EU representation of %v.
52In frameworks in which the ex ante utilitarian evaluations are made using possibly differing individual subjective
probabilities, an approach not considered here, it is well known that this equivalence can fail. We thank a referee for
emphasizing this point.
53The question of how these normalizations are related depends upon the interpretation of the individual preorder in
cases of nonexistence as discussed at the end of section 3.2.
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Remark 4.6 (Mixture-Preserving Representations). In section 2.7 we noted that our aggregation theo-
rems can be generalized to associative mixture sets of prospects and lotteries that do not necessarily
consist of probability measures. In that general setting, expected utility representations do not make
sense. However, one can still consider representations that are mixture preserving rather than expecta-
tional.54 In analogy to Lemma 4.3 and Theorem 4.4, and with essentially the same proof, (I3) for the
individual preorder is still necessary and sufficient for the existence of a mixture-preserving represen-
tation with values in a preordered vector space, and the social preorder then has a mixture-preserving
representation by total utility (McCarthy et al , 2017c). In addition to their generality and technical
simplicity, an advantage of dealing with mixture-preserving representations is that, unlike Vector EU
representations, they can always be given values in partially ordered rather than merely preordered vec-
tor spaces (McCarthy, Mikkola, and Thomas, 2017a). This fits the natural thought that equally good
prospects should have the same, rather than merely equally good, utilities.
Remark 4.7 (Canonical Utility Spaces). One can use structure theorems for preordered and partially
ordered vector spaces to make the utility spaces more concrete. In particular, mixture-preserving rep-
resentations can always be taken into a product of what Hausner and Wendel (1952) call ‘lexicographic
function spaces’. Informally, this means that we can choose the utilities to be matrices of real num-
bers. The space of row-vectors is lexicographically ordered, and one matrix ranks higher than another
if and only if it ranks higher in each row. Normatively natural constraints on the represented preorder
correspond to dimensional restrictions on the matrices.55
4.3. Pareto, separability, and independence. In the previous subsection we indicated the power of
strong independence (I3) as a condition on the individual preorder: it allows us to derive an expected total
utility representation of the social preorder. However, as we explained in section 1 (especially note 5), it
is not obvious that (I3) is an axiom to which utilitarians are conceptually committed. We now show in
Proposition 4.8 that, given the axioms of our aggregation theorems, the ‘rational’ independence axioms
(IQi ) introduced in section 4.1 are equivalent to corresponding Pareto axioms, and also to corresponding
separability axioms. As we will suggest, given the proximity of (I3) and (I
Q
3 ), this can be taken as an
informal argument that (I3) is a consequence of central utilitarian principles. Alternatively, Theorem 4.10
shows that Two-Stage Anonymity and a suitably strong Pareto principle are enough by themselves to
yield a slightly more general kind of expected total utility representation without having to appeal to
any independence axiom.
We will continue to consider both constant and variable population settings. However, in the constant
population setting, the results are most striking, and easiest to state, if we consider a family of constant
population models with populations of different sizes. If one accepts our constant population axioms
for aggregation from section 2.3 for one finite population, it is natural to accept them for every finite
population. The same goes for various conditions like Pareto or separability.
Formally, a constant population model is any tuple M = (I,W,P,%P ,D,L,%) satisfying the constant
population domain conditions (A)–(C) of section 2.2. Similarly, a variable population model is any
Mv = (I∞,Wv,Pv,%Pv ,Dv,Lv,%v) satisfying the variable population domain conditions (A)–(D) of
section 3.1. And, given an infinite population I∞, a family F of constant population models consists of
a constant population model (I,W,P,%P ,DI,LI,%I) for each finite I ⊂ I∞. Note that W, P, and %P
must be independent of I.
We will present the following axioms in a way that applies to both variable population models and
families of constant population models. Our convention so far has been to label variable population
objects with the superscript ‘v’. Here we will use the superscript ‘∗’ to cover both constant and variable
54See note 27. Expectational functions are always mixture preserving, and the generalization is modest in the sense
that mixture-preserving functions are expectational in the most commonly studied setting, where the domain X is a convex
set of finitely supported probability measures on a measurable space Y with measurable singletons.
55Hausner and Wendel (1952) assumed completeness. In the case of incompleteness, representations involving lexi-
cographic function spaces are given in Borie (2016), Hara, Ok and Riella (2016) and McCarthy et al (2017a), the last
discussing dimensional restrictions.
UTILITARIANISM WITH AND WITHOUT EXPECTED UTILITY 25
cases: for example, D∗I stands for DvI if we are talking about a variable population model, and it stands
for DI if we are talking about a family of constant population models. To make this work smoothly,
given a variable population model, and finite I ⊂ I∞, we define %vI to be the restriction of %v to LvI .
Thus in the new notation %∗I is invariably a preorder on L∗I .56
With this background, suppose we are given either a variable population model, or a family of constant
population ones. Let us state Pareto and separability axioms.
Because the individual preorder can be incomplete, Pareto axioms need to be stated with some care.
We first define relations ≈JP∗ , BJP∗ and ./JP∗ ; these are ways of comparing lotteries with respect to a finite
population J. For any lotteries L and L′ in L∗I and J ⊂ I:
L ≈JP∗ L′ ⇐⇒ P∗i (L) ∼P∗ P∗i (L′) for all i ∈ J
LBJP∗ L′ ⇐⇒ P∗i (L) P∗ P∗i (L′) for all i ∈ J
L ./JP∗ L
′ ⇐⇒ P∗i (L)upriseP∗ P∗i (L′),P∗i (L) ∼P∗ P∗j (L), and
P∗i (L′) ∼P∗ P∗j (L′) for all i, j ∈ J.
We might read ≈JP∗ , BJP∗ and ./JP∗ as, respectively, equally good, better, and equi-incomparable for all
members of J. To explain the last of these, suppose I = {1, 2} and consider the inference: P∗i (L) upriseP∗
P∗i (L′) for i = 1, 2 =⇒ Luprise∗I L′. This may seem natural: if L and L′ are incomparable for both 1 and 2,
they are incomparable. But suppose W∗ includes welfare states v and w, and consider two distributions
with two people each: d = (v, w) and d′ = (w, v). Treating welfare states and distributions as degenerate
prospects and lotteries, suppose v upriseP∗ w. Then the inference just considered implies d uprise∗I d′. But this
violates any standard formulation of anonymity (in our framework, Two-Stage Anonymity). The use of
./JP∗ in the following axioms blocks this kind of inference.
Pareto axioms. Suppose given a variable population model, or a family of constant population
ones. For finite I ⊂ I∞, L,L′ ∈ L∗I , and any partition I = J unionsqK with J 6= ∅,
(Pa) L ≈IP∗ L′ =⇒ L ∼∗I L′.
(Pb) LBJP∗ L′ and L ≈KP∗ L′ =⇒ L ∗I L′.
(Pc) L ./
J
P∗ L
′ and L ≈KP∗ L′ =⇒ Luprise∗I L′.
We will focus on the natural packages (P1) := (Pa), (P2) := (Pa)∧ (Pb), and (P3) := (Pa)∧ (Pb)∧ (Pc).
Of course, Pareto axioms are usually formulated with respect to a single finite population I; we just
apply them with respect to every finite I ⊂ I∞. Setting this aside, some of these packages have familiar
names. (P1) is Pareto Indifference; (P2) is strong Pareto; but (P3) appears to be novel. We will call it
Full Pareto.
The separability assumptions we consider only make sense under some further domain conditions.
We want to be able to ‘restrict’ lotteries to a subpopulation J. That is, suppose given finite populations
J ⊂ I ⊂ I∞. We first assume that for each d ∈ D∗I , D∗J contains a (necessarily unique) distribution piJ(d)
such that W∗j (piJ(d)) = W∗j (d) for each j ∈ J. This defines a function piJ : D∗I → D∗J . We assume it is
measurable.57 Given L ∈ L∗I , we can then define a pushforward probability measure L|J = L ◦ pi−1J on
D∗I . We further assume L|J is in L∗J . We thus have a restriction map L∗I → L∗J , L 7→ L|J. We summarize
these assumptions by saying that restrictions exist.
Separability axioms. Suppose given a variable population model, or a family of constant
population ones. Suppose that restrictions exist. For finite I ⊂ I∞, L,L′ ∈ L∗I , and any partition
I = J unionsqK with J 6= ∅,
56The reader may notice that, given a variable population model, we can formally obtain a family of constant population
models (I,Wv,%Pv ,DvI ,LvI ,%vI ), with the caveat that the set Wv of welfare states in these models happens to contain Ω.
So axioms and results about variable population models can sometimes be read directly off of axioms and results about
families of constant population models. We find it clearer not to rely on this fact presentationally.
57Recall that each constant population space DI has its own sigma algebra, while each variable population space D
v
I
has the sigma algebra restricted from Dv. Recall also in what follows that, even in the variable population case, elements
of LvJ can be identified with probability measures on D
v
J (see note 32).
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(Sa) L|J ∼∗J L′|J and L|K ∼∗K L′|K =⇒ L ∼∗I L′.
(Sb) L|J ∗J L′|J and L|K ∼∗K L′|K =⇒ L ∗I L′.
(Sc) L|J uprise∗J L′|J and L|K ∼∗K L′|K =⇒ Luprise∗I L′.
We consider the natural combinations (S1) := (Sa), (S2) := (Sa) ∧ (Sb), and (S3) := (Sa) ∧ (Sb) ∧ (Sc).
When L|K ∼∗K L′|K, (S3) says that the members of K can be ignored in the comparison between L and
L′. That is to say, L %∗I L′ ⇐⇒ L|J %∗J L′|J. Thus (S3) can be seen as an axiom of strong separability
across individuals.58
Separability is most interesting when the lotteries faced by J and K can vary independently. In
the variable population case, it turns out that our basic domain conditions already ensure a supply of
lotteries sufficient for our purposes. For a family of constant population models, the following suffices:
say that the family is compositional if, for any partition I = JunionsqK, and any P,Q ∈ P, there exists L ∈ LI
such that Pj(L) = P for all j ∈ J and Pk(L) = Q for all k ∈ K. For example, the family is compositional
if each DI equals WI equipped with the product sigma algebra, and LI is the set of all lotteries on DI
(Bogachev, 2007: Theorem 3.3.1).
Proposition 4.8 (Equivalence of Pareto, Separability, and Independence).
Constant Population. Suppose given a compositional family F of constant population models, and
that restrictions exist. Suppose that each social preorder %I is generated by %P . Then, for i = 1, 2, 3:
F satisfies (Si) ⇐⇒ F satisfies (Pi) ⇐⇒
every %I satisfies (I
Q
i ) ⇐⇒ %P satisfies (IQi ).
Variable Population. Suppose given a variable population model Mv, and that restrictions exist.
Suppose that the social preorder %v is generated by %Pv . Then, for i = 1, 2, 3:
Mv satisfies (Si) ⇐⇒ Mv satisfies (Pi) ⇐⇒
%v satisfies (IQi ) ⇐⇒ %Pv satisfies (IQi ).
This result shows that, against the background of our aggregation theorems, there is little difference
between Pareto, separability, and independence. It is true that Proposition 4.8 strictly speaking concerns
rational independence axioms like (IQ3 ), but there is simply no plausible normative or descriptive theory
that accepts (IQ3 ) while rejecting (I3). Examples mobilized against (I3), like the Allais paradox, are
indeed always formulated using rational numbers as probabilities.
One could take this as an informal argument for (I3) from utilitarian principles such as (P3) and (S3),
leading to the expected total utility representations of Theorem 4.4. Alternatively, we now show how to
use Proposition 4.8 to derive a slightly more general kind of expected total utility representation of the
social preorder directly from (P3) without assuming any independence condition.
59
Say that (V,%V) is a Q-preordered vector space if V is a real vector space and %V is a Q-linear preorder,
in the sense that for any v, v′, w ∈ V and rational λ > 0, v %V v′ ⇐⇒ λv +w %V λv′ +w. By allowing
such a space of utilities, we can slightly generalize Vector EUT:
Rational Vector EUT. For some Q-preordered vector space (V,%V) and some separating set A
of linear functionals on V, there is an expectational function U : P(Y ) → V that represents %X .
We say that U is a Rational Vector EU representation of %X .
The significance of this definition is explained by the following analogue of Lemma 4.3.
Lemma 4.9. Suppose %X is a preorder on P(Y ), a convex set of probability measures on a measurable
space Y . Then %X satisfies (IQ3 ) if and only if it satisfies Rational Vector EUT.
58A more common notion of strong separability says that, given L,L′,M,M ′ ∈ L∗I , with L|J = M |J, L′|J = M ′|J,
L|K = L′|K, and M |K = M ′|K, one has L %∗I L′ if and only if M %∗I M ′. Given a sufficiently rich domain of lotteries, our
(S3) is equivalent to the slightly stronger claim that, in fact, L %∗I L′ if and only if L|J %∗J L′|J.
59That one can use Pareto or independence to derive an expected total utility representation, although in a somewhat
different framework to ours, is emphasized by Mongin and Pivato (2015: p. 159); see also Pivato (2014: pp. 39–40).
In Theorems 5.2 and 5.3 we show that, in one common setting, expected total utility representations follow from our
aggregation theorems without assuming any independence, Pareto, or separability condition; we merely need monotonicity
for the social preorder.
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Combined with Proposition 4.8, this allows us to derive an analogue of Theorem 4.4 that takes Full
Pareto and Two-Stage Anonymity as the basic premises.60
Theorem 4.10. Suppose given either a compositional family of constant population models or a variable
population model, and that restrictions exist.
Constant Population.
(i) Full Pareto and Two-Stage Anonymity, for each social preorder %I in the family, hold if and only
if the individual preorder %P satisfies Rational Vector EUT and generates each %I.
(ii) If %P has a Rational Vector EU representation U , then each %I in the family has a Rational Vector
EU representation
∑
i∈I U ◦ Pi.
Variable Population.
(iii) Full Pareto and Two-Stage Anonymity hold if and only if %Pv satisfies Rational Vector EUT and
generates %v.
(iv) If %Pv has a Rational Vector EU representation Uv, normalized so that Uv(1Ω) = 0, then %v has
a Rational Vector EU representation
∑
i∈I∞ U
v ◦ Pvi .
Just as in Theorem 4.4, the conveniently brief ‘total expected utility’ form of representation can be
rewritten as expected total utility. So, to emphasize: this result shows that, given a rich enough domain,
Full Pareto and Two-Stage Anonymity (or Full Pareto and Posterior Anonymity) are by themselves
enough to yield an expected total utility representation of the social preorder (or of each one in the
family), with an unusually general, but still well-behaved, space of utilities. However one feels about these
general utility spaces, the fundamental point is that Full Pareto and Two-Stage Anonymity are enough
to determine the social preorder in terms of the individual preorder, while guaranteeing separability
(S3) and at least the rational version of strong independence, (I
Q
3 ). We give the proof of Theorem 4.10
in the appendix, but a sketch will illustrate the perhaps surprising power of Full Pareto. Full Pareto
entails both Anteriority and Reduction to Prospects, so Two-Stage Anonymity is the only one of our
aggregation axioms then needed to show that the social preorder is generated by the individual preorder.
Using Proposition 4.8, another application of Full Pareto implies that the individual preorder satisfies
(IQ3 ), and therefore (Lemma 4.9) has a Rational Vector EU representation. The derivation of the expected
total utility representation of the social preorder then proceeds just as in Theorem 4.4.
We conclude with two further remarks about Proposition 4.8. First, the proposition lends some
credence to our suggestion that Full Pareto, (P3), is the right way of extending the usual strong Pareto
condition (P2) to say something ‘Pareto-style’ about incomparability. For the question of whether (P3)
is plausible, the crucial issue is the status of its component (Pc). Suppose first that K in the statement of
(Pc) is empty. Then (Pc) is entailed by the conjunction of (P1) and the following plausible principle (in,
for concreteness, the variable-population framework): P uprisePv P ′ =⇒ LvI (P ) uprisev LvI (P ′). In the general
case where K can be non-empty, (Pc) is then motivated by the kind of separability principle which
underlies (Pb), that of ignoring groups of indifferent individuals. To this we now add that, since (P3) is
essentially equivalent to (I3), given our axioms for aggregation, and since (I3), as strong independence,
is so well-established, (P3) appears to be a very natural extension of (P2).
Second, our aggregation theorems 2.2 and 3.6 are compatible with the adoption of any non-expected
utility theory for the individual preorder, provided only that Omega Independence is satisfied in the
variable population case. This allows non-expected utility theory to be easily inserted into our approach
to aggregation. But Proposition 4.8 reveals a potential cost. Non-expected utility theories typically reject
every independence axiom. But given the assumptions of Theorem 3.6, rejecting any independence axiom
requires rejecting the corresponding Pareto axiom. To its critics, this may be a further strike against
non-expected utility theory; to its defenders, it may be evidence for a hidden problem with Pareto.
We briefly address the options for someone with broadly utilitarian sympathies who wishes to adopt a
non-expected utility theory without giving up Pareto in section 6.6.
60In both the constant and variable population cases, Posterior Anonymity could be used in place of Two-Stage
Anonymity, granted coherence (or countable I∞) in the variable population case. See Proposition 3.8 and its preceding
commentary, where coherence was defined.
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5. Non-expected utility
In this section we continue to explore the relationship between individual preorders and the social
preorders they generate, but we now focus on non-expected utility theory. Although independence
remains very popular as a normative principle, it continues to have its critics; see, for example, Buchak
(2013). It is therefore natural to ask what typical non-expected utility conditions on the individual
preorder imply about the social preorder, and vice versa.
Even if one accepts independence at the normative level, it is hard to ignore its widespread violation
at the empirical level (see note 4), and the project we pursue here may have some relevance to empirical
work. The literature has mostly focused on subjects who violate independence when only self-interest is
at play. But such subjects may on occasion put themselves in the position of the social planner to make
judgments about social outcomes. It is natural to ask whether their views about risk at the individual
level are reflected in their views about welfare distributions, even in risk-free cases. Answering this first
requires models of what independence-violating judgments about risk imply about social evaluation;
that is what our aggregation theorems provide. We do not pursue this empirical angle here, but see
Example 2.9 and section 6.1 for discussion relevant to the natural idea that there is a connection between
non-expected utility and egalitarian attitudes.
In what follows, we discuss two standard approaches to non-expected utility theory. The upshot is
that ideas from non-expected utility theory provide two conceptually distinct paths from our aggregation
theorems to something at least close to Harsanyi-style utilitarianism. First, Theorems 5.2 and 5.3 show
that assuming monotonicity for the social preorder, along with some common background assumptions,
is enough to guarantee that the social preorder is represented by expected total utility. Second, even
if we deny monotonicity, Theorems 5.5 and 5.7 show that when the individual preorder has a ‘local
expected utility’ representation in the style of Machina (1982), the social preorder has a ‘local expected
total utility’ representation.
5.1. Axioms. One strand of non-expected utility theory has been to articulate axioms which mildly
weaken independence in natural ways. Some non-expected utility axioms are straightforwardly inherited
by the social preorder in both the constant and variable population cases. These include Betweenness,
Quasiconcavity, Quasiconvexity, Very Weak Substitution, and Mixture Symmetry. In addition, Weak
Substitution and Ratio Substitution are inherited in at least the constant population case.61 These
results follow easily from the fact that the map L 7→ pL (or L 7→ pIL) is mixture preserving.
These conditions are typically combined with continuity and completeness in the non-expected utility
literature, but there is work aimed at allowing for failures of each of those conditions. Just to give
one example, Karni and Zhou (2016) propose an axiom they call Weak Substitution for Noncomparable
Lotteries, a condition which relaxes Weak Substitution to accommodate incompleteness. At least in the
constant population case, this is also inherited by the social preorder.
Inheritance of other non-expected utility axioms is less straightforward, as they are designed only for
the case in which the set of outcomes is a compact interval of real numbers (Schmidt, 2004). Thus even
if we assumed W was such an interval, the axioms would not make sense for D = WI. (And even when
the axioms make sense, representation theorems designed for an interval of outcomes may not apply.)
That problem aside, the ease with which inheritance can be shown for the axioms so far discussed might
lead one to guess that inheritance is the rule. Nevertheless, some important non-expected utility axioms
are not inherited.
Suppose in general that X = P(Y ) is a convex set of probability measures on a measurable space
Y , and that X includes the delta-measure 1y for every y ∈ Y . Suppose that a preorder %X on P(Y )
is upper-measurable, meaning that Uy := {z ∈ Y : 1z %X 1y} is measurable for every y ∈ Y . Define a
preorder %SDX on P(Y ) by p %SDX q ⇐⇒ p(Uy) ≥ q(Uy) for all y ∈ Y . We say that p stochastically
dominates q when p %SDX q. Consider the following axiom, which requires consistency with stochastic
dominance.
61For definitions and sources of these axioms see e.g. Schmidt (2004).
UTILITARIANISM WITH AND WITHOUT EXPECTED UTILITY 29
Monotonicity (M). For an upper-measurable preorder %X ,
(i) p ∼SDX q =⇒ p ∼X q; and
(ii) p SDX q =⇒ p X q.
This axiom is widely assumed in non-expected utility theory. But the next example shows that the social
preorder does not always inherit (M) from the individual preorder, even in the constant population case.
Example 5.1. Make the assumptions of Example 2.9, where the individual preorder had a rank-dependent
utility representation. Again make the concrete assumption that r(x) = x2 and u(x) = x; equip W = R
and D = Rn with the Borel sigma algebras. Assume a population of n = 2 people. Then % ranks a
distribution d = (w1, w2) with welfare states w1 ≤ w2 according to the aggregate score V (d) = 34w1+ 14w2.
Both %P and % are upper measurable, and %P satisfies (M). Consider three distributions d1 = (0, 0),
d2 = (−1, 3) and d3 = (−2, 6). Then 1d1 ∼ 1d2 ∼ 1d3 , so that 1d1∼SDL := 121d2 + 121d3 . But U(p1d1 ) = 0
and U(pL) = − 14 , hence 1d1  L, violating (M)(i). For a violation of (M)(ii), let d4 = (− 18 ,− 18 ). Then
LSD1d4 but 1d4  L.
This example reveals tension in a common line of thought. For, in some variant, (M) has been seen as
‘[t]he most widely acknowledged principle of rational behavior under risk’ (Schmidt, 2004: p. 19). But
it is also sometimes said that rationality requires applying to the social preorder whatever conditions
one imposes on the individual preorder (compare Harsanyi 1977a: p. 637).
One response would be insist that (M) does apply to the social preorder, and say so much the worse
for non-expected utility theories that are forced to reject it there. But the following result suggests that
this response places very strong restrictions on non-expected utility theories: indeed, given common
background assumptions, (M) for the social preorder is equivalent to its having an EU representation
(in which case it has an expected total utility form, by Theorem 4.4). We state the variable population
version result first, and then note a version for a family of constant population models below.
Theorem 5.2. Suppose that %v is upper-measurable and generated by %Pv . Suppose, moreover, that Dv
contains every possible distribution with finitely many people, i.e. DvI = (Wv)I for each finite I ⊂ I∞;
that Pv and each LvI consist of all finitely supported probability measures on Wv and DvI respectively; and
that %Pv is complete and strongly continuous.62 Then
(i) The social preorder %v satisfies (M) if and only if the individual preorder %Pv satisfies EUT.
(ii) If %Pv has an EU representation Uv, normalized so that Uv(1Ω) = 0, then %v has an EU repre-
sentation V v =
∑
i∈I∞ U
v ◦ Pvi .
(iii) In particular, if %v satisfies (M), then %Pv and %v satisfy (I3), (P3) and (if restrictions exist) (S3).
Thus in this relatively simple setting, we obtain a total expected utility (or expected total utility)
representation of the social preorder from our axioms for aggregation merely by assuming completeness
and strong continuity for the individual preorder and monotonicity for the social preorder; such properties
as strong independence (I3), strong separability (S3), and Full Pareto (P3) are derived, not assumed. It
is worth noting the analogue of Theorem 5.2 for families of constant population models (in the sense of
section 4.3). The proof is exactly the same, with constant population objects substituted for variable
population ones. But the result is independently interesting because the hypotheses of completeness and
strong continuity may both be more compelling when we exclude Ω from the set of welfare states.
Theorem 5.3. Suppose that every social preorder %I in a family of constant population models is upper-
measurable and generated by %P . Suppose, moreover, that DI = WI for each finite I ⊂ I∞; that P and
each LI consist of all finitely supported probability measures on W and DI respectively; and that %P is
complete and strongly continuous. Then
62Say that a sequence (pn) in a space X = P(Y ) of probability measures converges strongly to p ∈ X (written pn s−→ p)
whenever pn(A) → p(A) for all measurable A in Y . A preorder %X on X is strongly continuous if whenever pn s−→ p, (i)
pn %X q for all n =⇒ p %X q; and (ii) q %X pn for all n =⇒ q %X p. This is, of course, an instance of the continuity
axiom (Cont): the topology is the one whose closed sets are precisely the subsets that contain the limit points of their
strongly convergent sequences.
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(i) Every %I satisfies (M) if and only if %P satisfies EUT.
(ii) If %P has an EU representation U , then each %I has an EU representation V =
∑
i∈I U ◦ Pi.
(iii) In particular, if every %I satisfies (M), then %P and every %I satisfy (I3), (P3) and (if restrictions
exist) (S3).
These results make it seem unpromising (although perhaps not impossible) to pursue non-expected
utility theory for social preorders based on (M). Of course, even if we maintain (M) for the individual
preorder, denying it for social preorders also has its costs, not least that it rules out the application of
representation theorems for social preorders that take (M) as a premise. We therefore now turn to a kind
of non-expected utility representation that does not depend on (M) and which can apply to individual
and social preorders alike.
5.2. Local expected utility. The axiomatic approach to non-expected utility theory tries to respect
the normative plausibility of independence by focusing on axioms that weaken it only mildly. An
alternative approach, pioneered by Machina (1982), abandons independence entirely while imposing
technical conditions on preorders that are just strong enough to allow one to apply expected utility
techniques locally in order to deduce important global properties. A number of technical conditions
have been considered; we focus on one that allows us to elaborate on the utilitarian nature of our social
preorders. We begin by explicating a sense, weaker than Machina’s, in which a preorder of probability
measures can be locally governed by expected utility.
Let X = P(Y ) be a convex set of probability measures on Y . Recall from section 4.2 that a function
f : Y → R is P (Y )-integrable if it is Lebesgue integrable with respect to every element of P (Y ); and
that a function U : P(Y )→ R is expectational if there is a P(Y )-integrable function u such that, for any
q ∈ P(Y ), U(q) = ∫
Y
udq. Now, for any basepoint p ∈ P(Y ), we can rewrite this as U(p + t(q − p)) =∫
Y
ud(p+ t(q− p)) for all q ∈ P(Y ) and t ∈ [0, 1]. It is natural to say that U is a locally expectational at
p if there is a function up satisfying this equation up to first order in t. To be precise, U : P(Y )→ R is
locally expectational at p ∈ P(Y ) if there is a P(Y )-integrable function up such that, for each q ∈ P(Y ),
(5) U(p+ t(q − p)) =
∫
Y
up d(p+ t(q − p)) + o(t) as t→ 0+.63
Call such a up a local utility function for U at p. We say U is locally expectational on a subset S ⊂ P (Y )
to mean that it is locally expectational at every p ∈ S.
Consider the following condition on a preorder %X on P(Y ). For a reason we will soon explain (see
note 71), we state it relative to a subset S ⊂ P(Y ); if not explicitly mentioned, S = P(Y ).
Local EUT over S. There is a function U : P(Y ) → R that represents %X and that is locally
expectational on S. We say that U is a Local EU representation of %X over S.
While there are normatively natural axiomatizations of EUT, Multi EUT, and Vector EUT, the
normative significance of Local EUT can be understood via a differentiability concept. A function
U : P (Y )→ R is said to be Gaˆteaux differentiable at p ∈ P (Y ) if the one-sided limit
(6) U ′p(q − p) := lim
t→0+
U(p+ t(q − p))− U(p)
t
exists for all q ∈ P (Y ).64 Thus U ′p(q− p) is a directional derivative of U at p in the direction q− p. Say
that U is integrally Gaˆteaux differentiable at p ∈ P (Y ) when it is Gaˆteaux differentiable at p and there
exists a P (Y )-integrable up : Y → R such that
(7) U ′p(q − p) =
∫
Y
up d(q − p)
63Recall that the expression ‘f(t) = g(t) + o(t) as t→ 0+’ means limt→0+ f(t)−g(t)t = 0.
64Our notion of Gaˆteaux differentiability is very weak, as it only requires a one-sided limit, only considers q ∈ P (Y ),
and does not make any topological assumptions. It coincides with what is sometimes known as semi-differentiability.
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for all q ∈ P (Y ).65 Let ∇Up be the set of such up; thus U is integrally Gaˆteaux differentiable at p if
and only if ∇Up 6= ∅. It is well known that many normatively natural conditions on %X are compatible
with, and sometimes guarantee,66 the assumption that %X can be represented by an integrally Gaˆteaux
differentiable function. But then %X must satisfy Local EUT:
Lemma 5.4. Suppose P(Y ) is a convex set of probability measures on a measurable space Y . Then
U : P(Y )→ R is locally expectational at p ∈ P(Y ) if and only if it is integrally Gaˆteaux differentiable at p.
Specifically, the local utility functions for U at p are precisely those up ∈ ∇Up such that U(p) =
∫
Y
up dp.
In parallel to the constant population claims of Theorem 4.4 we have
Theorem 5.5 (Local EUT inheritance: constant population). Suppose %P generates %.
(i) %P satisfies Local EUT if and only if % does.
(ii) In particular, if %P has a Local EU representation U , then % has a Local EU representation
V (L) := #IU(pL).67
(iii) If uL is a local utility function for U at pL, then
∑
i∈I uL ◦ Wi is a local utility function for V at
L.
This result has two significant implications. First, the often justifiable assumption of Local EUT for
the individual preorder guarantees that Local EUT techniques and results can be applied to the social
preorder as well.68 Second, in Theorem 4.4, we saw that if the individual preorder has an expected
utility representation, then the social preorder has a representation by expected total utility. Corre-
spondingly, the last part of Theorem 5.5 shows that if the individual preorder has a local expected
utility representation, then the social preorder has what we can analogously call a local expected total
utility representation.69 This local version of Theorem 4.4(ii) bolsters the view that the social preorders
described by our aggregation theorems are utilitarian in spirit even when they do not satisfy (I3).
70
We would like to extend Theorem 5.5 to the variable population case. As usual (see section 3.1),
there is no problem in doing so for each finite population I ⊂ I∞: for any Local EU representation Uv
of %Pv , and any L ∈ LvI , we can define V v(L) = #IUv(pIL), in parallel to Theorem 5.5(ii). This will be a
Local EU representation of the restriction of %v to LvI , with a local expected total utility interpretation
as in Theorem 5.5(iii). The proofs are the same as in the constant population case. The only difficulty
is that this V v(L) is not a function of L independent of I, so does not define a representation of the
unrestricted social preorder.
To avoid this difficulty, we will focus on a narrower class of variable population social preorders,
for which an unrestricted representation V v is readily defined. We first explain why this class is still
generated by a rich and normatively interesting set of individual preorders. Say that a function Uv : Pv →
R is Omega-linear if for all P ∈ Pv and α ∈ [0, 1],
(8) Uv(αP + (1− α)1Ω) = αUv(P ) + (1− α)Uv(1Ω).
65Similar definitions, but with more restrictions on up or Y , are found in Chew, Karni and Safra (1987), Chew and Mao
(1995), and Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2016). For example, the latter, from whom we borrow notation,
assume up is continuous and bounded, but we make no such assumption.
66See Chew and Mao (1995) for a summary when Y is a real interval and P (Y ) is the set of Borel probability measures.
67The #I in the definition of V is optional here, but it facilitates comparison with the variable population analogue (9)
in which the corresponding factor is necessary.
68See Cerreia-Vioglio et al (2016) for extensive discussion of the global properties of preorders that satisfy (in our
terminology) Local EUT in terms of their local utility functions, along with detailed applications.
69A slightly different notion of local utilitarianism was discussed by Machina (1982: §5.2). His notion applies to social
welfare functions on ‘wealth distributions’, which he idealizes as probability measures on W.
70It is worth noting that the individual preorder in Example 5.1 satisfies Local EUT, even though the social preorder
does not satisfy (M). Thus Theorem 5.5 applies, even if nothing like Theorem 5.3 does. This illustrates the generality of the
local expected utility-based methods. It also illustrates the strategy of using a standard non-expected utility theory (here,
rank-dependent utility theory) for the individual preorder to derive Local EU representations of both the individual and
social preorders. It would work less well to start from a standard non-expected utility theory for the social preorder, since
such theories invariably assume (M), and, as we noted in section 5.1, (M) for the social preorder is a stringent assumption.
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Similarly, say that a function V v : L → R is dΩ-linear if for all L ∈ Lv and α ∈ [0, 1],
V v(αL+ (1− α)1dΩ) = αV v(L) + (1− α)V v(1dΩ).
Recall from Lemma 3.3 that dΩ here is the empty distribution.
Lemma 5.6. Suppose Pv extends P (see section 3.4). Let U : P → R.
(i) For any c ∈ R, U has a unique Omega-linear extension Uv : Pv → R that satisfies Uv(1Ω) = c.
(ii) If U is locally expectational on P, such a Uv is locally expectational on Pv \ {1Ω}.
We have noted that there is a normatively interesting class of constant population individual preorders
that satisfy Local EUT. Any such %P has a locally expectational representation U . By the lemma, U
has an Omega-linear extension Uv which is locally expectational on Pv \ {1Ω} with a free choice of the
value of Uv(1Ω), implying flexibility in how nonexistence is compared with other welfare states. This
Uv represents an Omega independent %Pv that extends %. Thus the individual preorders to which the
next result applies form a rich class.71
Theorem 5.7 (Local EUT inheritance: variable population). Suppose %Pv generates %v. Assume that
the sigma algebra on Dv is coherent.72
(i) %Pv satisfies Local EUT over Pv \ {1Ω} with respect to an Omega linear representation if and only
if %v satisfies Local EUT over Lv \ {1dΩ} with respect to an dΩ-linear representation.
(ii) In particular, if %Pv has an Omega-linear representation Uv that is Local EU over Pv \ {1Ω}, then
%Pv has an dΩ-linear representation V v that is Local EU over Lv \ {1dΩ}, defined for L ∈ LvI by
(9) V v(L) := #IUv(pIL)−#IUv(1Ω).73
(iii) If Uv is normalized so that Uv(1Ω) = 0, then, for any L ∈ LvI \ {1dΩ}, if uL is a local utility
function for Uv at pIL,
∑
i∈I∞ uL ◦Wvi is a local utility function for V v at L.
The normalization condition in (iii) has the usual significance: given one Omega-linear representation
of %Pv that is locally expectational on Pv\{1Ω}, we can obtain another by adding a constant. Aside from
the requirement of Omega-linearity, the implications of Theorem 5.7 parallel those of Theorem 5.5. In
particular, a wide range of variable population social preorders are compatible with constant population
individual preorders that satisfy normatively interesting non-expected utility conditions, and except
perhaps at one point, these social preorders have local expected total utility representations.
6. Comparisons
We now relate our aggregation theorems to several standard topics: egalitarianism; the ex ante versus
ex post distinction; utilitarianism; and Harsanyi’s impartial observer theorem. We end with discussion
of related literature.
6.1. Quasi utilitarianism and egalitarianism. Recall that we have defined quasi utilitarian social
preorders to be precisely the social preorders that are compatible with our aggregation theorems (Defini-
tions 2.3 and 3.7). We will defend this terminology in section 6.3. But we know of no discussion of quasi
utilitarian preorders, so our goal in this section is to discuss their properties in more detail, especially
by contrasting them with egalitarian social preorders. First we show that they form a rich class: they
are compatible with a wide variety of social preorders on distributions.
To simplify the discussion, let us assume that Dv is the set of all possible distributions with finite
populations, and that D is the set of all possible distributions with some given constant population. We
71It is easy to check from the definitions that, if Uv is Omega-linear, then the Gaˆteaux derivative (Uv)′1Ω (P − 1Ω) =
Uv(P )− Uv(1Ω). It follows from (7) and Lemma 5.4 that if u is a local utility function for Uv at 1Ω, then Uv is an EUT
representation, equal to the expectation of u. This is why we do not insist on Local EUT over Pv in the next theorem.
72We defined ‘coherent’ just before Proposition 3.8. Just as in that proposition, it would suffice to assume that I∞ is
countable, although we do not pursue this here.
73Since Uv is Omega-linear, it is easy to check that V v(L) is a well-defined function of L ∈ Lv, independent of I.
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also assume that the sigma algebras on Dv and D separate points,74 so that if d 6= d′ then 1d 6= 1d′ . We
can therefore think of distributions as delta-measures. Finally, we assume that Lv and L contain 1d for
any d in Dv and D respectively.
Say that a preorder %v0 on Dv is consistent with quasi utilitarianism if there exists some quasi util-
itarian preorder %v on Lv such that for all d, d′ ∈ Dv, d %v0 d′ ⇐⇒ 1d %v 1d′ . We can similarly
ask whether a preorder %0 on D is consistent with quasi utilitarianism for the given finite population:
whether d %0 d′ ⇐⇒ 1d % 1d′ for all d, d′ ∈ D. Discussions of distributive views like utilitarianism
or egalitarianism often focus solely on risk-free cases, so it is natural to ask which preorders on distri-
butions are consistent with quasi utilitarianism. We answer this question in terms of the following two
conditions.
Risk-Free Anonymity Given d ∈ D and σ ∈ Σ, we have d ∼0 σd.
Say that c ∈ Dv is an m-scaling of d ∈ Dv if it consists of ‘m copies’ of d—that is, there is an m-to-1 map
s of I∞ onto itself such that Wvi (c) =Wvs(i)(d) for every individual i. For example, (x, x, y, y,Ω,Ω, . . . )
is a 2-scaling of (x, y,Ω, . . . ).
Scale Invariance If, for some m > 0, c, c′ ∈ Dv are m-scalings of d, d′ ∈ Dv respectively, then
c %v0 c′ ⇐⇒ d %v0 d′.
Risk-Free Anonymity is obviously a very weak and uncontroversial constraint, while Scale Invariance
is a seemingly modest generalization75 (they are equivalent when m = 1). But these are the only
constraints imposed by consistency with quasi utilitarianism.
Proposition 6.1. Under the assumptions just made:
(i) A preorder on D is consistent with constant population quasi utilitarianism if and only if it satisfies
Risk-Free Anonymity.
(ii) A preorder on Dv is consistent with variable population quasi utilitarianism if and only if it satisfies
Scale Invariance.
This result shows that many seemingly reasonable egalitarian (and other) preorders of distributions
are consistent with quasi utilitarianism. This raises questions about the significance of quasi utilitarian
preorders as a class. In particular, why do they merit the ‘quasi utilitarian’ name, if they include
preorders with apparently egalitarian properties?
In fact, despite this worry, the axioms of our aggregation theorems precisely rule out certain features
of the social preorder that may be considered essential to standard egalitarian concerns. Thus, even if
some quasi utilitarian preorders are egalitarian in some useful sense, quasi utilitarianism still excludes
the main lines of egalitarianism. To see this, suppose given welfare states x and z with x P z, and a
population consisting of Ann and Bob. Consider the following lotteries (in which each column displays
a distribution with a 1/2 chance of occuring).
LE
1
2
1
2
Ann x z
Bob x z
LF
1
2
1
2
Ann x z
Bob z x
LU
1
2
1
2
Ann x x
Bob z z
It is arguable that LE is socially better than LF on the grounds that while Ann and Bob face identical
prospects (and therefore ex ante equality obtains) in both, LE ensures ex post equality (Myerson, 1981).
It is also arguable that LF is better than LU on the grounds that while there is nothing to chose between
their outcomes, under LF there is ex ante equality, so LF is apparently fairer (Diamond, 1967).
In our view, suitable generalizations of ‘LE  LF ’ and ‘LF  LU ’ are essential to ex post and ex
ante egalitarianism respectively.76 In related work, we use this idea to develop accounts of ex ante and
74This is weaker than the assumption that singletons are measurable.
75Though see note 77.
76For similar views, see Broome (1989, 1991); Ben-Porath, Gilboa, and Schmeidler (1997); Fleurbaey (2010); Grant,
Kajii, Polak and Safra (2012b); Saito (2013); and McCarthy (2015) among others. For surveys on ex ante and ex post
egalitarianism see Mongin and Pivato (2016a: §§25–26) and Fleurbaey (2018).
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ex post egalitarianism that are compatible with any individual preorder. This leads to a taxonomy
of the main distributive views in which quasi utilitarianism is distinguished from the other views by
containing at its core the indifference to equality expressed by ‘LE ∼ LF ∼ LU ’. Quasi-utilitarianism
is inconsistent with ex ante egalitarianism because it accepts Two-Stage Anonymity, and is inconsistent
with ex post egalitarianism because it accepts Anteriority. Thus despite the egalitarian appearance of
some quasi utilitarian preorders of distributions, there is a sharp distinction between quasi utilitarianism
and standard forms of egalitarianism.
Because it accepts Reduction to Prospects, quasi utilitarianism also conflicts with two other ideas
that are at least related to egalitarianism. Let w, x, y, z ∈W. First, suppose that w ∼Pv Ω. Recall that
dΩ is the empty distribution in which no one exists, and let (w) and (w,w) denote distributions with,
respectively, one or two people in welfare state w. By Reduction to Prospects, dΩ ∼v (w) ∼v (w,w).
But an egalitarian might judge that (w,w) v (w) on the grounds that while the two distributions are
equally good from the point of view of wellbeing, (w,w) contains more of the good of equality.77 Second,
in moral philosophy a distributive view known as ‘prioritarianism’ or ‘the priority view’ has been much
discussed, although it is sometimes seen just as a variant of egalitarianism (see Tungodden 2003 for
discussion). Suppose that the individual preorder is indifferent between y and equal chances of x and
z. It is arguable that the core idea of prioritarianism is to socially strictly prefer the distribution (y)
to equal chances of (x) and (z), expressing a form of social risk aversion which is inconsistent with the
constant population version of Reduction to Prospects (McCarthy, 2017).78
6.2. Ex ante and ex post . We now explain why there is a natural sense in which quasi utilitarian
preorders are those social preorders that are weakly ex ante and anonymously ex post. This generalizes
the contrast between quasi utilitarianism and ex post and ex ante egalitarianism developed in 6.1.
We focus on the constant population case, the variable case being parallel. The Pareto conditions
discussed below (and introduced in section 4.3) are therefore understood relative to a fixed population.
As throughout, we assume probabilities are given, and thus do not address problems that arise from
defining ex ante principles in terms of possibly differing individual subjective probabilities.79
6.2.1. Ex ante. Let (Ant) and (RP) stand for Anteriority and Reduction to Prospects. The following
irreversible implications are obtained by noting that (RP) is equivalent to the restriction of (P3) to
lotteries in L(P).
(RP)⇐ (P3)⇒ (P2)⇒ (P1)⇒ (Ant)
Social preorders are commonly said to be ex ante if, in some sense, they respect unanimous ‘before the
event’ judgments of individual welfare. Each of the above principles expresses some way of making this
rough idea precise, which helps explain why ‘ex ante’ is used quite flexibly. But the most popular inter-
pretation sees social preorders as ex ante if they satisfy strong Pareto (P2) (Mongin and d’Aspremont,
1998: §5.4). This corresponds to a relatively strong notion of unanimity: respect the unanimous judg-
ments of non-indifferent individuals. But this notion of unanimity is more fully captured by (P3), which
strengthens (P2) in cases where the individual preorder is incomplete. We therefore suggest that it is
social preorders which satisfy (P3) which should be seen as ex ante.
However, as long as the social preorder is impartial in the sense expressed by Two-Stage Anonymity,
requiring it also to be ex ante in the sense of (P3) carries an implicit commitment: it effectively means
that the individual preorder has to satisfy strong independence (see Theorem 4.10). But that rules out
a wide range of possibilities for individual welfare comparisons, so it is natural to ask which principle
expresses the ex ante idea as strongly as possible while remaining neutral on the properties of the
individual preorder. According to our aggregation theorem 2.2, that principle is the conjunction of
(Ant) and (RP). We will therefore say that social preorders satisfying that conjunct are weakly ex ante.
77Such egalitarians would reject Scale Invariance.
78It is not our goal to evaluate the disputes with quasi utilitarianism. But for criticisms of egalitarianism and priori-
tarianism as construed here, see McCarthy (2015: §§20 and 21) and McCarthy (2017: §11).
79For an entry into the huge literature on this topic, see Mongin and Pivato (2016b); see also section 6.7.4.
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Similarly, in the variable population case, we will say that a social preorder satisfying (P3) is ex ante,
and one satisfying Anteriority and Reduction to Prospects is weakly ex ante.
6.2.2. Ex post. Social preorders are often said to be ex post when they satisfy expected utility theory
(Mongin and d’Aspremont, 1998: §5.4). But this seems distant from the ordinary meaning of the term,
which suggests that lotteries should be socially evaluated from some sort of ‘after the event’ perspective
in which all risk has resolved. In particular, if two lotteries are in some natural sense equivalent from
that perspective, then they should be ranked as equals.
To approach the matter more directly, let us suppose thatX = P(Y ) is a set of probability measures on
a measurable space Y , and that the following domain condition (∗) is satisfied: the set {y} is measurable
for each y ∈ Y , and P(Y ) contains each corresponding delta-measure 1y. Say that a subset B of P(Y )
is ‘closed under indifference’ if y ∈ B and 1y ∼X 1y′ entail y′ ∈ B. The following condition seems to
capture a general sense in which a preorder %X on P(Y ) should count as ex post.
Posteriority. Given p, p′ ∈ P(Y ), suppose that p(B) = p′(B) whenever B is a measurable subset
of Y that is closed under indifference. Then p ∼X p′.
For example, assume that domain condition (∗) holds for the set of lotteries L. Say that a ‘level of social
welfare’ is an equivalence class of distributions under the social indifference relation ∼. Two lotteries
are naturally said to be equivalent from an ‘after the event’ perspective whenever they define the same
probability measure over levels of social welfare. Posteriority then says that two such lotteries are equally
good.80 For this reason, we will say that a social preorder is ex post if it satisfies Posteriority.81
Continuing with the domain conditions, if B is a measurable subset of D that is closed under indiffer-
ence, Risk-Free Anonymity implies that B is permutation-invariant. Hence given Risk-Free Anonymity,
Posterior Anonymity emerges as a much weaker, special case of Posteriority. It is therefore natural
to call social preorders satisfying Posterior Anonymity anonymously ex post. The same applies in the
variable population case.
An appealing feature of this terminology is that anonymously ex post social preorders rule out ex ante
egalitarianism, and weakly ex ante social preorders rule out ex post egalitarianism (see section 6.1).
It should be noted that this derivation of Posterior Anonymity does not always make sense in our very
general framework, as the domain condition (∗) is not guaranteed to hold. For example, our framework
does not require that 1d is in L for all d in D. Nevertheless, Posterior Anonymity has self-standing
appeal, and is always well-defined in our framework.
6.2.3. Two-Stage Anonymity and the aggregation theorems redux. Two-Stage Anonymity is entailed by
Posterior Anonymity, and although Posterior Anonymity is our conceptually favored principle, it was
simpler to work with Two-Stage Anonymity. Nevertheless, granted the harmless assumption of coher-
ence in the variable population case, Propositions 2.4 and 3.8 show that Two-Stage Anonymity and
Posterior Anonymity are equivalent given our other axioms for aggregation. Thus we can recapitulate
our aggregation theorems as follows.
Proposition 6.2. Any social preorder (constant or variable population) that is generated by a given
individual preorder is the unique social preorder that is weakly ex ante and anonymously ex post. (In
the variable-population case, we assume that the sigma-algebra on Dv is coherent.)
In section 2.3 we raised the question of how Two-Stage Anonymity is related to strong independence
as a condition on the social preorder. Assuming Anonymity for this discussion, it is clear that Two-Stage
Anonymity follows more specifically from the weaker ‘independence of indifference’ axiom (I1) we stated
in section 4.1. As we have just noted, Two-Stage Anonymity also follows from Posteriority, and also
from the closely related part (i) of monotonicity. It is therefore natural to wonder whether Two-Stage
Anonymity really represents a significant weakening of these three alternative principles.
80Compare the discussion of Posterior Anonymity in section 2.3, and especially note 18.
81Note that, when the social preorder is upper-measurable, so that the stochastic dominance relation is defined, Pos-
teriority is implied by the first part of monotonicity, (M)(i), and these conditions often coincide in practice. Even then,
though, Posteriority is logically weaker, and gets more directly at the ex post idea.
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In fact, it is much weaker than any of them, even when it is combined with our other axioms for
aggregation. To see this, note two points. First, our axioms for aggregation are compatible with any
constant population individual preorder %P (Theorem 2.2 and Proposition 3.10(i)). Second, no matter
how severely %P violates the three alternative principles, the social preorder % it generates will always
satisfy Two-Stage Anonymity, but will violate the alternative principles in a comparably severe manner.
This is because, by Reduction to Prospects, the restriction of % to L(P) is a copy of %P .82 Examples like
5.1 also show that, even if the individual preorder satisfies (M)(i) and, relatedly, Posteriority, the social
preorder need not do so. We noted in section 5.1 that axiomatic approaches to non-expected utility
weaken independence only mildly, and invariably impose monotonicity. Since Two-Stage Anonymity
allows for major violations of those principles, Two-Stage Anonymity is compatible with violations
that are far more severe than any which would be taken seriously by non-expected utility theorists.
Thus although it is ex post enough to rule out Diamond’s example of ex ante egalitarianism, Two-
Stage Anonymity is much weaker than the conjunction of Anonymity with any of the standard ex post
principles. The same conclusion applies to Posterior Anonymity, since, as we noted above, it is essentially
equivalent to Two-Stage Anonymity given our other axioms for aggregation.
6.3. Utilitarianism. The case for our ‘quasi utilitarian’ terminology rests on the claim that our social
preorders have enough properities traditionally associated with utilitarianism to merit the name (see
note 3). The principal properties here are indifference to ex ante and ex post equality, anonymity, and the
positive dependence of social welfare on individual welfare given by Reduction to Prospects. The reason
for the ‘quasi’ is that our social preorders do not always have well-behaved total utility representations,83
nor do they necessarily satisfy separability or Pareto conditions, even in risk-free cases; these conditions
might fairly be seen as important utilitarian commitments.
Setting aside one subtlety to which we return below, it is only when our preorders satisfy strong
independence (I3) that they possess the full range of properties naturally associated with utilitarianism,
including Pareto (P3) and separability (S3). In addition, (I3) for the individual preorder is necessary
and sufficient for the social preorder to have the well-behaved expected total utility representation of
section 4.2. Thus we propose to define as utilitarian precisely those social preorders that are generated
by an individual preorder that satisfies (I3). The discussion of section 5.2 suggests that a fairly general
and important range of social preorders should then be deemed locally utilitarian.
The subtlety is that one might identify utilitarianism with a slightly broader class of social preorders
by replacing (I3) with its ‘rational’ version (I
Q
3 ). As noted in section 4.3, this would allow an espe-
cially parsimonious axiomatization that directly expresses classical utilitarian ideas without any appeal
to independence. The most visibly utilitarian variant (Theorem 4.10 note 60) assumes only Posterior
Anonymity and the Pareto principle (P3). But Pareto and Risk-Free Anonymity are central utilitarian
ideas, while the extension of Risk-Free Anonymity to Posterior Anonymity is a modest expression of the
teleological basis of classical utilitarianism (compare section 6.2.2). This proposal would still give utili-
tarian social preorders a reasonably well-behaved expected total utility representation (Theorem 4.10),
and would imply the separability principle (S3). Nonetheless, as we explained after Proposition 4.8, it
is so implausible to violate (I3) while satisfying (I
Q
3 ), and (I3) is so standard and technically convenient,
that for pragmatic reasons we recommend the slightly narrower identification.
82Here is a simple example of an individual preorder that violates (I1), (M)(i), and Posteriority in an appropriately
severe way. Set W = {x, y}, and let P contain all probability measures on W (with every subset of W being measurable).
Let the individual preorder be such that 1x ∼P 1y , with all non-trivial mixtures of 1x and 1y ranked equally but strictly
below 1x and 1y . This models a pure and extreme form of uncertainty-aversion.
83There is a superficial sense in which every quasi utilitarian social preorder has an additive representation. Sticking
to the constant population case, we could take V = Span(P) as our utility space, and extend %P to a preorder on V.
Then L 7→ pL ∈ V is a vector valued representation of %, and since pL =
∑
i∈I
1
#IPi(L), one might say it is a total
utility representation. But we cannot necessarily define %V in a way that validates the natural requirement that a sum
is an increasing function of its summands. All of the ‘total utility’ representations we study in this paper satisfy this
requirement, which is obviously related to Pareto and separability.
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6.4. Harsanyi’s utilitarian theorem. Harsanyi’s (1955) utilitarian theorem, as we sketched in sec-
tion 1, derived a real-valued, expected total utility representation of the constant population social
preorder. He used premises which, translated into our framework, amount to EUT for the individual
preorder, EUT for the social preorder, Anonymity, and strong Pareto (P2). In Theorem 4.4 we showed
how to derive the same result simply by adding EUT for the individual preorder to our basic axioms
of Anteriority, Reduction to Prospects, and Two-Stage Anonymity. The premises we use, then, are
weaker than Harsanyi’s: Two-Stage Anonymity is much weaker than the conjunction of social EUT and
Anonymity, while Anteriority and Reduction to Prospects are together much weaker than (P2), given
that the individual preorder satisfies EUT and is therefore complete.
6.5. The veil of ignorance. Harsanyi (1953) gave a different argument for utilitarianism, often known
as his impartial observer theorem. The distinctive premise is that social evaluation corresponds to
self-interested evaluation by someone behind a veil of ignorance, uncertain who he is.
Surprisingly, Harsanyi seems not to have thought that his utilitarian theorem would extend to variable
populations. He used the veil of ignorance in that case, and argued that it leads to average rather than
total utilitarianism, a claim that has often been endorsed.84 But appeals to the veil of ignorance have
been criticized in the constant population case,85 and they are especially difficult to interpret, let alone
justify, in the variable case. For example, it is unclear whether individuals behind the veil are required
to be certain of their existence.
However, while we do not endorse the veil of ignorance as a basic axiom, our Theorems 2.2 and 3.6
can nevertheless be seen as supporting a quite general version of the veil as a derived principle. In the
variable population case, for example, the lottery pIL defined in Theorem 3.6 can be interpreted as the
prospect faced by an individual behind a veil, in the sense that he has an equal chance of being any
member of I under L. So the quasi utilitarian social preorders are precisely the ones that correspond to
individual preorders behind this veil.
This version of the veil is compatible with average utilitarianism, as we saw in Example 3.12; indeed,
Harsanyi endorsed the kind of individual preorder used in that example (Ng, 1983). But as illustrated
in sections 3.5 and 3.6, quasi utilitarianism is compatible with many other social preorders as well,
including total utilitarianism.86
6.6. An alternative. We now remark on an alternative way of generalizing Harsanyi’s work. One of
our aims has been to show that a Harsanyi-like approach to social aggregation can be maintained even
if strong independence is rejected. But as we now explain, the rejection of strong independence leads to
tension between two ideas that may each seem central to Harsanyi’s utilitarianism.
The discussion after Theorem 4.10 shows that Two-Stage (or Posterior) Anonymity and Full Pareto
together imply that the social preorder is quasi utilitarian and that both the social and individual
preorders satisfy strong independence, at least in its rational-coefficient form. Rejecting strong indepen-
dence for the individual preorder in any plausible way therefore means abandoning either Two-Stage
Anonymity or Full Pareto.87 However, both Two-Stage Anonymity and Full Pareto seem strongly in the
spirit of Harsanyi’s approach. Two-Stage Anonymity is entailed by premises Harsanyi accepts, captur-
ing (for one thing) indifference to ex ante equality. While he does not consider Full Pareto, Harsanyi
(1977a) regards strong Pareto as a rather obvious assumption, and in section 4.3 we suggested that Full
84Harsanyi’s views about the variable population case are mainly presented in correspondence quoted in Ng (1983), but
see also Harsanyi (1977a: note 12). The claim that the veil supports average utilitarianism was also made by Rawls (1971:
§27), who coined the phrase ‘veil of ignorance’, and is also implicit in Vickrey (1945); see Kavka (1975), Barry (1977), and
Ng (1983) for skepticism.
85See for example Scanlon (1982) and Broome (1991: §3.3).
86For a modification of the constant population veil of ignorance that is incompatible with our approach, see the defense
of ‘generalized utilitarianism’ in Grant, Kajii, Polak and Safra (2010, 2012a). Their approach is designed to accommodate
different attitudes to risk within the population in a way that in our framework would clash with Two-Stage Anonymity.
87It is worth noting that this observation applies directly to the version of the veil of ignorance that is vindicated by our
aggregation theorems (see section 6.5). If the impartial observer’s preferences over prospects violate strong independence,
her social preferences over lotteries essentially cannot satisfy both Two-Stage (or Posterior) Anonymity and Full Pareto.
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Pareto is the natural way to extend strong Pareto in the face of incompleteness. Thus rejecting strong
independence for the individual preorder involves a commitment to rejecting at least one assumption
that is arguably integral to Harsanyi’s approach.88 In this paper we have taken Two-Stage Anonymity
as a basic axiom, and allowed for the rejection of Full Pareto. But it would be natural to instead explore
the possibilities for a Harsanyi-like approach that retains Full Pareto while allowing for the rejection
of Two-Stage Anonymity, and thereby strong independence. The task would be to look for principles
that sufficiently weaken Two-Stage Anonymity while preserving impartiality and indifference to ex ante
equality. But we leave this for another time.
6.7. Related literature. We will not repeat comparisons made with Harsanyi in sections 1, 6.4, and
6.5. Instead, we briefly relate our results to some recent developments. These can be classified according
to which aspects of the framework of Harsanyi’s social aggregation theorem they preserve. Recall from
the introduction that this framework assumes a constant population, does not assume interpersonal
comparisons, and involves risk rather than other forms of uncertainty.
6.7.1. Constant and variable population, no interpersonal comparisons, risk. For derivations of the con-
clusion of Harsanyi’s social aggregation theorem using weaker assumptions, see Fleurbaey (2009: Thm.
1) and Mongin and Pivato (2015). For generalizations of the theorem still assuming no interpersonal
comparisons and risk, see Hammond (1988) (variable populations); Zhou (1997) (allowing for infinite pop-
ulations); Danan, Gajdos and Tallon (2015) (dropping completeness, allowing for infinite populations);
and McCarthy et al (2017b) (dropping completeness and continuity, allowing for infinite populations).
6.7.2. Constant population, interpersonal comparisons, risk. Harsanyi-like results that, like ours, explic-
itly assume a single individual preorder, and a form of anonymity, but weaken the premises of Harsanyi’s
utilitarian theorem, are given in Fleurbaey (2009) and Pivato (2013).
Fleurbaey (2009: Thm. 2) derives a constant population, finite support, total expected utility rep-
resentation based on ordinary expected utility theory for the individual preorder, completeness for the
social preorder, strong Pareto, anonymity, and a dominance condition similar to (M). This weakens
Harsanyi’s assumptions by not requiring continuity or independence for the social preorder. Differences
in framework make difficult a strict comparison to our own results, but suffice to note that the ordinary
EUT version of our Theorem 4.4(ii) rests on significantly weaker premises: it does not require social
completeness, uses only Reduction to Prospects and Anteriority instead of strong Pareto, and uses only
Two-Stage Anonymity instead of anonymity and dominance (cf. section 6.2). Our Theorems 4.10 and 5.3
derive similar results based on Pareto and (M) without even assuming EUT for the individual preorder.
In the result that is closest to ours, Pivato (2013: Thm. 2.1) assumes Pareto and independence axioms
for the individual and social preorders,89 along with Anonymity. He shows that the social preorder must
extend the one generated by the individual preorder. This shows that if the individual preorder is
complete, then so is the social preorder; more generally, it restricts the degree of incompleteness of the
social preorder in terms of that of the individual preorder.
Our Theorem 2.2 improves this picture. Its conclusion is that the social preorder is identical to the one
generated by the individual preorder, showing precisely how incompleteness of the individual preorder
determines that of the social preorder. Moreover, it makes no assumptions at all about the individual
preorder, and rests on premises that are much weaker than Pivato’s in most respects. The only premise
that is not implied by any of Pivato’s is a component of Reduction to Prospects: for any P , P ′ in P,
P upriseP P ′ =⇒ L(P )upriseL(P ′). This principle expresses a natural connection between individual and social
incompleteness, and we suggest that it is very plausible.
88Theorem 5.3 makes a similar point: monotonicity for the social preorder entails strong independence, albeit with
somewhat restrictive background conditions. Given that standard ways of rejecting strong independence typically maintain
monotonicity, the latter might also be seen as a core commitment of Harsanyi’s utilitarianism.
89These are intermediate in strength between (I1)/(P1) and (I2)/(P2).
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6.7.3. Variable population, interpersonal comparisons, risk. An extension of Harsanyi’s utilitarian the-
orem to the variable population case, resulting in critical level utilitarianism, is given in Blackorby,
Bossert, and Donaldson (1998, 2007). Along with the full expected utility framework, this result as-
sumes that at least some distributions have a critical level (roughly, a utility level at which creating
an additional person would be a matter of social indifference). Under one of several important inter-
pretations, Pivato (2014: Thm. 1) shows, roughly, that for variable but finite populations, there is
a Harsanyi-like mixture-preserving total utility representation into a linearly ordered abelian group if
and only if the social preorder is complete, anonymous, and satisfies a separability condition. Under
this interpretation, the separability condition implies both strong independence and strong separability
across individuals. Thus the main advance in terms of ethical assumptions is to have dispensed with
continuity.90 In contrast, our Theorem 3.6 neither assumes nor implies completeness, continuity, strong
independence, strong separability across people, or the existence of a critical level for some distribution.
When we further assume that the individual preorder is strongly independent, we obtain an expecta-
tional, and therefore mixture-preserving (note 54), total utility representation into a preordered vector
space. As Pivato notes, a linearly ordered abelian group can always be embedded in an ordered vector
space (and specifically into a lexicographic function space, by the Hahn embedding theorem), so our use
of preordered vector spaces as utility spaces allows his kind of representation as a special case (compare
Remark 4.7). One difference is that Pivato’s framework is designed to allow for infinitesimal probabili-
ties, whereas we have assumed standard real-valued probabilities. But as discussed in section 2.7, this
assumption plays no real role in either of our aggregation theorems.
6.7.4. Constant population, no interpersonal comparisons, uncertainty. In Harsanyi’s social aggregation
theorem, each individual’s preorder and the social preorder apply to lotteries, understood as probability
measures on a shared outcome space. His result is therefore most obviously relevant to situations
in which probabilities are objective or universally agreed. If instead lotteries are interpreted as such
things as Anscombe-Aumann or Savage acts, we obtain a framework in which individuals can apparently
have differing subjective probabilities. But a number of results suggest that the gain in generality is
illusory: strong Pareto plus a version of subjective expected utility for all the preorders implies that the
subjective probabilities must be identical.91 This seems to show that Harsanyi-style social aggregation
is not possible for individuals whose subjective probabilities disagree.92 These results do not assume
interpersonal comparisons, but parallel difficulties will emerge if and when they are introduced.
In either case, one well-known reaction is to conclude that uncertainty should first be given a single
representation before social aggregation takes place.93 Such a representation could have many interpreta-
tions, such as expert consensus, social consensus, or the view of the social planner (compare section 2.1).
It could fall far short of being a single probability measure. But as illustrated in Examples 2.10 and
2.11, our aggregation theorems can still cope.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Some Lemmas. We first collect together a few basic results about probability measures to which we
will frequently appeal.
Lemma A.1. Let p be a probability measure on a measurable space Y , and let A1, . . . , Am and B1, . . . , Bn
be measurable subsets of Y . Suppose that each y ∈ Y appears the same number of times in the sets Ai
as in the Bi. Then
m∑
i=1
p(Ai) =
n∑
i=1
p(Bi).
Proof. Writing χAi and χBi for the characteristic functions of Ai and Bi, we have
∑m
i=1 p(Ai) =∫
Y
(
∑m
i=1 χAi) dp and
∑n
i=1 p(Bi) =
∫
Y
(
∑n
i=1 χBi) dp. By hypothesis, for each y ∈ Y ,
(∑m
i=1 χAi)(y) =(∑n
i=1 χBi)(y). The two integrands are therefore identical. 
Lemma A.2. Let X and Y be measurable spaces. Let f : X → Y be a measurable function, and let µ
be a nonnegative measure on X. Then µ ◦ f−1 is a measure on Y . Moreover, suppose g : Y → R is
integrable with respect to µ ◦ f−1. Then g ◦ f is integrable with respect to µ, and one has∫
Y
g d(µ ◦ f−1) =
∫
X
g ◦ f dµ.
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Proof. The proof that µ ◦ f−1 is a measure is routine. For the second claim, we spell out a remark
Bogachev (2007) makes after his Theorem 3.6.1. Since g is (µ ◦ f−1)-integrable, it agrees with some
measurable function G on some set of (µ ◦ f−1)-measure 1 (see note 46). Bogachev’s Theorem 3.6.1
shows that G ◦ f is integrable with respect to µ and that∫
Y
Gd(µ ◦ f−1) =
∫
X
G ◦ f dµ.
However, g ◦ f agrees with G ◦ f on a set of µ-measure 1; therefore g ◦ f is integrable with respect to µ,
and replacing G by g in the displayed equation does not change the value of either side. 
The following two lemmas concern the notion of ‘support’ introduced in footnote 32.
Lemma A.3. Let p be a probability measure on a measurable space Y , and let A be a subset of Y . The
following conditions are equivalent:
(1) The measure p is supported on A, in the sense that p(B) = 0 whenever B ⊂ Y is measurable
and disjoint from A.
(2) If B1, B2 ⊂ Y are measurable and B1 ∩A = B2 ∩A, then p(B1) = p(B2).
Proof. Suppose p is supported on A. Suppose B1 ∩A = B2 ∩A. Then p(B1) = p(B1 ∩B2) + p(B1 \B2).
B1 \B2 is disjoint from A. So p(B1) = p(B1 ∩B2); this equals p(B2) by parallel reasoning. Conversely,
suppose p(B1) = p(B2) whenever B1 ∩A = B2 ∩A. Then, if B is disjoint from A, p(B) = p(∅) = 0. 
The following lemma shows that any finitely supported probability measure can be written as a convex
combination of delta-measures, regardless of whether singletons are measurable.
Lemma A.4. Let p be a probability measure on a measurable space Y . Then p is finitely supported (i.e.
supported on a finite set) if and only if p =
∑n
i=1 αi1yi for some n ≥ 1, some distinct y1, . . . , yn ∈ Y ,
and some α1, . . . , an > 0 with
∑n
i=1 αi = 1. Moreover, if the sigma algebra on Y separates points,
94 then
the yi and αi are uniquely determined (up to re-ordering).
Proof. The right to left direction is obvious: if p is a weighted sum of delta-measures then it is supported
on the set of points occuring in the sum. For the left to right, suppose p is supported on a finite set
of n elements, S = {y1, . . . , yn}. We can assume n is as small as possible. Now, suppose that every
measurable set containing a given yi also contains some distinct yj ; then p is in fact supported on
S \ {yj}, contradicting the minimality of n. We can therefore find measurable sets A1, . . . , An such that
Ai ∩S = {yi}, and by excising the intersections of these sets, we can ensure that they are disjoint. Note
that each p(Ai) 6= 0 by the minimality of n. We claim that p =
∑n
i=1 p(Ai)1yi . To see this, note that
(by Lemma A.3) two measurable sets have the same measure with respect to p if they contain the same
elements of S; therefore, for any measurable A,
p(A) = p
( ⋃
yi∈A∩S
Ai
)
=
∑
yi∈A∩S
p(Ai) =
n∑
i=1
p(Ai)1yi(A).
Of course,
∑n
i=1 p(Ai) = p(Y ) = 1.
As to the uniqueness claim, suppose that p =
∑n
i=1 αi1yi can also be written as
∑m
i=1 βi1xi , with
the xi mutually distinct, the yi mutually distinct, and all αi, βi > 0. It suffices to show that each yj is
equal to some xk, and that αj = βk. By the hypothesis that the sigma algebra separates points, we can
find a measurable set Bj whose intersection with {y1, . . . , yn, x1, . . . , xm} is precisely {yj}. Thus, from
the second expression for p, p(Bj) = 0 unless yj is equal to some xk, in which case p(Bj) = βk. But
from the first expression p(Bj) = αj > 0. This shows that some xk must equal yj , and then βk = αj , as
claimed. 
94I.e. for all y, y′ ∈ Y , there is a measurable set containing y but not y′.
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Section 2.
Proof of Proposition 2.4. Suppose that % is generated by %P . Suppose that L(B) = L′(B) for every
measurable and permutation-invariant B ⊂ D. We want to show L ∼ L′. Suppose given measurable
A ⊂W. We can write
(10)
#I · pL(A) =
∑
i∈I
Pi(L)(A)
=
∑
i∈I
L(Wi−1(A)) =
#I∑
n=1
L
 ⋃
I⊂I
#I=n
⋂
i∈I
Wi−1(A)
.
The first equation is from the definition of pL, the second from the definition of Pi, and the last equation
is a direct application of Lemma A.1. (Note that if a distribution is an element of the argument of L in
exactly k terms of the left-hand sum, then it also an element of the argument of L in exactly k terms of
the right-hand sum, namely those with n = 1, 2, . . . , k.) On the right hand side, all arguments of L are
permutation-invariant. We therefore find that
#I · pL(A) = #I · pL′(A)
for arbitrary measurable A. Hence pL = pL′ . Since %P generates %, we must have L ∼ L′, as required.

Section 3.
Proof of Lemma 3.3. For (i), suppose given L ∈ LvI and i ∈ I∞ \ I. Let A be measurable in Wv with
Ω ∈ A. Then DvI ⊂ (Wvi )−1(A), hence Pvi (L)(A) = L((Wvi )−1(A)) = 1. Since this is true for every such
A, we must have Pvi (L) = 1Ω. Since Lv is nonempty, and hence by (D) some LvI is nonempty, by (A)
we must have 1Ω ∈ Pv.
For (ii), for any finite I, we have dΩ = DvI (Ω) ∈ Dv. Now invoke assumption (B).
For (iii), we have LvI (1Ω) ∈ Lv, and we claim that LvI (1Ω) = 1dΩ . Indeed, for any measurable
B ⊂ Dv with dΩ ∈ B, we have Ω ∈ (DvI )−1(B). Therefore LvI (1Ω)(B) = 1Ω((DvI )−1(B)) = 1, as desired.
Moreover, for any measurable A ⊂Wv with Ω ∈ A, we have, for any i ∈ I∞, dΩ ∈ (Wvi )−1(A). Therefore
Pvi (1dΩ)(A) = 1dΩ((Wvi )−1(A)) = 1. Therefore Pvi (1dΩ) = 1Ω.
For (iv), suppose we have L ∈ LvI , and Pvi (L) = 1Ω for all i ∈ I∞. Then L((Wvi )−1(W)) =
Pvi (L)(W) = 0 for all i. (Note that W is measurable in Wv, being the complement of {Ω}, which
is measurable by hypothesis.) Defining B :=
⋃
i∈I(Wvi )−1(W), we must have L(B) = 0. Suppose given
measurable B′ ⊂ Dv with dΩ /∈ B′. We have B′ ∩ DvI ⊂ B ∩ DvI , so B′ ∩ DvI = B′ ∩ B ∩ DvI . Since L is
supported on DvI , Lemma A.3 gives L(B′) = L(B′ ∩B) ≤ L(B), so L(B′) = 0. Therefore L = 1dΩ . 
Lemma A.5. Suppose given a tuple (I∞,Wv,Pv,Dv,Lv) satisfying the variable population domain con-
ditions (A)–(D), and let F denote the sigma algebra on Dv. Then F is contained in a sigma algebra F
such that (a) F is coherent; (b) every L ∈ Lv extends naturally to a probability measure L with respect
to F ; (c) if we write Dv for Dv equipped with the sigma algebra F , and Lv := {L : L ∈ Lv}, then
(I∞,Wv,Pv,Dv,Lv) again satisfies the domain conditions (A)–(D).
Proof. Define F by the rule that B ⊂ Dv is in F if and only if, for every finite I ⊂ I∞, there exists some
B ∈ F such that B ∩DvI = B ∩DvI . It is easy to check that F is a coherent sigma algebra containing F ,
and the restriction of F to each DvI ⊂ Dv is the same as the restriction of F .
Given L ∈ Lv, we can extend L to a probability measure L on F : if L ∈ LvI , then, for B and B related
as above, L(B) := L(B). To see that L(B) is independent of the choice of I and B, use Lemma A.3.
It remains to verify that the domain conditions (A)–(D) are satisfied. For (A), it is obvious that each
Wvi is measurable with respect to F , since F contains F . For clarity, let us retain the notation Pvi for
the map from Lv to prospects defined in terms of F , and write Pvi for analogous map on Lv defined in
terms of F . Then Pvi (L) = L ◦ (Wvi )−1 = L ◦ (Wvi )−1 = Pvi (L), which shows that Pvi (Lv) ⊂ Pv.
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For (B), each DvI is measurable with respect to F : we have (DvI )−1(B) = (DvI )−1(B), for B,B
related as above, showing that (DvI )−1(B) is measurable in Wv. Again distinguishing LvI : Pv → Lv
defined in terms of F from the map LvI defined in terms of F , we find LvI (P )(B) = P ((DvI )−1(B)) =
P ((DvI )−1(B)) = LvI (P )(B). This shows that LvI (P ) = LvI (P ) ∈ Lv, so LvI (Pv) ⊂ Lv.
For (C), given σ ∈ Σ∞ and B ∈ F , we can find B ∈ F with B ∩DvσI = B ∩DvσI. Then (σ−1B)∩DvI =
(σ−1B)∩DvI . Since this holds for any I, σ−1B is in F , and the action of Σ∞ is measurable with respect
to F . Moreover, for L ∈ LvI , we find σL(B) = L(σ−1B) = L(σ−1B) = σL(B) = σL(B), so Lv is
Σ∞-invariant.
Finally, for (D), it is easy to check that, given L ∈ LvI , we have also L ∈ LvI . 
Proof of Proposition 3.8. Suppose that %v is generated by %Pv . Suppose that L(B) = L′(B) for
every measurable and Σ∞-invariant B ⊂ Dv. We want to show L ∼v L′. Pick finite non-empty
I ⊂ I∞ such that L,L′ ∈ LvI . It suffices to show that pIL = pIL′ . Now, for any measurable A′ ⊂ Wv,
pIL(A
′) = 1− pIL(Wv \A′). Since either Ω /∈ A′ or Ω /∈Wv \A′, it suffices to show that pIL(A) = pIL′(A)
for every measurable A ⊂Wv such that Ω /∈ A.
For each number n, 1 ≤ n ≤ #I, let Bn be the set of distributions in which at least n individuals
have welfare states in A; and, for any finite population J, let BJn be the set of distributions in which at
least n individuals in J have welfare states in A. That is:
Bn :=
⋃
I⊂I∞
#I=n
⋂
i∈I
(Wvi )−1(A) BJn :=
⋃
I⊂J
#I=n
⋂
i∈I
(Wvi )−1(A).
Each set BJn is measurable in Dv (since the Wvi are measurable functions, and we take finitely many
intersections and unions); therefore BJn∩DvJ is measurable in DvJ (since its sigma algebra is the restriction
of the one on Dv). Given the assumption that Ω /∈ A, we have Bn∩DvJ = BJn∩DvJ . Therefore, if the sigma
algebra on Dv is coherent, Bn is also measurable in Dv. If, instead of coherence, we assume that I∞ is
countable, then the definition of Bn involves only countable unions and finite intersections of measurable
sets, so Bn is again measurable.
In exact parallel to (10) in the proof of Proposition 2.4, we have
#I · pIL(A) =
∑
i∈I
Pvi (A) =
∑
i∈I
L((Wvi )−1(A)) =
#I∑
n=1
L(BIn)
again using Lemma A.1 for the last equation. Now, because L is supported on DvI , and, for each n,
BIn ∩ DvI = Bn ∩ DvI , Lemma A.3 gives L(BIn) = L(Bn). Therefore #I · pIL(A) =
∑#I
n=1 L(Bn), and
similarly #I · pIL′(A) =
∑#I
n=1 L
′(Bn).
Now since each set Bn is Σ
∞-invariant, L(Bn) = L′(Bn). Therefore pIL(A) = p
I
L′(A), establishing
Posterior Anonymity. 
The following lemma is used in the proof of Proposition 3.10. Preordered vector spaces are defined
in section 4.2.
Lemma A.6. Every preorder has a representation with values in a preordered vector space.
Proof. The following construction is inspired by Conrad (1953); see McCarthy et al (2017a: Thm. 11)
for an alternative. Suppose %X is a preorder on a set X. Set X := X/∼X , and for x ∈ X let x be its
class in X. There is a partial order %X on X defined by x %X y ⇐⇒ x %X y. Let V be the vector
space of functions f : X → R such that supp(f) := {x ∈ X : f(x) 6= 0} satisfies the ascending chain
condition, i.e. every nonempty subset has a %X -maximal element. Define a relation %V on V by the
rule that f %V g ⇐⇒ f(x) > g(x) for all x maximal in supp(f − g). This makes %V into a preordered
vector space; the only non-trivial claim to prove is that %V is transitive.
Suppose, for this, that f %V g %V h. We want to show that, given x maximal in Xfh := supp(f − h),
we have (f −h)(x) > 0. Now, (f −h)(x) = (f −g)(x)+(g−h)(x), so at least one of the latter two terms
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must be non-zero. Correspondingly, x is in Xfg ∪ Xgh. This union also satisfies the ascending chain
condition, so we can find y maximal in {y ∈ Xfg ∪Xgh : y %X x}. This y is automatically maximal in
Xfg ∪Xgh. So if y is in Xfg, it must be maximal there, and (f − g)(y) > 0; if y is in Xgh, it must be
maximal there, and (g− h)(y) > 0; therefore, either way, (f − h)(y) = (f − g)(y) + (g− h)(y) > 0. Thus
y ∈ Xfh. Since x is maximal in Xfh, and y %X x, and %X is a partial order, we must actually have
x = y, and (f − h)(x) > 0. Therefore %V is transitive.
Finally, consider the function that maps x ∈ X to the characteristic function of {x}; this is a repre-
sentation of %X with values in V. 
Proof of Proposition 3.10. (i) Applying Lemma A.6 toX = PΩ, we have a representation U : PΩ → V
of %PΩ , for some preordered vector space (V,%V). Since P
v extends P, each member of Pv can be written
in the form Pα := αP + (1− α)1Ω for some P ∈ P, α ∈ [0, 1]. This presentation is unique except when
α = 0. Define a function U : Pv → V by the rule
U(Pα) = αU(P ) + (1− α)U(1Ω).
Let %Pv be the preorder on Pv represented by U . We claim that %Pv is Omega Independent and extends
%PΩ .
For all P ∈ PΩ, U(P ) = U(P ), so %Pv extends %PΩ . To show that %Pv satisfies Omega Independence,
suppose given P , P ′ ∈ Pv and α ∈ (0, 1) ∩ Q. We wish to show that P %Pv P ′ ⇐⇒ Pα %Pv P ′α. We
have P = Qβ and P
′ = Q′γ for some Q, Q
′ ∈ P, β, γ ∈ [0, 1]. Then Pα = Qαβ and P ′α = Q′αγ . Thus:
P %Pv P ′ ⇐⇒ U(P ) %V U(P ′)
⇐⇒ βU(Q) + (1− β)U(1Ω) %V γU(Q′) + (1− γ)U(1Ω)
⇐⇒ αβU(Q) + (1− αβ)U(1Ω) %V αγU(Q′) + (1− αγ)U(1Ω)
⇐⇒ U(Pα) %V U(P ′α)
⇐⇒ Pα %Pv P ′α
Here the third line is obtained from the second by applying the order-preserving transformation of V
given by v 7→ αv + (1− α)U(1Ω). This establishes that %Pv is Omega Independent and extends %PΩ .
(ii) Given %PΩ , there is a unique preorder %Pv on P
v that extends %PΩ and satisfies the following
property: for any P,Q ∈ P and α, β ∈ (0, 1),
Pα Pv Q and Pα Pv 1Ω and Pα ∼Pv Qβ .
In other words, elements of Pv not in PΩ are ranked as equals above all elements of PΩ. This %Pv does
not satisfy Omega Independence: for P,Q ∈ P, α, β ∈ (0, 1) as before, we have αP + (1−α)1Ω = Pα %Pv
Qαβ = αQβ + (1 − α)1Ω, but we do not have P %Pv Qβ as Omega Independence requires for rational
values of α. 
Section 4.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. For (i), we present only the variable population case, the constant popula-
tion case being exactly parallel. The general strategy is to use the assumption that %Pv generates %v as
follows. We use it directly to derive each condition on %v from the same condition on %Pv ; conversely,
we use Reduction to Prospects (which holds by Theorem 3.6) to derive the condition on %Pv from the
condition on %v. Moreover, we can use the fact that the maps L 7→ pIL and P 7→ LvI (P ) are mixture
preserving (in the sense of note 27). The arguments for the different conditions are very similar, so we
only present the proof for (I3), or strong independence. Recall that for a preorder %X on a convex set
X, (I3) is equivalent to the condition
p %X p′ if and only if αp+ (1− α)q %X αp′ + (1− α)q for all p, p′, q ∈ X, α ∈ (0, 1).
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Suppose first that %Pv satisfies (I3). Suppose given L, L′, M ∈ Lv, α ∈ (0, 1). There is some finite,
nonempty I ⊂ I∞ with L, L′, M ∈ LvI . Then
L %v L′ ⇐⇒ pIL %Pv pIL′ (%Pv generates %v)
⇐⇒ αpIL + (1− α)pIM %Pv αpIL′ + (1− α)pIM ((I3) for %Pv)
⇐⇒ pIαL+(1−α)M %Pv pIαL′+(1−α)M (L 7→ pIL is mixture preserving)
⇐⇒ αL+ (1− α)M %v αL′ + (1− α)M (%Pv generates %v).
Therefore %v satisfies (I3), as claimed. Conversely, suppose %v satisfies (I3), and suppose given P,Q,R ∈
Pv. Then
P %Pv Q ⇐⇒ LvI (P ) %v LvI (Q) (Reduction to Prospects)
⇐⇒ αLvI (P ) + (1− α)LvI (R) %v αLvI (Q) + (1− α)LvI (R) ((I3) for %v)
⇐⇒ LvI (αP + (1− α)R) %v LvI (αQ+ (1− α)R) (LvI is mixture preserving)
⇐⇒ αP + (1− α)R %Pv αP + (1− α)R (Reduction to Prospects).
So (I3) for %v implies (I3) for %Pv .
Now let us turn to part (ii) of the proposition, beginning with the constant population case. First
a general observation. Suppose given topological spaces X,Y with preorders %X ,%Y , and a function
f : X → Y . Assume (1) that f is continuous, and (2) that for all a, b ∈ X, a %X b ⇐⇒ f(a) %Y f(b).
Then, we claim, if %Y is continuous, so is %X . Indeed, for any q ∈ X, we find
{p ∈ X : p %X q} = {p ∈ X : f(p) %Y f(q)} = f−1{y ∈ Y : y %Y f(q)}.
The right-hand side is the inverse image of a closed set under a continuous function, so it is closed. A
similar calculation shows that {p ∈ X : q %X p} is closed; hence %X is continuous.
Taking f = L : P → L, assumption (1) in the previous paragraph is part of (Top), and assumption (2)
follows from Reduction to Prospects, which itself follows by Theorem 2.2 from the hypothesis that %P
generates %. We conclude that, if % is continuous, so is %P . Conversely, define f : L → P by f(L) = pL.
Assumption (1) follows from the continuity of mixing and of every Pi, whereas (2) is part of what it
means for % to be generated by %P . We conclude that, if %P is continuous, so is %.
As for the variable population case, let %vI be the restriction of %v to LvI , and equip the latter with a
topology as a subspace of Lv. It suffices to prove two claims: first, that %Pv is continuous on Pv if and
only if %vI is continuous on LvI , for every finite I ⊂ I∞; second, that the latter holds if and only if %v is
continuous on Lv.
The first claim follows from the logic just used for the constant population case. As for the second
claim, suppose (from right to left) that %v is continuous on Lv. By definition of %vI , for any M ∈ LvI ,
{L ∈ LvI : L %vI M} = {L ∈ Lv : L %v M} ∩ LvI . Since %v is continuous, {L ∈ Lv : L %v M} is closed in
Lv, and since LvI has the subspace topology, this intersection is closed in LvI . A similar argument shows
{L ∈ LvI : M %vI L} is closed in LvI as well. Therefore %vI is continuous. For left to right, it suffices
to show that, for any L0 ∈ Lv, the set X = {L ∈ Lv : L %v L0} is closed in Lv (and similarly that
{L ∈ Lv : L0 %v L} is closed). By topological coherence, it is enough to show that X ∩ LvI is closed
in LvI , for every finite I. Pick finite J such that L0 is in LvJ , and let K = I ∪ J, so L0 is also in LvK.
Then X ∩ LvK is closed in LvK, by continuity of %vK. That means there is some closed V ⊂ Lv such that
V ∩ LvK = X ∩ LvK. But then X ∩ LvI = V ∩ LvI is closed in LvI , as desired. 
Proof of Lemma 4.3. We first check that %X satisfies (I3) if it satisfies Vector EUT, that is, if it has
a Vector EU representation U with respect to some preordered vector space (V,%V) and separating set
A of linear functionals on V. The main point is that U is mixture preserving; as defined in note 27, this
means that U(αp+ (1−α)q) = αU(p) + (1−α)U(q) for p, q ∈ P(Y ), α ∈ [0, 1]. This is just the linearity
of the integral; in detail, for any Λ ∈ A we have Λ(αU(p)+(1−α)U(q)) = αΛ(U(p))+(1−α)Λ(U(q)) =
α
∫
Y
Λ ◦ udp+ (1− α) ∫
Y
Λ ◦ udq = ∫
Y
Λ ◦ ud(αp+ (1− α)q) = Λ(U(αp+ (1− α)q)). Since this works
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for any Λ in the separating set A, we obtain the mixture preservation equation. Now, to derive (I3), for
p, p′, q ∈ P(Y ) and α ∈ (0, 1),
p %X p′ ⇐⇒ U(p) %V U(p′)
⇐⇒ αU(p) + (1− α)U(q) %V αU(p′) + (1− α)U(q)
⇐⇒ U(αp+ (1− α)q) %V U(αp′ + (1− α)q)
⇐⇒ αp+ (1− α)q %X αp′ + (1− α)q.
The first and last biconditionals hold because U is a representation of %X . The second biconditional is
immediate from the definition of ‘preordered vector space’, and the third follows from the fact that U is
mixture preserving.
Conversely, suppose that %X satisfies (I3). Let V be the vector space of finite signed measures on Y
(it is the span of the set of probability measures). For each measurable A ⊂ Y , define FA : V → R by
FA(p) = p(A). Let A be the set of all such FA. Then A is a separating set of linear functionals on V.
Let U be the inclusion of P (Y ) into V. Define u : Y → V by u(y) = 1y. For each FA ∈ A, FA ◦u is the
characteristic function of A. Therefore, for each p ∈ P (Y ), we have ∫
Y
FA ◦ udp = p(A) = FA ◦ U(p).
Therefore, u is weakly P (Y )-integrable (with respect to A) and ∫
Y
udp = U(p). It only remains to
define a linear preorder on V making U into a representation of %X .
Define C ⊂ V by C := {λ(q − q′) : λ > 0; q, q′ ∈ P (Y ); q %X q′}. Define a binary relation %V on
V by v %V v′ ⇐⇒ v − v′ ∈ C. It is well known, and easy to check, that this construction makes V
into a preordered vector space. The only non-trivial claim is that %V is transitive, which follows from
%X satisfying (I3). Indeed, suppose that v %V v′ %V v′′. We can then write v − v′ = λ1(q1 − q′1)
and v′ − v′′ = λ2(q2 − q′2) for some λ1, λ2 > 0, q1 %X q′1, and q2 %X q′2. Setting α = λ1/(λ1 + λ2),
straightforward rearrangement shows
v − v′′ = (v − v′) + (v′ − v′′) = 2(λ1 + λ2)
[(
αq1 + (1− α)q2
2
+
αq′1 + (1− α)q′2
2
)
− (αq′1 + (1− α)q′2)].
Now two applications of (I3) show q3 := αq1 + (1− α)q2 %X αq′1 + (1− α)q2 %X αq′1 + (1− α)q′2 =: q′3,
and another application shows q4 := q3/2 + q
′
3/2 %X q′3. However, the displayed equation says v − v′′ =
2(λ1 + λ2)(q4 − q′3), so v − v′′ is in C, so v %V v′′.
Finally, we check that U is a representation of %X . Since U is the inclusion of P (Y ) into V, the
claim is just that p %X p′ ⇐⇒ p %V p′. First, p %X p′ =⇒ p − p′ ∈ C =⇒ p %V p′. Conversely,
suppose p %V p′. Then there must be λ > 0 and q, q′ ∈ P (Y ) with q %X q′ and p− p′ = λ(q − q′). Let
α := 11+λ . Then αp+(1−α)q′ = αp′+(1−α)q. This, together with the fact that %X satisfies (I3), yields
q %X q′ =⇒ αp′ + (1− α)q %X αp′ + (1− α)q′ =⇒ αp+ (1− α)q′ %X αp′ + (1− α)q′ =⇒ p %X p′,
as desired. 
Proof of Theorem 4.4. Part (i) follows from Proposition 4.2 and Lemma 4.3. However, a more explicit
argument is useful. Suppose given a Vector EU representation U of %P . Then the formula in part (ii)
will define a Vector EU representation of % (and similarly for part (iii) in the variable population case).
Note that the representation V has values in the same space as U . Just before Lemma 4.3, we explained
how both ordinary and Multi EU representations can be identified with Vector EU representations
whose value spaces V have certain forms. So with these identifications in mind, if U is an ordinary EU
representation, V will be one too, and if U is a Multi EU representation, so is V . Conversely, given
a Vector EU representation V of %, with V (L) =
∫
D v dL, we claim that U := V ◦ L is a Vector EU
representation of %P . (And similarly in the variable population case: if V v is a Vector EU representation
of %v, then any V v ◦ LvI is a Vector EU representation of %Pv .) That this U is a representation follows
from Reduction to Prospects, which holds by Theorem 2.2. To see that it is expectational, consider any
Λ ∈ A. Using, in turn, the definition of U , the definition of the weak integral, the definition of L, and
Lemma A.2, we find
Λ ◦ U(P ) = Λ ◦ V ◦ L(P ) =
∫
D
Λ ◦ v dL(P ) =
∫
D
Λ ◦ v d(P ◦ D−1) =
∫
W
Λv ◦ D dP.
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By definition of the weak integral, we find that U(P ) =
∫
W v ◦ D dP , showing that U is expectational.
Again, since U has values in the same space as the given V , if V is (up to identification) either an
ordinary EU representation or a Multi EU representation, then so is U .
The proofs of parts (ii) and (iii) are parallel, so we present only the variable population case, part
(iii). We begin with a general observation. Suppose that %Pv is represented by a function Uv : Pv → V,
where (V,%V) is a preordered vector space, normalized so that Uv(1Ω) = 0. Suppose that Uv is mixture
preserving. (As defined in note 27, this means that Uv(αP + (1− α)P ′) = αUv(P ) + (1− α)Uv(P ′) for
P, P ′ ∈ Pv, α ∈ (0, 1).) For L,L′ ∈ LvI , we have
(11)
L %v L′ ⇐⇒ pIL %V pIL′ (%Pv generates %v)
⇐⇒ Uv(pIL) %V Uv(pIL′) (Uv represents %Pv)
⇐⇒ 1#I
∑
i∈I U
v(Pvi (L)) %V 1#I
∑
i∈I U
v(Pvi (L′)) (Uv is mixture preserving)
⇐⇒ ∑i∈I∞ Uv(Pvi (L)) %V ∑i∈I∞ Uv(Pvi (L′)).
The last line incorporates two moves: multiplying both sides of the previous line by #I (this is an
order-preserving transformation of V) and then extending the sum from I to I∞: by Lemma 3.3(i), the
additional terms are all zero.
Suppose now that %Pv satisfies Vector EUT with respect to some (V,%V,A). Let Uv : Pv → V provide
a Vector EU representation, so that Uv(P ) =
∫
Wv udP . By adding a constant to U
v, we may assume
Uv(1Ω) = 0. As shown in the proof of Lemma 4.3, U
v is mixture preserving. From (11) we therefore
find that %v is represented by the function L 7→∑i∈I∞ Uv(Pvi (L)) = ∑i∈I∞ ∫Wv udPvi (L).
To establish part (iii) of the theorem, the only thing left to prove is the identity
∑
i∈I∞
∫
Wv
udPvi (L) =
∫
Dv
∑
i∈I∞
(u ◦Wvi ) dL
stated in the definition of V v(L). Again, each sum over i ∈ I∞ can be replaced by a finite sum over
i ∈ I. Considering each i ∈ I separately, we are reduced to proving
(12)
∫
Wv
udPvi =
∫
Dv
u ◦Wvi dL.
For any Λ ∈ A, Lemma A.2 above yields∫
Wv
Λ ◦ udPvi (L) =
∫
Wv
Λ ◦ ud(L ◦ (Wvi )−1) =
∫
Dv
Λ ◦ u ◦Wvi dL.
Equation (12) then follows from the definition of the V-valued integral. 
Proof of Proposition 4.8. We will treat the constant and variable population cases simultaneously.
In either case, the equivalence between (IQi ) for the individual preorder and (I
Q
i ) for the social preorder
(or preorders) follows from Proposition 4.2. So it remains to show that (Si) ⇐⇒ (IQi ) ⇐⇒ (Pi) for
i = 1, 2, 3, where (IQi ) is understood as a condition on %P∗ .
We first argue that (Si) ⇐= (IQi ) =⇒ (Pi) for i = 1, 2, 3. It will be sufficient to show that
(Si) ⇐= [(IQa )&(IQi )] =⇒ (Pi) for i = a,b, c. So suppose we have (IQa ) and (IQi ). Let the symbol 
stand for ∼, , or uprise, corresponding to i = a,b, c. We claim
(D1) The antecedent of each of (Si) and (Pi) implies p
K
L ∼P∗ pKL′ .
(D2) The antecedent of each of (Si) and (Pi) implies p
J
L P∗ pJL′ .
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Granted (D1) and (D2), we can deduce pIL P∗ pIL′ by assuming the antecedent of either (Si) or (Pi):
pIL =
#J
#I p
J
L +
#K
#I p
K
L
∼P∗ #J#I pJL + #K#I pKL′ (IQa ) and (D1)
P∗ #J#I pJL′ + #K#I pKL′ (IQi ) and (D2)
= pIL′
Since %P∗ generates %∗I , we find L ∗I L′, validating both (Si) and (Pi). It remains to prove (D1) and
(D2).
Suppose the antecedent of (Si) is satisfied, so that L|K ∼∗K L′|K. Then pKL = pKL|K ∼P∗ pKL′|K = pKL′ , as
claimed by (D1). Similar reasoning shows pJL = p
J
L|J P∗ p
J
L′|J = p
J
L′ , as claimed by (D2).
Suppose instead that the antecedent of (Pi) is satisfied, so that L ≈KP∗ L′. This means that P∗k (L) ∼P∗
P∗k (L′) for all k ∈ K. We obtain pKL ∼P∗ pKL′ , as claimed by (D1), by repeatedly applying (IQa ). If i = a or
i = b, then pJL P∗ pJL′ follows by a similar method. The case i = c is slightly more complicated. Choose
any j ∈ J. Since P∗k (L) ∼P∗ P∗j (L) for any other k ∈ J, we can deduce pJL ∼P∗ P∗j (L) by repeatedly
applying (IQa ). Similarly, p
J
L′ ∼P∗ P∗j (L′). Since P∗j (L)upriseP∗ P∗j (L′), we obtain pJLupriseP∗ pJL′ , completing the
proof of (D2).
We now argue that (Si) =⇒ (IQi ) ⇐= (Pi) for i = 1, 2, 3, and indeed for each of i = a,b, c. Suppose
given p, p′, q ∈ P∗ and α ∈ (0, 1) ∩Q. Let P := αp+ (1− α)q, P ′ := αp′ + (1− α)q. It suffices to show
that, given i ∈ {a,b, c}, each of (Si) and (Pi) implies the conditional p P∗ p′ =⇒ P P∗ P ′.
Let J, K ⊂ I∞ be finite with J ∩K = ∅ such that #J#K = α1−α . Let I := J ∪K.
We first specialize to the case of a family F of constant population models. Given the hypothesis
that F is compositional, we can find L,L′ ∈ LI such that Pj(L) = p and Pj(L′) = p′ for all j ∈ J,
and Pk(L) = Pk(L′) = q for all k ∈ K. Then pIL = P and pIL′ = P ′, while pJL = p, pJL′ = p′, and
pKL = p
K
L′ = q. We claim that the antecedent of each of (Pi) and (Si) holds if and only if p P p′; for (Pi)
this is immediate, while for (Si) it holds because %P generates %J and %K. In addition, the consequent
of each of (Pi) and (Si) holds if and only if P P P ′; this follows from the fact that %P generates %I.
Therefore, as we wanted to show, each of (Si) and (Pi) yields the implication p P p′ =⇒ P P P ′.
Turning now to a variable population model M, we can argue in a similar way, but now defining
L := 12LvJ (p) + 12LvK(q) and L′ := 12LvJ (p′) + 12LvK(q). In this case, Pvj (L) = 12p + 121Ω = pJL and
Pvj (L′) = 12p′ + 121Ω = pJL′ for all j ∈ J, and Pvk (L) = Pvk (L′) = 12q + 121Ω = pKL = pKL′ for all k ∈ K;
moreover, pIL =
1
2P +
1
21Ω and p
I
L′ =
1
2P
′ + 121Ω. As before, the antecedent of each of (Pi) and (Si)
holds if and only if p Pv p′; this now uses Omega Independence. In addition, the consequent of each of
(Pi) and (Si) holds if and only if P Pv P ′; this also uses Omega Independence. Therefore, as we wanted
to show, each of (Si) and (Pi) yields the implication p Pv p′ =⇒ P Pv P ′. 
Proof of Lemma 4.9. The proof is exactly the same as the proof of Lemma 4.3, with ‘(I3)’ replaced by
‘(IQ3 )’, ‘Vector EU’ replaced by ‘Rational Vector EU’, ‘preordered vector space’ replaced by ‘Q-preordered
vector space’, ‘linear preorder’ replaced by ‘Q-linear preorder’, and the coefficients α, λ, λ1, λ2 restricted
to rational numbers throughout. 
Proof of Theorem 4.10. We consider the variable population case, the constant population case being
parallel. For part (iii) of the theorem, Full Pareto implies Anteriority and Reduction to Prospects as
special cases. So, by the aggregation Theorem 3.6, Full Pareto and Two-Stage Anonymity imply that
%Pv generates %v. Indeed, this shows that Full Pareto and Two-Stage Anonymity hold if and only if
Full Pareto holds and %Pv generates %v. By Proposition 4.8, therefore, Full Pareto and Two-Stage
Anonymity hold if and only if %Pv satisfies (IQ3 ) and generates %v. Appealing to Lemma 4.9, we find
that, as claimed, Full Pareto and Two-Stage Anonymity hold if and only if %Pv has a Rational Vector
EU representation and generates %v.
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The proof of part (iv) of the theorem, giving a total utility representation of %v, is exactly parallel
to the proof of Theorem 4.4(iii). 
Section 5.
Proof of Theorem 5.2. Suppose we establish statement (i) of the theorem, that %v satisfies (M) if
and only if %Pv has an EU representation. The explicit form for V v in statement (ii) was derived in
Theorem 4.4. As for statement (iii), preorders with EU representations satisfy (I3) (by Lemma 4.3),
while (P3) and (S3) follow easily from the total expected utility form of V
v. (The assumption that
restrictions exist is required for (S3) to make sense.)
So it remains to establish statement (i). Suppose first that %Pv has an EU representation. By
Theorem 4.4, %v also has an EU representation V v and in particular satisfies (Comp). Suppose lottery
L stochastically dominates L′. By Lemma A.4 we can write both L and L′ as convex combinations of
delta-measures: L =
∑m
i=1 αi1di and L
′ =
∑n
i=1 α
′
i1d′i with each αi, α
′
i ∈ (0, 1] and di, d′i ∈ Dv. By
(Comp), we can assume 1d1 %v · · · %v 1dm and 1d′1 %v · · · %v 1d′n ; recombining terms as necessary, we
can assume m = n and each αi = α
′
i. Stochastic dominance then means that the first sum dominates
the second term-wise, i.e. 1di %v 1d′i , so V
v(1di) ≥ V v(1d′i). But then V v(L) =
∑n
i=1 αiV
v(1di) ≥∑n
i=1 αiV
v(1d′i) = V
v(L′). Therefore L %v L′, and we find that %v satisfies (M).
For the converse, suppose that %v satisfies (M). In Steps 1–5 below, we show that %Pv satisfies
(I3), and then in Step 6 use this to construct an EU representation. Suppose given P,Q,R ∈ Pv and
α ∈ (0, 1). Write [P,R] for the mixture αP + (1− α)R. To establish (I3) for %Pv , we want to show that
P %Pv Q ⇐⇒ [P,R] %Pv [Q,R].
Step 1. According to Lemma A.4, we can write P and Q as convex combinations of delta-measures.
Suppose for a first step that the coefficients of these delta-measures are rational numbers. It follows
that, for some common denominator N , any population I of size N , and some vi, wi ∈Wv, we can write
P =
1
N
∑
i∈I
1vi Q =
1
N
∑
i∈I
1wi .
By hypothesis there exists some dP ∈ DvI with Wvi (dP ) = vi for all i ∈ I, and therefore a lottery
LP := 1dP with p
I
LP
= P . Similarly for Q.
Since, by hypothesis, %Pv is complete, either P %Pv Q or Q %Pv P ; since %Pv generates %v, this means
that either LP %v LQ or LQ %v LP . Since LP and LQ are delta-measures, [LP ,LvI (R)] stochastically
dominates [LQ,LvI (R)] if LP %v LQ, and vice versa if LQ %v LP . Applying (M), we find
[LP ,LvI (R)] %v [LQ,LvI (R)] ⇐⇒ LP %v LQ.
Now, pI[LP ,LvI (R)] = [P,R] and p
I
[LQ,LvI (R)] = [Q,R], and we already have p
I
LP
= P and pILQ = Q. Since
%Pv generates %v, these equations yield in addition the first and third biconditionals:
[P,R] %Pv [Q,R] ⇐⇒ [LP ,LvI (R)] %v [LQ,LvI (R)] ⇐⇒ LP %v LQ ⇐⇒ P %Pv Q.
This establishes (I3) for %Pv under the restriction that P and Q have rational coefficients.
Step 2. Suppose now that P,Q are general—that is, they are arbitrary finitely supported prospects.
In this step, we show as a preliminary that %Pv is upper-measurable and satisfies (M). If x is any welfare
state, then
(13) Ux := {y ∈Wv : 1y %Pv 1x} = (DvI )−1({d ∈ Dv : 1d %v 1DvI (x)}) = (DvI )−1(UDvI (x))
for any finite non-empty population I. Here we use Reduction to Prospects, which follows from the fact
that %v is generated by %Pv . Since %v is upper-measurable by hypothesis, equation (13) presents Ux as
the inverse image of a measurable set by a measurable function; therefore Ux is measurable, and %Pv is
upper-measurable.
To show that %Pv satisfies (M), suppose that P %SDPv Q. We have to show that P %Pv Q, and that if
P SDPv Q then P Pv Q.
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Let I ⊂ I∞ be finite and nonempty. First, we claim that LvI (P ) stochastically dominates LvI (Q). If
so, it follows from (M) for %v that LvI (P ) %v LvI (Q), and by Reduction to Prospects that P %Pv Q, as
desired. Since %v is upper-measurable, the claim is that LvI (P )(Ud) ≥ LvI (Q)(Ud) for all d ∈ Dv. Fix d.
By definition of LvI , LvI (P )(Ud) = P (A) where
A := (DvI )−1(Ud) = {w ∈Wv : 1DvI (w) %v 1d}.
Similarly, LvI (Q)(Ud) = Q(A). The claim, then, is that P (A) ≥ Q(A). To show this, let SQ be a finite
set supporting Q. If SQ ∩ A = ∅, then Q(A) = 0, so P (A) ≥ Q(A) as claimed. Otherwise, since %Pv
is complete, there is a minimal element s of SQ ∩ A, in the sense that w ∈ SQ ∩ A =⇒ 1w %Pv 1s.
Now, if 1w %Pv 1s, then, by Reduction to Prospects, 1DvI (w) %
v 1DvI (s) %
v 1d; this shows that Us ⊂ A.
Therefore P (A) ≥ P (Us); since P %SDPv Q, P (Us) ≥ Q(Us); and since Us ∩ SQ = A ∩ SQ, Lemma A.3
gives Q(Us) = Q(A). Therefore P (A) ≥ Q(A), as claimed. So we conclude that LvI (P ) stochastically
dominates LvI (Q) and P %Pv Q.
Now suppose that, more strongly, P SDPv Q. That is, P %SDPv Q but P (Ux) > Q(Ux) for some x ∈Wv.
By (13) and the definition of LvI , we find LvI (P )(UDvI (x)) > LvI (Q)(UDvI (x)). The previous argument
showed that LvI (P ) stochastically dominates LvI (Q); this strict inequality shows that the domination is
strict, i.e. LvI (Q) does not stochastically dominate LvI (P ). By (M) for %v, this means LvI (P ) v LvI (Q),
and by Reduction to Prospects, P Pv Q. This establishes (M) for %Pv .
Step 3. Now we claim we can find a sequence (Pi) in Pv strongly converging to P such that each
Pi has rational coefficients and stochastically dominates P . To see this, using Lemma A.4 write P as a
sum of delta-measures, P = α11v1 + · · · + αn1vn . Since by hypothesis %Pv is complete, we can assume
1v1 %Pv 1v2 %Pv · · · %Pv 1vn . In the simplest case, n = 1, and then we can take Pi := P for all i.
For n > 1, let P ′ be the prospect P ′ = α11−αn 1v1 + · · · +
αn−1
1−αn 1vn−1 , so that P = (1 − αn)P ′ + αn1vn .
By induction on n, we can find a sequence (P ′i ) of prospects with rational values, each stochastically
dominating P ′, strongly converging to P ′. Let (βi) be a sequence from [0, 1] ∩ Q approaching αn from
below. Then it is easy to check that the sequence of prospects given by Pi := (1− βi)P ′i + βi1vn has the
required properties.
Step 4. By a similar construction, we can find a sequence (Qi) strongly converging to Q such that
each Qi has rational values and Q stochastically dominates each Qi.
Step 5. Since, as we proved in Step 2, %Pv satisfies (M), Pi %Pv P and Q %Pv Qi. Using this, the
result for rational-coefficient prospects in Step 1, and strong continuity (applied once for Pi
s−→ P and a
second time for Qi
s−→ Q), we have
P %Pv Q =⇒ ∀ij.Pi %Pv Qj ⇐⇒ ∀ij.[Pi, R] %Pv [Qj , R] =⇒ [P,R] %Pv [Q,R].
To complete the derivation of (I3), it suffices to show that the first and last implications displayed are
reversible. For the first one, strong continuity yields ∀ij.Pi %Pv Qj =⇒ P %Pv Q. For the last one,
for each i, [Pi, R] stochastically dominates [P,R], so, by (M), [Pi, R] %Pv [P,R]. Similarly, for any j,
[Q,R] stochastically dominates [Qj , R], so [Q,R] %Pv [Qj , R]. Therefore, if [P,R] %Pv [Q,R], we must
also have [Pi, R] %Pv [Qj , R] for any i, j. This establishes (I3).
Step 6. It remains to show that %Pv has an EU representation. We first show that %Pv satisfies
(MC). Suppose that β is a limit point of {α ∈ [0, 1] : αP + (1− α)R %Pv Q}. Then there is a sequence
(βn) in [0, 1] converging to β with βnP + (1− βn)R %Pv Q. It is clear that βnP + (1− βn)R converges
strongly to βP + (1 − β)R, so by strong continuity, βP + (1 − β)R %Pv Q, implying that {α ∈ [0, 1] :
αP + (1− α)R %Pv Q} is closed. A similar argument shows that {α ∈ [0, 1] : Q %Pv αP + (1− α)R} is
closed. Therefore %Pv satisfies (MC).
Given that %Pv satisfies (I3), (MC), and (Comp), the main result of Herstein and Milnor (1953:
Theorem 8) is that %Pv has a mixture-preserving representation Uv : Pv → R. Set u(y) = Uv(1y) for
any y ∈ Wv. We want to show that, for any P ∈ Pv, Uv(P ) = ∫Wv udP . We can again use Lemma
A.4 to write P in the form P =
∑
αi1vi . Since U
v is mixture preserving, we have Uv(P ) =
∑
αiu(vi).
It remains to show that u(vi) =
∫
Wv ud1vi , which is automatic if u is measurable. To show that u is
measurable, it suffices to show that Ax := u
−1([x,∞)) is a measurable subset of Wv, for all x ∈ R. First,
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if u(v) < x for all v ∈ Wv, then Ax = ∅ is measurable. Second, if {u(w) : w ∈ Wv, u(w) ≥ x} has a
minimal element u(w), then Ax is the upper set Uw, and so is measurable since (as proved in Step 2) %Pv
is upper-measurable. Otherwise, choose a sequence (wi) in Wv with u(wi) ≥ x and u(wi) converging to
inf{u(w) : w ∈ Wv, u(w) ≥ x}. Then Ax is the countable union of the upper sets Uwi , and therefore
measurable. 
Proof of Lemma 5.4. Let U : P(Y )→ R. Suppose first that U is integrally Gaˆteaux differentiable at
p ∈ P(Y ). In other words, there exists some vp ∈ ∇Up. We claim that there is at least one up ∈ ∇Up
satisfying
(14) U(p) =
∫
Y
up dp.
Using the fact that P(Y ) consists of probability measures, it is easy to check that ∇Up is closed under
the addition of constant functions; thus up := vp + U(p) −
∫
Y
vp dp is also in ∇Up. By integrating
both sides with respect to p, we find that up satisfies (14). We conclude that U is integrally Gaˆteaux
differentiable at p ∈ P(Y ) if and only if there exists up ∈ ∇Up satisfying (14). To prove the lemma, it
remains to show that up is in ∇Up, and satisfies (14), if and only if it is a local utility function for U at
p, in the sense of satisfying (5).
Suppose given any up ∈ ∇Up satisfying (14). Being in ∇Up means that U ′p(q− p) =
∫
Y
up d(q− p) for
all q ∈ P(Y ). By definition of U ′p(q − p), this is equivalent to
(15) U(p+ t(q − p)) = U(p) + t
∫
Y
up d(q − p) + o(t) as t→ 0+.
Using (14), we obtain equation (5).
Conversely, suppose up satisfies (5) for all q ∈ P(Y ). Putting t→ 0+ in (5), we recover (14). Together,
(5) and (14) entail (15). As in the previous paragraph, (15) means that up is in ∇Up. 
Proof of Theorem 5.5. For the right to left direction of part (i) of the theorem, suppose that %
satisfies Local EUT. In particular, suppose that V : L → R represents % and is locally expectational on
L. Since %P generates %, Reduction to Prospects holds, by the aggregation theorem 2.2. It follows that
U := V ◦ L is a representation of %P .
It remains to show that U is locally expectational. Fix P ∈ P. By Lemma 5.4, V is integrally
Gaˆteaux differentiable at L(P ); that is, ∇VL(P ) 6= ∅. Since the map P 7→ L(P ) is mixture-preserving,
L(P + t(Q−P )) = L(P )+ t(L(Q)−L(P )), so U(P + t(Q−P )) = V (L(P )+ t(L(Q)−L(P ))). Applying
the definition (6) of the Gaˆteaux derivative, we find
(16) U ′P (Q− P ) = V ′L(P )(L(Q)− L(P )).
Thus U is Gaˆteaux differentiable at P . Now fix vP ∈ ∇VL(P ). For any Q ∈ P, vP is integrable with
respect to L(Q) = Q ◦ D−1. By Lemma A.2, vP ◦ D is integrable with respect to Q, for any Q, and is
hence P-integrable. Lemma A.2 also gives∫
D
vP dL(Q) =
∫
W
vP ◦ D dQ.
Combining this with (16) we find
U ′P (Q− P ) = V ′L(P )(L(Q)− L(P )) =
∫
D
vP d(L(Q)− L(P )) =
∫
W
vP ◦ D d(Q− P ).
Thus U is integrally Gaˆteaux differentiable at P . By Lemma 5.4, U is locally expectational at P , as
claimed.
Conversely, suppose %P satisfies Local EUT, with a Local EU representation U : P (Y ) → R. Note
that #IU also represents %P . Since %P generates %, % is therefore represented by
L 7→ V (L) := #IU(pL).
We want to show that V is locally expectational.
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Fix L ∈ L. By Lemma 5.4, U is integrally Gaˆteaux differentiable at pL; that is, ∇UpL 6= ∅.
Since the map L 7→ pL is mixture-preserving, pL+t(M−L) = pL + t(pM − pL), so V (L + t(M − L)) =
#IU(pL + t(pM − pL). Applying the definition (6) of the Gaˆteaux derivative, we find
(17) V ′L(M − L) = #IU ′pL(pM − pL).
Thus V is Gaˆteaux differentiable at L.
Fix uL ∈ ∇UpL . For any M ∈ L and i ∈ I, uL is integrable with respect to Pi(M) = M ◦ Wi−1.
Using Lemma A.2, we find that uL ◦Wi is integrable with respect to M , implying that
∑
i∈I uL ◦Wi is
L-integrable, and also that
(18) #I
∫
W
uL dpM =
∫
W
∑
i∈I
uL d(Pi(M)) =
∫
D
∑
i∈I
uL ◦Wi dM.
Combining this with (17), we find
V ′L(M − L) = #IU ′pL(pM − pL) = #I
∫
W
uL d(pM − pL) =
∫
D
∑
i∈I
uL ◦Wi d(M − L)
so V is integrally Gaˆteaux differentiable at L, with
∑
i∈I uL ◦ Wi ∈ ∇VL. By Lemma 5.4, V is locally
expectational at L. This establishes the left-to-right direction in part (i) of the theorem, and indeed
establishes the more specific claim of part (ii).
For part (iii), suppose that uL is a local utility function for U at pL. By Lemma 5.4, this means uL ∈
∇UpL and U(pL) =
∫
W uL dpL. We then have V (L) = #IU(pL) = #I
∫
W uL dpL =
∫
D
∑
i∈I uL ◦ Wi dL,
using (18) at the last step. Using Lemma 5.4 again, we find that
∑
i∈I uL ◦Wi is a local utility function
for V at L. 
The next result is used in the proofs of Lemma 5.6 and Theorem 5.7. Recall the notation Pα :=
αP + (1− α)1Ω for any P ∈ Pv and α ∈ [0, 1].
Lemma A.7. Suppose Uv : Pv → R is Omega-linear. Fix P,Q ∈ Pv and suppose that there is a Pv-
integrable function uv such that
(19) (Uv)′P (Q− P ) =
∫
Wv
uv d(Q− P ) and (Uv)′P (1Ω − P ) =
∫
Wv
uv d(1Ω − P ).
Then, for any α ∈ (0, 1] and β ∈ [0, 1], we have
(Uv)′Pα(Qβ − Pα) =
∫
Wv
uv d(Qβ − Pα).
Proof. We first show that
(20) (Uv)′Pα(Qβ − Pα) = β(Uv)′P (Q− P ) + (β − α)(Uv(P )− Uv(1Ω))
given that, by hypothesis, the derivative on the right-hand side exists.
Suppose first that β = 0. This reduces (20) to
(21) (Uv)′Pα(1Ω − Pα) = −α(Uv(P )− Uv(1Ω)),
which follows from a direct calculation of the Gaˆteaux derivative (6) using Omega-linearity of Uv.
Suppose instead that β > 0. Set f(t) := Uv(Pα + t(Qβ −Pα)), for t ∈ [0, 1). Set x(t) = βtα+t(β−α) and
R(t) := P +x(t)(Q−P ). Since x(t) approaches 0 from above as t approaches 0 from above, R(t) is in Pv
for all t small enough. Moreover, a straightforward calculation shows Pα + t(Qβ − Pα) = R(t)α+t(β−α).
Therefore, by Omega-linearity (8),
f(t) = Uv(R(t)α+t(β−α)) = (α+ t(β − α))Uv(R(t)) + (1− (α+ t(β − α)))Uv(1Ω).
By definition, (Uv)′Pα(Qβ − Pα) is the partial derivative ∂+f(t)t=0, and by elementary calculus
(Uv)′Pα(Qβ − Pα) = ∂+f(t)|t=0 = α∂+Uv(R(t))|t=0 + (β − α)Uv(R(0))− (β − α)Uv(1Ω).
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Noting that R(0) = P , and comparing this with (20), it remains to establish
(22) α∂+U
v(R(t))|t=0 = β(Uv)′P (Q− P ).
This is essentially just an application of the chain rule. To work it out in this unfamiliar setting,
∂+U
v(R(t))|t=0 = lim
t→0+
Uv(R(t))−Uv(R(0))
t = lim
t→0+
Uv(R(t))−Uv(R(0))
x(t) · x(t)t = (Uv)′P (Q− P ) · x′(0).
The last equation follows from the definition of (Uv)′P and the fact that x(t) → 0+ as t → 0+. Since
x′(0) = β/α, we obtain (22). This concludes the proof of (20).
Now we calculate:∫
Wv
ud(Qβ − Pα) =
∫
Wv
ud(Qβ − Pβ) +
∫
Wv
ud(Pβ − Pα)
=
∫
Wv
ud(βQ− βP ) +
∫
Wv
ud((β − α)P − (β − α)1Ω)
= β
∫
Wv
ud(Q− P ) + (β − α)
∫
Wv
ud(P − 1Ω)
= β(Uv)′P (Q− P )− (β − α)(Uv)′P (1Ω − P )
applying the hypotheses of this lemma to obtain the last line. By (21) with α = 1 we have (Uv)′P (1Ω −
P ) = −(Uv(P )− Uv(1Ω)). Therefore we have found∫
Wv
ud(Qβ − Pα) = β(Uv)′P (Q− P ) + (β − α)(Uv(P )− Uv(1Ω)).
And, according to (20), this equals (Uv)′Pα(Qβ − Pα), as desired. 
Proof of Lemma 5.6. For part (i), since Pv extends P, every element of Pv is of the form Pα :=
αP + (1 − α)1Ω for some P ∈ P and α ∈ [0, 1]. This presentation is unique except when α = 0, so
we may define Uv(Pα) = αU(P ) + (1 − α)c. Then Uv is the unique Omega-linear extension of U that
satisfies Uv(1Ω) = c.
For part (ii), suppose that U is locally expectational on P. We want to prove that Uv as defined
above is locally expectational at Pα, for each P ∈ P and α ∈ (0, 1].
By Lemma 5.4, there is some u in ∇UP with
∫
W udP = U(P ). Extend it to u
v : Wv → R by setting
uv(Ω) = c. We first show that uv is Pv-integrable. Since Pv extends P, W is measurable in Wv,
with Q(W) = 1 for any Q ∈ P; therefore uv is Q-integrable, with ∫Wv uv dQ = ∫W uv dQ = ∫W udQ.
Similarly, {Ω} is measurable and ∫Wv uv d1Ω = uv(Ω) = c. Together this shows that uv is Pv-integrable,
and specifically that for any Q ∈ P and β ∈ [0, 1], ∫Wv uv dQβ = β ∫W udQ+ (1− β)c.
We now fix Q ∈ P and verify the hypotheses (19) of Lemma A.7. Since Uv extends U , and since u is
a local utility function for U at P , we have
(Uv)′P (Q− P ) = U ′P (Q− P ) =
∫
W
ud(Q− P ) =
∫
Wv
uv d(Q− P ).
Next, the definition (6) of the Gaˆteaux derivative and Omega-linearity yield
(Uv)′P (1Ω − P ) = lim
t→0+
Uv((1− t)P + t1Ω)− Uv(P )
t
= Uv(1Ω)− Uv(P ).
Given that Uv(1Ω) = c =
∫
Wv u
v d1Ω and U
v(P ) = U(P ) =
∫
W udP =
∫
Wv u
v dP , we conclude
(Uv)′P (1Ω − P ) =
∫
Wv
uv d(1Ω − P ).
Applying Lemma A.7 we find that, for any β ∈ [0, 1],
(Uv)′Pα(Qβ − Pα) =
∫
Wv
uv d(Qβ − Pα).
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This shows that Uv is integrally Gateaux differentiable at Pα. By Lemma 5.4 it is locally expectational
at Pα, as desired. 
Proof of Theorem 5.7. We first prove the right-to-left direction of part (i) of the theorem. Suppose
we are given an dΩ-linear function V
v : Lv → R that is locally expectational on Lv \ {1dΩ}. Fix finite,
nonempty I ⊂ I∞. We can now follow the proof of the right to left direction of Theorem 5.5(i), with
variable population objects replacing constant population ones. That is, essentially the same argument
shows that Uv = V v ◦ LvI is a representation of %Pv ; that, for P,Q ∈ Pv with P 6= 1Ω, we have
(Uv)′P (Q− P ) = (V v)′LvI (P )(L
v
I (Q) − LvI (P )) in analogy with (16); and that, for any vvP ∈ ∇V vLvI (P ), we
have
(Uv)′P (Q− P ) =
∫
Wv
vvP ◦ DvI d(Q− P ).
Therefore Uv is integrally Gaˆteaux differentiable on Pv \ {1Ω}, and so by Lemma 5.4 it is locally expec-
tational there, as desired.
To complete the right-to-left direction of part (i), it remains to show that Uv is Omega-linear. Since
the map P 7→ LvI (P ) is mixture preserving, we find that for any P ∈ Pv and α ∈ [0, 1], Uv(αP +
(1 − α)P ) = V v(αLvI (P ) + (1 − α)LvI (1Ω)). Since LvI (1Ω) = 1dΩ , and V v is dΩ-linear, this equals
αV v(LvI (P )) + (1 − α)V v(LvI (1Ω)). By definition of Uv, this equals αUv(P ) + (1 − α)Uv(1Ω), so Uv is
Omega-linear, as desired.
Conversely, for the left-to-right direction of part (i), suppose Uv : Pv → R is an Omega-linear repre-
sentation of %Pv that is locally expectational on Pv \ {1Ω}. For L ∈ LvI , define
V v(L) := #IUv(pIL)−#IUv(1Ω)
as in part (ii) of the theorem. We first show that V v represents %v. Since %Pv generates %v, and Uv is
a representation of %Pv , we have, for L,L′ ∈ LvI ,
L %v L′ ⇐⇒ Uv(pIL) ≥ Uv(pIL′) ⇐⇒ #IUv(pIL)−#IU(1Ω) ≥ #IUv(pIL′)−#IUv(1Ω)
as desired.
Next we show that V v is dΩ-linear. We have to show that, for L ∈ LvI and α ∈ [0, 1], V v(αL +
(1 − α)1dΩ) = αV v(L) + (1 − α)V v(1dΩ). Note first that V v(1dΩ) = 0, so we need to show that
V v(αL+ (1− α)1dΩ) = αV v(L). But
V v(αL+ (1− α)1dΩ) = #IUv(αpIL + (1− α)pI1dΩ )−#IU
v(1Ω)
= α#IUv(pIL) + (1− α)#IUv(1Ω)−#IUv(1Ω)) = αV v(L).
The first step uses the definition of V v and the fact that the map L 7→ pIL is mixture preserving; the
second step uses the fact that pI1dΩ = 1Ω and the Omega-linearity of U
v.
To complete the proof of the left-to-right direction of part (i) of the theorem, as well as proving
part (ii), we need to show that V v is locally expectational at each L ∈ Lv \ {1dΩ}. Fix such an L for
the remainder of the proof, and I ⊂ I∞ such that L ∈ LvI . Note that, by Lemma 5.4, Uv is integrally
Gaˆteaux differentiable on Pv \ {1Ω}, and it suffices to show that V v is integrally Gaˆteaux differentiable
at L.
We first show that V v is Gaˆteaux differentiable at L; that is, for any M ∈ Lv, the Gaˆteaux derivative
(V v)′L(M − L) exists. We can find J ⊃ I such that both L and M are in LvJ . Note that since L is in
Lv \ {1dΩ}, pJL is in Pv \ {1Ω}, and therefore Uv is integrally Gaˆteaux-differentiable at pJL. Now, we
have V v(L+ t(M −L)) = #JUv(pJL + t(pJM − pJL))−#JUv(1Ω). Applying the definition of the Gaˆteaux
derivative, we find that V v is Gaˆteaux differentiable at L, and in particular,
(23) (V v)′L(M − L) = #J(Uv)′pJL(p
J
M − pJL).
We now show that V v is integrally Gaˆteaux differentiable at L. Since Uv is integrally Gaˆteaux-
differentiable at pIL, we may pick uL ∈ ∇UvpIL . By the variable population domain assumption (D) in
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section 3.1,
f :=
∑
i∈I∞
(uL ◦Wvi − uL(Ω))
is a well-defined function on Dv. To show that V v is integrally Gaˆteaux differentiable at L, we show
specifically that f ∈ ∇V vL .
As a preliminary, let us show that f is Lv-integrable, i.e. integrable against an arbitrary M ∈ Lv.
Choose nonempty, finite J ⊂ I∞ with M ∈ LvJ . Enlarging J if necessary, we can assume that Pvi (M) = 1Ω
for some i ∈ J (using Lemma 3.3(i)). For any finite K ⊂ I∞, define fK :=
∑
i∈K(uL ◦ Wvi − uL(Ω)).
In parallel to the derivation of (18) in the proof of Theorem 5.5, uL is integrable with respect to
Pvi (M) = M ◦ (Wvi )−1. Using Lemma A.2, uL ◦Wvi is integrable with respect to M , and moreover∫
Dv
uL ◦Wvi dM =
∫
Wv
uL dPvi (M).
This implies that fJ is integrable with respect to M , and specifically∫
Dv
fJ dM = #J
∫
Wv
(uL − uL(Ω)) dpJM .
We claim that f coincides with fJ on a set of M -measure 1, and is therefore M -integrable with the same
integral.
Since uL is p
J
M -integrable, there is a measurable function uL on Wv that equals uL on a set A ⊂Wv
of measure 1 with respect to pJM (see note 46). By the definition of p
J
M , this A must have measure 1 with
respect to each Pvi (M), i ∈ J. In particular, A has measure 1 with respect to 1Ω, so we have Ω ∈ A.
Define f, fK by the same formulae as f, fK, but using uL instead of uL. Then fK, the sum of
measurable functions, is itself measurable. Note that f |DvK = fK|DvK . Therefore, for any measurable
C ⊂ R, (f)−1(C) ∩ DvK = (fK)−1(C) ∩ DvK, showing that (f)−1(C) ∩ DvK is measurable in DvK. Since
this works for every K, we conclude from coherence that (f)−1(C) is measurable. Therefore f is a
measurable function. Since they are both measurable functions, the set B1 ⊂ Dv on which f and f J
coincide is measurable. B1 clearly includes DvJ , on which M is supported, so B1 has M -measure 1.
Now consider the set B2 =
⋂
i∈I∞(Wvi )−1(A). Using that fact that Ω ∈ A, we see that, for each
K ⊂ I∞, we have B2 ∩ DvK =
⋂
i∈K(Wvi )−1(A) ∩ DvK. This is the intersection of DvK with a measurable
set. Therefore B2 ∩DvK is measurable in DvK, for any K. So, by coherence, B2 is measurable. Since M is
supported on DvJ , Lemma A.3 also gives us M(B2) = M(
⋂
i∈J(Wvi )−1(A)). Moreover, M((Wvi )−1(A)) =
Pvi (M)(A) = 1 for i ∈ J; therefore M(B2) = 1. Finally, since uL|A = uL|A, we have f |B2 = f |B2 and
f J|B2 = fJ|B2 . Combining these equalities with the fact that f |B1 = f J|B1 , we find that f |B1∩B2 =
f |B1∩B2 = f J|B1∩B2 = fJ|B1∩B2 . That is, as claimed, f coincides with fJ on B1 ∩ B2, a measurable set
of M -measure 1. In summary, f is Lv-integrable, with
(24)
∫
Dv
f dM = #J
∫
Wv
(uL − uL(Ω)) dpJM .
Now, given arbitrary M ∈ Lv, we can again choose J ⊃ I with L,M ∈ LvJ , and Uv is integrally
Gaˆteaux differentiable at pJL. Note that p
J
L is a mixture of p
I
L and 1Ω. We now apply Lemma A.7, with
P := pIL, Pα := p
J
L, any Q ∈ Pv, β := 1, and uv := uL. The hypotheses (19) hold because uL was chosen
from ∇Uv
pIL
, and the conclusion is that this same uL is also in ∇UvpJL .
Since ∇Uv
pJL
is closed under the addition of constant functions, uL − uL(Ω) ∈ ∇UvpJL . Combining this
fact with equations (23) and (24) above, we find
(V v)′L(M − L) = #J(Uv)′pJL(p
J
M − pJL) = #J
∫
Wv
(uL − uL(Ω)) d(pJM − pJL) =
∫
Dv
f d(M − L).
This shows f ∈ ∇V vL , establishing part (ii) of the theorem, and the left to right direction of part (i).
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For part (iii) of the theorem, suppose that uL is a local utility function for U
v at pIL, and that
Uv(1Ω) = 0. We first verify that uL(Ω) = 0. By definition of integral Gaˆteaux differentiability,
lim
t→0+
Uv(pIL + t(1Ω − pIL))− Uv(pIL)
t
= (Uv)′pIL(1Ω − p
I
L) =
∫
Wv
uLd(1Ω − pIL).
Since Uv is Omega-linear, the left-hand side simplifies to −Uv(pIL), whereas, using Lemma 5.4, the
right-hand side simplifies to uL(Ω)− Uv(pIL). Hence uL(Ω) = 0.
Taking this into account, the final claim of the theorem is that our f is a local utility function for V v
at L. Since we have already shown f ∈ ∇V vL , it is enough by Lemma 5.4 to prove that
∫
Dv f dL = V
v(L).
Moreover, since by hypothesis Uv(1Ω) = 0, the definition of V
v reduces to V v(L) = #IUv(pIL).
By equation (24), putting M := L, we have
∫
Dv f dL = #J
∫
Wv uL dp
J
L. Here we cannot simply
replace J by I, because the derivation of (24) was premised on a large enough choice of J. However,
pJL =
#I
#Jp
I
L +
#J−#I
#J 1Ω, so we find
∫
Dv f dL = #I
∫
Wv uL dp
I
L + (#J−#I)
∫
Wv uL d1Ω. Since uL(Ω) = 0,
the last term vanishes, whereas Lemma 5.4 shows that
∫
Wv uL dp
I
L = U
v(pIL). Therefore
∫
Dv f dL =
#IUv(pIL) as desired. 
Section 6.
Proof of Proposition 6.1. The proof of (i) is an easy version of the proof of (ii), so we present only
the latter.
Suppose that %v0 is consistent with quasi utilitarianism, and specifically corresponds to an individual
preorder %Pv . For any finite, non-empty I ⊂ I∞ and d ∈ DvI , define pId := 1#I
∑
i∈I 1Wvi (d). Thus for
d, d′ ∈ DvI , we have d %v0 d′ iff pId %Pv pId′ . Suppose that c ∈ Dv is an m-scaling of d ∈ DvI , and that s
is a corresponding m-to-1 map. Then it is easy to see that pId = p
s−1(I)
c . Now, given d, d′ ∈ DvI , their
m-scalings c, c′, and corresponding m-to-1 maps s, s′, we can, by applying a permutation to c, ensure
that s−1(I) = (s′)−1(I) =: J. Since then c and c′ are in DvJ , we have
c %v0 c′ ⇐⇒ pJc %Pv pJc′ ⇐⇒ pId %Pv pId′ ⇐⇒ d %v0 d′.
Therefore %v0 satisfies Scale Invariance.
Conversely, suppose that %v0 satisfies Scale Invariance; we need to define a corresponding individual
preorder. We first show that Pv contains the set Pv0 of convex combinations of delta-measures on Wv
with rational coefficients. For any w ∈ Wv and finite, nonempty I ⊂ I∞, Lv contains 1DvI (w): for by
variable population domain condition (B) we have DvI (w) ∈ Dv, and by hypothesis in section 6.1, Lv
contains 1d for every d ∈ Dv. So by the domain condition (A), Pv contains 1w; since Pv is convex, it
contains Pv0.
For any w, w′ ∈Wv, the sigma algebra on Dv separates DvI (w) and DvI (w′) by assumption, and since
DvI is measurable, the sigma algebra on Wv separates w and w′. By Lemma A.4, the representation of
members of Pv0 by convex combinations of delta-measures is essentially unique: any p ∈ Pv0 is the sum
of a unique finite set of delta-measures with non-zero coefficients, and these (rational) coefficients are
uniquely determined. We will use this to first define a preorder on Pv0 and then extend it to a preorder
on Pv.
Choose a sequence of populations I1 ⊂ I2 ⊂ . . . such that #In = n. For any p ∈ Pv0, there is some
n > 0 and d ∈ DvIn such that p = pInd . In this case say that d is a realization of p at n. More specifically,
for any p ∈ Pv0, let N(p) be the least common denominator of the rational coefficients appearing in p.
Then p has a realization at n if and only if n is a multiple of N(p). Moreover, any realization of p at,
say, mN(p) is an m-scaling of any realization of p at N(p).
For any pair p, p′ ∈ Pv0, let N(p, p′) be the least common multiple of N(p) and N(p′): p and p′ both
have realizations at n if and only if n is a multiple of N(p, p′). Let I(p, p′) be the set of all such multiples.
The scale-invariance of %v0 yields the following observation. If d, d′ are realizations of p, p′ at m ∈ I(p, p′),
and c, c′ are realizations of p, p′ at n ∈ I(p, p′), then d %v0 d′ if and only if c %v0 c′.
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This allows us to define %Pv0 on Pv0 as follows:
p %Pv0 p
′ ⇐⇒ for some (therefore any) n ∈ I(p, p
′), there are
realizations d, d′ of p, p′ at n with d %v0 d′.
This is a preorder. In particular it is transitive, since, given p, p′, p′′ ∈ Pv0, we can consider realizations
d, d′, d′′ of p, p′, p′′ at some common n. If p %Pv0 p′ %Pv0 p′′ then we must have d %v0 d′ %v0 d′′. Since %0 is
transitive, d %0 d′′, and therefore p %Pv0 p′′.
Let us also check that %Pv0 satisfies Omega Independence. Suppose given p, p′ ∈ Pv0, and m/n =: α ∈
(0, 1) ∩ Q. Then realizations of p, p′ at N(p, p′)m are elements of DvIN(p,p′)m ; considered as elements of
the larger set DvIN(p,p′)n , they are also realizations of αp + (1 − α)1Ω and αp′ + (1 − α)1Ω at N(p, p′)n.
It follows that p %Pv0 p′ if and only if αp+ (1− α)1Ω %Pv0 αp′ + (1− α)1Ω, as desired.
We now extend %Pv0 to a preorder %Pv on Pv. Here is a construction that works in general (of course,
in any given case there may be more natural ways to do it).
p %Pv p′ ⇐⇒
{
p, p′ ∈ Pv0 and p %Pv0 p′, or
p = p′.
Then %Pv is a preorder on Pv which satisfies Omega Independence. (Here we rely on the fact that
Omega Independence only quantifies over rational values of α.) Let %v be the social preorder on Lv it
generates. Then, for any finite non-empty set I ⊂ I∞ such that d and d′ are in DvI , d %v0 d′ ⇐⇒ pId %Pv
pId′ ⇐⇒ pI1d %Pv pI1d′ ⇐⇒ 1d %v 1d′ . This shows that %v0 is consistent with the quasi utilitarian
preorder %v. 
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